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Abstract
This thesis deals with two main matters of modern public key cryptography: provable
security and efficient implementation.
Indubitably, security is the most important property of any cryptographic scheme.
Nevertheless, cryptographic algorithms have often been designed on a trial-and-error ba-
sis, i. e., a system has been regarded as secure as long as it withstood cryptanalytic attacks.
In contrast, the provable security approach provides rigorous mathematical proofs within
well-defined models. Nowadays, provable security is a key requirement for many applica-
tions.
The main contribution of the first part of this thesis is the development and analysis of
new provably secure trapdoor one-way permutations. (Trapdoor) one-way functions are
the cardinal primitives in public key cryptography, as they are utilized as building blocks
for numerous kinds of cryptographic protocols. For this reason, and because of the small
number of promising candidates known today, the invention of new trapdoor one-way func-
tions is of interest on its own. However, to prove the practical relevance of our proposal,
we additionally invent several provably secure applications in the range of homomorphic
encryption, fail-stop signature schemes, hybrid encryption, and trapdoor commitments.
In the second part of this work, we will turn our attention to the efficient implemen-
tation of public key algorithms. Besides security, efficiency is the main criterion when
evaluating cryptographic schemes because inefficient cryptosystems are of little practical
value. In widely-used hand-held devices with scarce resources, cryptosystems based on
elliptic curve point groups are the first choice today. Consequently, it is an active area
of research to enhance the efficiency of elliptic curve scalar multiplication, which is the
most common operation in these cryptosystems. Our contribution here is located in the
field of multiplication methods with low memory requirements. We will introduce an algo-
rithm which is as efficient as the state-of-the-art solution, but which significantly reduces
the consumption of working memory. Moreover, we will develop a highly flexible variant
which can be adapted to the exact amount of available storage. Therefore, the algorithms
presented here are especially useful in connection with limited-constraint devices such as
smart-cards.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit zwei der wichtigsten Aspekte beim Entwurf von Public-
Key Kryptosystemen: Beweisbare Sicherheit und Effizienz.
Es steht außer Frage, dass Sicherheit eine unverzichtbare Eigenschaft jeder kryp-
tographischen Anwendung ist. Nichtsdestotrotz vertrauten die Entwickler kryptographi-
scher Verfahren lange Zeit der Methode von Versuch-und-Irrtum, d.h. ein Verfahren galt
so lange als sicher, bis erfolgreiche Kryptanalyse eine Schwa¨che offenbarte. Im Gegensatz
dazu bedient sich der Ansatz beweisbarer Sicherheit strenger mathematischer Beweise in
wohldefinierten Sicherheitsmodellen. Heutzutage gilt beweisbare Sicherheit in vielen Berei-
chen als eine Standardforderung an ein Kryptosystem.
Den Hauptbeitrag des ersten Teils dieser Arbeit bildet die Entwicklung und Analyse
von neuen beweisbar sicheren Falltu¨r-Einweg-Permutationen. (Falltu¨r-)Einweg-Funktionen
sind das wichtigste Primitiv in der Public-Key-Kryptographie, denn sie bilden den Haupt-
baustein fu¨r zahlreiche kryptographische Anwendungen. Aus diesem Grunde, und nicht
zuletzt weil nur a¨ußerst wenige geeignete Kandidaten bekannt sind, ist die Entwicklung
neuer (Falltu¨r-)Einweg-Funktionen bereits fu¨r sich genommen von gro¨ßtem Interesse. Um
jedoch auch den praktischen Nutzen der vorgeschlagenen Konstruktionen unter Beweis
zu stellen, werden beweisbar sichere Anwendungen aus den Bereichen homomorphe Ver-
schlu¨sselung, Fail-Stop Signaturen, hybride Verschlu¨sselung und Falltu¨r-Hinterlegungsver-
fahren vorgestellt und analysiert.
Der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit widmet sich der effizienten Implementierung von Algorith-
men der Public-Key-Kryptographie. Neben der Sicherheit ist die Effizienz das Hauptbewer-
tungsmerkmal kryptographischer Verfahren, denn ineffiziente Algorithmen sind unbrauch-
bar fu¨r praktische Anwendungen. In den heute weit verbreiteten mobilen Endgera¨ten mit
beschra¨nktem Speicherplatz sind Elliptische-Kurven-Kryptosysteme aufgrund ihrer mod-
eraten Schlu¨ssella¨ngen die erste Wahl. Die ha¨ufigste Operation dieser Kryptosysteme ist
die Skalarmultiplikation, daher ist die Entwicklung von Verfahren zu deren Beschleuni-
gung ein vielbeachtetes Forschungsgebiet. Die vorliegende Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich speziell
mit Multiplikations-Algorithmen, die geringe Anforderungen an den Speicherplatz stellen.
Es wird ein neuer Algorithms entworfen, der ebenso effizient ist wie die “state-of-the-
art” Lo¨sung, allerdings bei signifikant geringerem Speicherbedarf. Desweiteren wird eine
Variante dieses Algorithmus entwickelt, die exakt an den zur Verfu¨gung stehenden Spe-
icherplatz angepasst werden kann, so dass keine wertvollen Ressourcen verschwendet wer-
den mu¨ssen. Die vorgestellten Verfahren erweisen sich also als besonders nu¨tzlich fu¨r die
Implementierung auf speicherbeschra¨nkten Medien wie Smart-Cards.
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Chapter 1
Preface
”No one has yet discovered any warlike purpose to be served by the theory of numbers
or relativity, and it seems very unlikely that anyone will do so for many years.”
G.H. Hardy, The Mathematician’s Apology, 1940.
For centuries cryptography had almost exclusively been a business for governments and
intelligence services, and cryptographic research had been a matter of utmost secrecy. In
contrast, nowadays in the ubiquitous computing and networking area, cryptography is a
matter of everybody’s concern. In the course of these transitions, the objectives of crypto-
graphy (which literally translates to secret writing) became more multifarious. Instead
of just enabling two parties to communicate secretly, in recent decades cryptographic
methods have been developed to ensure multiple aspects of information security, as there
are confidentiality, authenticity, data integrity, and anonymity. An important consequence
of this changed meaning is the development of public key cryptography, a branch especially
useful for open networking.
Since its foundation was provided by W. Diffie and M.E. Hellman [DH76], public key
cryptography has fascinated mathematicians all over the world. One remarkable aspect
of public key cryptography is the fact that it eventually establishes applications to the
theory of numbers, one of the oldest and purest branches of mathematics. For millenia,
number theory—considered as the queen of mathematics by C.F. Gauss—was exclusively
conducted as an art for art’s sake. In connection with public key cryptography, however,
various applications emerged, not only immediate ones for elementary number theory but
also indirect ones for algebraic number theory, e. g., in the development of advanced fac-
toring algorithms like the number field sieve [LL93]. Thus, we are faced with an impressive
argument for the importance of fundamental research, though not everyone may be pleased
with the actual state of affairs (see the quotation prefacing this chapter).
This thesis deals with two main topics of modern public key cryptography: provable
security and efficiency. There is no doubt that security is the sine qua non of any cryp-
tographic application. Nevertheless, cryptographic algorithms have often been designed
on a trial-and-error basis, and security simply was defined as the absence of known at-
tacks. As the history of cryptology shows, however, withstanding cryptanalytic attacks for
a while provides no guarantee at all. In contrast, the provable security approach defines
security in a framework adopted from computational complexity theory: a cryptographic
scheme is said to be provably secure if any reasonable attack against its well-defined secu-
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rity can be transfered into an algorithm solving a problem assumed to be hard, e. g., the
factorization of large integers. After various cryptanalytic achievements resulting in lots
of broken schemes, nowadays provable security of cryptosystems is demanded as a crucial
requirement even by standardization authorities [Sho04a,New04].
On the other hand, inefficient cryptosystems are of little practical value, regardless
of the level of security they offer. To enhance the acceptance and popularity of public
key cryptography, finding efficient solutions is a task of particular importance, especially
with regard to the rapid dispersal of limited-constraint devices like smart-cards in the
ubiquitous computing area.
Unfortunately, for a long time the issues of provable security and efficiency seemed to
be incompatible. Indeed, the common property of all early provably secure cryptosystems
was their high level of inefficiency. This went so far that in its beginning provable security
has been regarded as a playground for theoreticians rather than a useful concept. As said
before, the situation is different today. There are two reasons for this change in mind: the
increased awareness of the necessity of reliable security arguments on the one hand, and
the availability of efficient provably secure solutions on the other.
Contributions Of This Thesis
In the first part of this thesis, we focus on the development and improvement of provably
secure cryptographic schemes. After providing a quick account of provable security and
establishing the most important notions in Chapter 2, we turn our attention to the security
reductions of RSA-OAEP and RSA-Paillier in Chapter 3. In both proofs, the problem of
finding small solutions of bivariate linear modular congruences arises and is solved by
means of lattice reduction. We develop an alternative algorithm for this purpose, prove
its correctness and efficiency, and finally apply it to both reduction proofs. In the case of
RSA-OAEP, we are able to improve the reduction cost of the previously known solution,
whilst for RSA-Paillier we obtain an explicit reduction algorithm and state the concrete
reduction costs, where previous works provided asymptotic results only.
We consider Chapter 4 as the main contribution of this thesis. In this chapter, a new
trapdoor one-way permutation based on the hardness of factoring integers of the shape
n = p2q is introduced and analyzed. We point out several similarities of our approach to
Rabin-type modular squaring. There are, however, crucial differences, and we show that
these discrepancies provide interesting applications to homomorphic encryption, hybrid
encryption, fail-stop signature schemes and trapdoor commitments. In the following, we
summarize our contributions to these different domains:
First, we prove that Paillier’s famous homomorphic encryption scheme is one way under
the p2q-factorization assumption if we replace the modulus n = pq with n = p2q. This is
a notable improvement since Paillier’s original scheme is proved to be one way under a
non-standard assumption only. The flip-side of the coin, however, is that there is a sim-
ple IND-CCA1 attack mountable against our new variant. In case of Paillier’s original
scheme, it is unknown if IND-CCA1 security does hold or not. In environments where
chosen-ciphertext attacks are not an issue the new scheme is clearly preferable.
Next, we propose a new hybrid encryption scheme following Abe et al.’s recently published
Tag-KEM/DEM framework [AGK05]. Compared to the members of the well-known EPOC
family, which are based on similar assumptions, the new scheme offers some advantages
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in efficiency and parameter length.
Then we address the problem of constructing efficient factorization-based fail-stop signa-
ture schemes. All known solutions of provably secure fail-stop signature schemes follow a
generic construction proposed by van Heijst, Pfitzmann and Pedersen in 1992 [vHPP92].
Utilizing the same framework, we develop a novel fail-stop signature scheme based on the
p2q-factorization assumption which is comparable in efficiency and parameter size to the
state-of-the-art factorization-based solution [vHPP92]. In contrast to the latter, our new
scheme is more elegant and simple. Moreover, we propose an improvement to the gen-
eral construction, and based on this analysis it turns out that an adjusted version of our
proposed scheme indeed outperforms the solution from van Heijst, Pfitzmann and Peder-
sen [vHPP92].
We conclude Chapter 4 with the development of two novel trapdoor commitment schemes.
The first one, to the best of our knowledge, is the first trapdoor commitment that perfectly
meets the requirements for Shamir-Taumann-type on-line/off-line signature schemes1 [ST01].
The second one turns out to be the first factorization-based trapdoor commitment scheme
that enables the construction of on-line/off-line chameleon signatures [KR00], thus improv-
ing a previous solution based on the RSA(n, n) problem [CGHGN01], i. e., the hardness
of inverting the RSA function where the public exponent equals the public modulus.
The second part of this thesis deals with efficient implementation of cryptographic
algorithms in memory-constraint devices. Due to shorter key-lengths, elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems (ECC) are the method of choice for these applications. The most important
operation in ECC is scalar multiplication, i. e., the multiplication of an elliptic curve point
with an integer scalar. For this reason, efficient methods for performing this operation
have been extensively studied by the cryptographic community in recent years. A review
of the results most important within the scope of this thesis is given in Chapter 5. The
basis for all common scalar multiplication methods is the so-called scalar recoding, that
is, the re-writing of the binary scalar to a different base-2 representation with a reduced
Hamming weight. As the binary representation is unique, this can only be achieved with
digit sets different from {0, 1}.
In Chapter 6, we introduce a new signed binary representation of integers, i. e., a base
2 representation utilizing the digit set {0,±1}. In the case of ECC scalar multiplication,
signed representations are preferable because the inversion of elliptic curve points can
be computed virtually for free. Based on this representation—which we consider to be
canonical for signed binary—we develop algorithms for signed representations with larger
digit sets. Such representations are meaningful if precomputation is permitted. In contrast
to all previous solutions, our new algorithm scans the scalar from the most to the least
significant bit, i. e., left-to-right. The benefit of this feature is that the common methods
for evaluating the multiplication based on the preceding recoding also operate left-to-right,
hence there is no longer any need to store the entire recoded scalar as an intermediate
result. Moreover, it turns out that in terms of efficiency and precomputational effort, our
proposed algorithm achieves the same properties as the best previously known (right-to-
left) solution.
Finally, in Chapter 7, we apply Mo¨ller’s fractional window method [Mo¨l02] to the
representations introduced in Chapter 6. The aim of fractional windows is to maximize
the effectiveness of memory consumption. More precisely, the fractional methods offer a
1Several working solutions exist in the literature, but our proposal combines the best known efficiency
and the most powerful generic construction.
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suitable multiplication algorithm exactly tailored for any amount of memory available,
which has not been possible with previous solutions. We therefore obtain a highly flexible
variant of the main algorithm from the preceeding chapter. Moreover, using Markov theory,
we are able to prove rigorously that the asymptotic non-zero density of the achieved
representation is the same as Mo¨ller claimed in his original proposal for the right-to-left
case. In a subsequent work independent from ours, Mo¨ller has also analyzed the left-to-
right fractional window method [Mo¨l04]. In particular, Mo¨ller has additionally proved
minimality of Hamming weight among all representations utilizing a certain digit set,
which is a further selling point for our proposed algorithm.
About This Thesis
Except of the introducing Chapters 2 and 5, all work presented in this thesis has been
published in conference proceedings or journals. Chapter 3 is taken from a paper pub-
lished at Asiacrypt 2003 [KSST03]. The core part of this dissertation—Chapter 4—is
based on three papers published at ICICS 2004 [SS04], STM 2005 [SS06] and MyCrypt
2005 [SST05]. Chapter 6 is extracted from a paper presented at Crypto 2004 [OSSST04a],
and, finally, Chapter 7 is excerpted from an article to appear in IEEE Transactions on
Computers [SSST06].
Some of the papers cited above are the outcome of collaborative research with my PhD
supervisor Tsuyoshi Takagi and with my colleagues Kaoru Kurosawa, Katsuyuki Okeya,
Olivier Semay, and Christian Spahn. To clarify my own contributions, theorems which
have been provided by my co-authors are not proved in this thesis. Instead, a citation of
the corresponding paper is given. This applies to Chapters 6 and 7.
Part I
Provable Security
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Chapter 2
Provable Security in Public Key
Cryptography
In this chapter, we review the most important notions related to provable security. We
focus on those definitions that are important within the scope of this thesis. Fewer used
terms are introduced when needed.
More than 50 years ago, when the rigorous theoretical treatment of security started
with the pioneering work of Shannon [Sha48,Sha49], potential adversaries have been sup-
posed to possess unlimited computational power. Withstanding these kind of attacks is
denoted as perfect secrecy or (in modern terms) information-theoretic security. Perfectly
secret encryption exists (e. g., the well-known Vernam’s one-time pad), it is, however,
required that the communication parties exchange an appropriate amount of secret bits
before the actual information transfer begins. Therefore, in modern cryptography (espe-
cially in the public key case where this burden has been overcome) the idea of an adversary
with unbounded computational recourses has been relaxed significantly. The current ap-
proach is related to practical infeasibility rather than absolute impossibility, in this sense a
scheme informally is said to be secure if no polynomial-time attack with non-negligible suc-
cess probability can be mounted against it. In contrast to information-theoretic security,
we now talk about computational security. The bulk of this thesis considers computational
security only, but in Section 4.5 we will see an example of a certain notion of information-
theoretic security in the public key scenario.
The two main concepts of public key cryptography are encryption and digital signa-
tures. Here, the security goals are privacy and authenticity, respectively. We start with
some general remarks about the goals and limitations of provable security. Concepts re-
lated to encryption are reviewed in Section 2.2, whilst Section 2.3 is devoted to digital
signatures.
2.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the invention of public key cryptography by Diffie and Hellman in
1976 [DH76], design and evaluation of public key cryptosystems has been done merely in
an ad-hoc manner based on trial-and-error. But very quickly, due to various cryptanalytic
achievements resulting in lots of broken schemes, the cryptographic community understood
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that this ad-hoc approach might not be good enough. Moreover, in the early days of
public key cryptography, security considerations only dealt with the most basic attacks,
i. e., cryptanalytic research concentrated on inverting the schemes’ underlying one-way
functions. In the “real world”, however, cryptosystems normally flawed due to different
reasons. The paradigm of provable security is an outcome of these insights. The goals of
provable security are to define appropriate models of security on the one hand, and to
develop cryptographic designs that can be proven to be secure within particular models
on the other.
2.1.1 Reductionist Security
The roots of provable security go back to the early 1980s when the famous cryptographic
researchers Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest adopted the framework from computational
complexity theory for the purpose of rigorously defining the security of cryptographic
schemes [GM82,GM84,GMR84]. In the so-called reductionist security model, a cryptosys-
tem is called provably secure if there is a polynomial reduction proof from a well-established
hard problem (such as the integer factorization problem) to an attack against the security
of the cryptosystem. Informally, this means that if there is a polynomially bounded ad-
versary breaking the scheme, then the problem assumed to be hard can also be solved in
polynomial time. As this is a contradiction, no such adversary exists (provided the hard-
ness assumption related to the problem is true). It remains to clarify the phrase breaking
the scheme which depends on the particular security notion. In general, we distinguish
different attack goals (e. g., determining the plaintext from its ciphertext) and different
attack scenarios (e. g., availability of oracles that the adversary is allowed to query and
which provide certain additional information like the decryption of ciphertexts of the ad-
versary’s choice). Needless to say, the strongest notion is defined as infeasibility of reaching
the highest attack goal even in the most restricted attack scenario. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3,
we will describe these matters in more detail. But first we will address a special attack
scenario that has attracted much attention in modern practical-oriented cryptography.
2.1.2 The Random Oracle Model
Until the early 1990s, only rather inefficient solutions for cryptosystems with strong prov-
able security were known. Consequently, provable security has been considered to be of
theoretic interest only and has been ignored by standardization authorities at that time.
Things changed 1993, when Bellare and Rogaway introduced the so called random ora-
cle model (ROM) as a compromise between security requirements and practical efficiency
considerations [BR93]. In the random oracle model, all parties—the legitimate ones as
well as the adversary—have black-box access to functions which behave like truly random
functions. Under this idealized assumption, it became possible to develop cryptosystems
that are both efficient and provably secure. In concrete implementations, however, truly
random functions are out of reach and the random oracles are replaced by concrete ob-
jects like cryptographic hash functions. Thus, it is obvious that even a rigorously analyzed
security proof in the random oracle model does not guaranty security in the real world. A
real world adversary may exploit some weaknesses of the hash functions used, thus a proof
in the ROM can only exclude generic attacks against the scheme. Even worse, recently
published results show separations between the random oracle scenario and the so-called
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standard model where no random oracles are used, as there exist cryptosystems provably
secure in the ROM that nevertheless are breakable when implemented with any concrete
realization [CGH98,CGH04]. The interceders of the ROM, however, argue that those re-
sults do not affect the usability of the approach, because all found “weaknesses” only
apply to artificial and pathological examples without practical relevance [Poi04,MK04].
In contemporary cryptographic research, the reliability of the random oracle paradigm is
a topic of highly controversial discussion. Possibly most convincing is the viewpoint of D.
Stinson, who argues that “[. . . ] The random oracle model is just one of many possible
attack models [. . . ] It is not fundamentally “different” from many other attack models
[. . . ]” [Sti04]. The crucial point is that cryptographic security proofs never give evidence
that a cryptographic protocol is secure in the “real world” (as we will see in the preceed-
ing paragraph 2.1.3), therefore the vast dispute about the role of the ROM seems to be
disproportionate.
2.1.3 Limitations of Provable Security
Although mathematically elegant and appealing, the approach of proving security via
reduction has some shortcomings. First of all, it is quite a young research area. Developing
precise and adequate definitions of security related matters seems to be a delicate and
challenging issue, and in certain cases it took several years until a widely accepted solution
has been found. Consequently, definitional difficulties have been the source for multiple
flawed schemes. Even the famous “gap” in the RSA-OAEP proof traces back to the use of
an inadequate definition (see Section 3.2.1). A problem occuring frequently in this context
is the clashing of theoretical attack scenarios with real world adversaries. A recent example
is the security analysis of the well-known EPOC cryptosystems: EPOC-1 and EPOC-
2 [FKM+00] have been proven to meet the strongest notion of security in the ROM. In
the proofs, however, it is implicitly assumed that the adversary queries her decryption
oracle on correctly generated ciphertexts only. In [JQY01], Joye et al. demonstrate that
the EPOC cryptosystems can be completely broken if the adversary sends ciphertexts to
her decryption oracle that she had constructed by encrypting ill-formed plaintexts. Their
attack is similar to Bleichenbacher’s chosen ciphertext attack on PKCS #1 [Ble98]. In both
cases, the information if cleverly constructed ciphertexts are valid or not can be exploited
to obtain secret data via binary search. In contrast to PKCS #1, there is a simple fix
available for the EPOC cryptosystems.
Another notable point is that reductionist security proofs are of asymptotic nature
only. Usually, a so-called security parameter k is established and the proved result is of
the following kind: if the appropriate system parameters (e. g., key-lengths) equal k, and
if there is an adversary A against the scheme with running time polynomial in k, then
the underlying problem assumed to be hard can also be solved in time polynomial in k.
The proof usually is done by presenting a problem solver which utilizes the presumed
adversary as a subroutine, such that the former runs in polynomial time of the latter. A
positive interpretation of such a result is that the analyzed scheme is reliable if we just
choose the security parameter large enough. The devil’s advocate, however, may argue
that asymptotic security provides no evidence for any concrete instantiation, where natu-
rally the security parameter is fixed. This problem is the more serious the larger the gap
between breaking the original scheme and solving the underlying problem actually is, i. e.,
the worse the reduction is. Here, the optimal case is referred to as tight security reduction,
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defined as a reduction that carries over one instance into the other without any reasonable
loss of efficiency or success probability. To deal with the problem of asymptotic security,
recently a new line of cryptographic research came up, the so-called concrete security ap-
proach (for details see the survey paper [Bel97]). A concrete security reduction is intended
to provide quantitative results instead of just qualitative ones. That is, the success prob-
ability of the attack against the trusted assumption is exactly determined as a function
of the adversary A’s success probability and of the amount of additional information A
needs for breaking the scheme (e. g., the number of decryption queries in the accordant
model). In an analogue way, the running times are related to each other. The objective
of this attempt apparently is to give practitioners concrete numbers at hand, in order to
facilitate the optimal choice of the security parameter. However, it is often overlooked that
recommendations of key sizes are always heuristics, regardless of how exactly the reduction
is analyzed. This is due to the fact that the run time analysis of algorithms for solving the
most important candidates for fundamental hard problems (e. g., integer factorization or
discrete logarithm) are themselves of asymptotic nature only. Thus, it is out of reach to
determine exactly how many basic operations1 are required to factor say a 2048 bit RSA
modulus. In addition, when translating the concrete reduction into a parameter size rec-
ommendation, the amount of additional information the potential adversary asks for has
to be specified. For example, it is common to assume that a chosen-ciphertext adversary in
the random oracle model makes at most 260 oracle- and 230 decryption-queries, but these
values are just arbitrary estimations. With these facts in mind, some scepticism against
conclusions like “the key-length should be chosen not smaller than 1139 bits” should be
advisable. Concrete security may have its benefits compared with asymptotics only, but it
is not a definite solution of all the problems, and it should be avoided to sham accuracy
by providing too explicit recommendations. In Section 4.4, we will give an example for a
concrete security reduction.
Last but not least, it has to be mentioned that security proofs do not rule out attacks on
the implementation level. The proofs only deal with black-box reductions,i. e., the schemes
are treated as algorithms specified by input-output behavior only. In concrete implemen-
tations, however, additional information may be leaked like power consumption, timings
of operations, electromagnetic emanations, etc. Attacks based on this kind of information
are called side channel attacks. Side channel attacks and similar fault attacks—where the
adversary tries to gain informations about secret parameters by actively inducing errors
into the cryptographic algorithms—are a topic of active research, but are not dealt with in
this thesis (see [QK02] for a fairly actual survey; the interested reader may also check out
the web-site of the Side Channel Cryptanalysis Lounge [SCA] for further information).
2.1.4 Notations
Throughout this thesis, we use the following notations:
The magnitude of a finite set S is denoted with #S.
Let n be a positive integer. We write Zn for the ring of residue classes modulo n, and Z×n
for its multiplicative group, i. e., the set of invertible elements modulo n. Unless stated
otherwise, we use {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} as representatives for the residue classes modulo n.
For x ∈ Z×n , ordn(x) denotes the multiplicative order of x modulo n, i. e., the smallest
1In the literature about concrete security, a basic operation usually refers to a the equivalent of a 3-DES
encryption.
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positive integer k with xk = 1 mod n.
Furthermore, ϕ : N −→ N and λ : N −→ N are Euler’s totient function and Charmichael’s
function, respectively.
The L-function is defined as Ln(x) = (x−1)/n for n ∈ N and x ∈ {x ∈ Z|n divides x−1}.
For any homomorphism h, we denote its kernel and its image with ker(h) and im(h),
respectively.
Unless indicated otherwise, all algorithms are randomized, but we do not mention the
random coins as an extra input. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then A(y1, . . . , yn) refers
to the probability space which to the string x assigns the probability that A on input
y1, . . . , yn outputs x. For any probability space S, the phrase x←[ S denotes the experiment
that x is selected at random according to S. In particular, if S is a finite set, then x←[ S
is the operation of picking x uniformly at random from S. If S1, S2, . . . , Sn are probability
spaces and p is an n-ary predicate, then Pr[x1 ←[ S1; . . . ;xn ←[ Sn : p(x1, . . . , xn)] denotes
the probability that p(x1, . . . , xn) is true after the experiments xi ← [ Si have been executed
in ascending order.
PPA is an abbreviation of probabilistic polynomial time algorithm.
PRIMES is the set of all prime numbers, and PRIMES(l) denotes the set of all prime
numbers with bit-length l.
The logarithm log always refers to base 2.
We write |x|2 for the bit-length of the integer x. In addition, if x is a natural number, we
write [x]l for the l most significant bits and [x]l for the l least significant bits of the binary
representation of x, respectively. These values may be identified with the corresponding
integers.
2.2 Public Key Encryption
In the following, we review security notions related to public key encryption. First of all,
we formally define a public key encryption scheme:
Definition 2.1 (Public Key Encryption Scheme) A public key encryption scheme
is a triple (KeyGen, E ,D) of polynomial time algorithms such that the following holds:
1. KeyGen is a probabilistic key generation algorithm which on input 1k (the security
parameter) produces a pair (pk, sk) of public and secret key. For notational simplicity,
we assume that the public key pk implicitly includes a description of the finite space
of messagesM and the finite space of ciphertexts C.
2. E is a probabilistic encryption algorithm which on input m ∈ M and pk produces a
ciphertext c ∈ C. For convenience, we also write Epk(m) instead of E(m,pk).
3. D is a deterministic decryption algorithm which on input c ∈ C and sk outputs a
message m ∈M or a failure symbol ⊥ indicating that the input ciphertext is invalid.
For convenience, we also write Dsk(c) instead of D(c, sk).
4. If (pk, sk) is a possible outcome of KeyGen, then we have Dsk(Epk(m)) = m for all
m ∈M.
Remark 2.1 In the definition above, the random coins used for encryption are not men-
tioned as an additional input. This notation simplifies most preceeding definitions. When
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describing explicit probabilistic encryption schemes, however, it is convenient to specify
the randomness, too. In this case, we separate the message from the randomness with a
semicolon: Epk(m; r).
Example 2.1 (The RSA Encryption Scheme) The most famous public key encryp-
tion system is the RSA cryptosystem, named after the mathematicians Rivest, Shamir
and Adleman who invented it in 1977 [RSA78]. It can be described as follows:
KeyGen : On the input 1k (security parameter) choose p, q ∈ PRIMES(k) with p 6= q and
define n = pq. Furthermore, select a small e relatively prime to ϕ(n) = (p−1)(q−1)
and define d = e−1 mod ϕ(n). The public key equals (n, e), whilst d is the secret key.
Moreover, we haveM = C = Zn.
E : For m ∈M, the ciphertext c is defined as c = me mod n.
D : A ciphertext c ∈ C is decrypted as m = cd mod n.
The decryption procedure is correct because
(me)d = m1+lϕ(n) = m mod n
holds for a suitable l ∈ Z.
Note that RSA encryption is deterministic, although we allow the encryption algorithm
to be probabilistic, i. e., encrypting the same message several times may lead to pairwise
different ciphertexts. One obvious advantage of probabilistic encryption appears if we
assume that the message space is quite small (e. g., four digit numbers for credit card
PINs): If the encryption algorithm were deterministic, recovering the original message from
a given cipher could be easily done by encrypting all possible plaintexts and comparing the
results with the cipher in question. Moreover, if encryption is deterministic, sending the
same message twice is easily detectable; this is undesirable in most applications. Another
important but less obvious benefit of probabilistic encryption is postponed to Section 2.2.3.
We give a second example to picture probabilistic encryption:
Example 2.2 (Paillier’s Encryption Scheme) Although probabilistic encryption is
known since 1984 (see Section 2.2.3), we present a rather young example which is important
in subsequent chapters of this thesis. The following scheme has been proposed by Pascal
Paillier in 1999 [Pai99a].
KeyGen : On the input 1k (security parameter) choose p, q ∈ PRIMES(k) with p 6= q
and define n = pq. Furthermore, choose g ∈ Z×
n2
such that n| ordn2(g) and define
λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). The public key equals (n, g), whilst λ is the secret key2.
Moreover, setM = Zn, C = Zn2 .
E : Choose a random value r ∈ Z×n . For m ∈ M, the ciphertext c is defined as c =
gmrn mod n2.
D : A ciphertext c ∈ C is decrypted as m = Ln(cλ mod n2)
Ln(gλ mod n2)
mod n, where the L-function
here is defined as Ln(x) = (x− 1)/n
2Note that λ equals the evaluation of Charmichael’s function on n.
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In [Pai99a], it is shown that the decryption procedure is correct, and especially that
the values of cλ mod n2 − 1 and gλ mod n2 − 1 are indeed divisible by n. It is notable
that Paillier’s scheme possesses homomorphic properties, i. e., we have (gm1 r
n
1 )(g
m
2 r
n
2 ) =
gm1+m2(r1r2)n mod n2. For efficiency, it is useful to choose g = n+ 1 (note that we have
ordn2(n+1) = n, thus g = n+1 is admissible). This choice speeds up encryption because of
(n+1)m = 1+mn mod n2. Further important variants include RSA-Paillier [CGHGN01]
and Rabin-Paillier [GMMV03].
Naturally, we want an encryption scheme to assure a certain kind of privacy. In the rest
of this section, we develop the definitions to capture different levels of this issue. As we
only deal with computational security, we have to come up with a notion of practical
infeasibility, i. e., we want to express that no polynomial-time attack can be mounted with
non-negligible success probability. Thus, we need the definition of a negligible function:
Definition 2.2 (Negligible function) A function f : N −→ R≥0 is called negligible
if f decreases faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial, i. e., for every constant c > 0
there exists an integer kc such that f(k) < k−c for all k ≥ kc.
2.2.1 Attack Models
As stated before, we evaluate the security of an encryption scheme by distinguishing
different attack goals and different attack scenarios. We start with examining the latter.
Here, the most crucial distinction is made between active and passive attacks. A passive
adversary is only allowed to encrypt messages of her choice, therefore this attack scenario
is known as chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). Note that in the public key scenario, everyone
is in the position to encrypt arbitrary messages, thus this scenario is indeed the weakest
one.
In contrast, active attackers are assumed to have the ability of decrypting ciphertexts of
their choice, therefore this model is called chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). If not specified
otherwise, the adversary is allowed to put decryption queries in an adaptive manner, i. e.,
the actual query may depend on all of the preceding ones.
In any case, the ability of encrypting plaintexts—resp. decrypting ciphertexts—is mod-
eled as the availability of corresponding oracles for the adversary. This is meant by black
box access to the encryption scheme.
The general framework is similar for most security definitions: The attack is formalized
as a game played by the adversary. She is given the public data and interacts with her
oracles as specified in the concrete attack scenario. At a certain point, the adversary
indicates that the first phase is finished and then, she is given an appropriate challenge
which she tries to solve, again interacting with the available oracles. The scheme is said
to be secure if no polynomial-time adversary wins the attack game with a non-negligible
success probability.
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2.2.2 Attack Goals: One-wayness
One of the weakest demands on encryption schemes is that it should be infeasible to recover
the entire message from its corresponding ciphertext without knowledge of the secret key3.
This requirement is denoted one-wayness (OW).
To define one-wayness formally we use the framework sketched above. Here the chal-
lenge simply is a randomly generated ciphertext. Thus, we have the following definition:
Definition 2.3 (OW-CPA, OW-CCA) Let PKE = (KeyGen, E ,D) be a public key en-
cryption scheme and let A be an adversary against the one-wayness of PKE playing the
following game:
GAME.OW:
Step 1. (pk, sk)←[ KeyGen(1k)
Step 2. m←[M
Step 3. c←[ Epk(m)
Step 4. m˜←[ AO(pk, c)
The superscript O indicates the oracle(s) the adversary is allowed to query. In case of
chosen-plaintext attack, O stands for an encryption oracle only, whereas in case of chosen-
ciphertext attack O includes encryption oracle and decryption oracle as well. In the ROM,
O additionally includes access to the random oracles. However, A is not allowed to query
her decryption oracle on the challenge ciphertext. We define the advantage of the adversary
A as A = Pr[m˜ = m]. Moreover,  is defined as maxA(A), where the maximum is taken
over all adversaries modeled as probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines. PKE is said
to be one-way against chosen-plaintext attacks (OW-CPA) or one-way against chosen-
ciphertext attacks (OW-CCA), respectively, if  is negligible in the security parameter
k.
Chosen-ciphertext one-wayness is a strictly stronger notion than the chosen-plaintext one,
as the RSA cryptosystem demonstrates: RSA is assumed to be OW-CPA (this claim is well-
known as RSA assumption), but due to its homomorphic properties it is vulnerable against
chosen-ciphertext attacks: given the challenge c ∈ C, the attacker chooses a random value
r ∈ Z×n and feeds her decryption oracle with rec mod n. From the received value (rec)d =
rm mod n the message m can be easily obtained by multiplication with r−1 mod n.
One-wayness usually is not strong enough. First, one-wayness security does not prevent
attackers from reconstructing messages that are taken from a small subset ofM (As it is
mentioned in [GB01], the amount of words in {A,B, . . . , Z}k that form correct sentences in
English language is negligible if k is large enough. Thus, even a secure one-way encryption
scheme may fail if only highly structured messages are encrypted.) Second, one-wayness
security is only related to the entire message, it does not rule out the possibility of obtain-
ing some specific partial information about the encrypted message. In the RSA case, for
3We do not state the weakest demand, because the notion of withstanding total breaks is even weaker,
where a total break is defined as computing the secret key from the public data. We do not discuss total
breaks in this thesis.
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instance, the Jacobi Symbols of the plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext are equal
(since e is odd), thus this information is not protected when using RSA encryption.
For these reasons we need a stronger notion: semantic security will do.
2.2.3 Attack Goals: Semantic Security and Indistinguishability
The notion of semantic security (SS) has been invented in a seminal paper by Goldwasser
and Micali [GM84]. Roughly speaking, an encryption scheme is semantically secure if no
meaningful information about the encrypted message can be computed from its ciphertext.
This notion is the analogue of Shannon’s perfect secrecy in the computational model. Gold-
wasser and Micali noticed that no deterministic encryption scheme can be semantically
secure, and consequently they introduced the concept of probabilistic encryption. Defin-
ing semantic security formally, however, is somewhat involved, and for the sake of proving
cryptosystems to be meet this strong requirement, the notion of indistinguishability (IND)
turned out to be more convenient. The latter means that given a ciphertext and two possi-
ble plaintexts, it is infeasible to decide which one has been encrypted. Indistinguishability
has also been introduced by Goldwasser and Micali in [GM84], where they proved equiv-
alence between SS and IND for the chosen-plaintext attack scenario. Interestingly, the
analogue equivalence for the chosen-ciphertext model has been assumed be to be crypto-
graphic folklore for years, but was formally proved only very recently [WSI03,Gol03]. As
now equivalence is shown for all attack scenarios, we only deal with indistinguishability
in this thesis, and sometimes we may use the phrase semantic security as a synonym for
both notions.
To define indistinguishability formally, again we use the game-oriented framework. In
contrast to one-wayness, the IND game is divided in two phases: in the find stage the
adversary given the public key chooses two messages and in the guess stage, she has to
decide which of these has been encrypted to form the challenge. Thus, we have the following
definition:
Definition 2.4 (IND-CPA, IND-CCA) Let PKE = (KeyGen, E ,D) be a public key en-
cryption scheme and let A be an adversary against the indistinguishability of PKE playing
the following game:
GAME.IND:
Step 1. (pk, sk)←[ KeyGen(1k)
Step 2. (m0,m1, st)←[ AO(pk)
Step 3. b←[ {0, 1}
Step 4. c←[ Epk(mb)
Step 5. b˜←[ AO(c, st)
The superscript O indicates the oracle(s) the adversary is allowed to query. In case of
chosen-plaintext attacks, O stands for an encryption oracle only, whereas in case of chosen-
ciphertext attacks, O includes encryption oracle and decryption oracle as well. In the ROM,
O additionally includes access to the random oracles. In Step 5, however, A is not allowed
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to query her decryption oracle on the challenge ciphertext. The value st is an internal
state information. We define the advantage of the adversary A as A =
∣∣∣Pr[b˜ = b]− 12 ∣∣∣.
Moreover, we define  as maxA(A), where the maximum is taken over all adversaries mod-
eled as probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines. PKE is said to be indistinguishable
under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) or indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext
attacks (IND-CCA), respectively, if  is negligible in the security parameter k.
Again, chosen-ciphertext attacks turn out to be strictly stronger than chosen-plaintext
ones. We demonstrate this fact with Paillier’s cryptosystem. On the one hand, Paillier
proved his scheme to be IND-CPA under the so-called Decisional Composite Residuosity
Assumption, on the other hand a chosen-ciphertext attacker can easily win GAME.IND:
From gm+1rn = g(gmrn) mod n2 we deduce that the ciphertext of m + 1 is obtained by
multiplying the ciphertext of m with the public value g. This shows that under a chosen-
ciphertext attack Paillier’s cryptosystem is not even one-way4.
Remark 2.2 There is as well a refinement as a relaxation of the definition of IND-CCA
known. On the one hand, a further subdivision can be made by restricting the adversary’s
access to the decryption oracle. Namely, a strictly weaker attack scenario is obtained if
the adversary is only allowed to query this oracle during the find-stage, i. e., before she is
given the challenge ciphertext. This model is often called lunchtime attack, and sometimes
it is refered to as IND-CCA1 in contrast to the above described general case, which for
clarification is denoted IND-CCA2. In this thesis, when speaking of IND-CCA resp. chosen-
ciphertext attacks, we always think of the stronger notion. The same treatment also applies
to the notion of one-wayness. Here again, chosen-ciphertext attacks of lunchtime-type are
strictly weaker than unrestricted ones.
A relaxation of IND-CCA security, on the other hand, has been recently proposed by An
et al. [ADR02]. An et al. complain about a definitional inadequacy in the above given
definition, namely an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme becomes formally “insecure” if
each ciphertext is padded with a useless random bit. Indeed, in this case the adversary
can switch the last bit of her challenge ciphertext and feed her decryption oracle with
the altered cipher. For the sake of ruling out such unintuitive counterexamples, An et al.
define a generalized notion of IND-CCA which they call gIND-CCA. As the definitional
inadequacy does not affect the results presented in this thesis, we stick to the standard
notion nevertheless.
2.3 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are intended to replace handwritten signatures in the electronic world.
The security goal here is authenticity, e. g., the proof of authorship of messages. Besides ob-
vious applications in electronic commerce, digital signatures are important building blocks
for various kinds of cryptographic protocols, and traditional public key infrastructures rely
on digital signatures for certifying public keys. We define a digital signature scheme as
follows:
4The above described weakness is related to the notion of non-malleability (NM) [DDN91]. Roughly
speaking, a cryptosystem is non-malleable if given a ciphertext c it is infeasible to generate a ciphertext
c′ 6= c such that the two underlying plaintexts are “meaningfully related”. It can be shown that IND-CCA
and NM-CCA are equivalent notions, whilst NM-CPA is strictly stronger than IND-CPA [BDPR98].
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Definition 2.5 (Digital Signature Scheme) A digital signature scheme is a triple
(KeyGen,S,V) of polynomial time algorithms such that the following holds:
1. KeyGen is a probabilistic key generation algorithm which on input 1k (the security
parameter) produces a pair (sk, vk) of secret signing and public verification key. For
notational simplicity, we assume that the verification key vk implicitly includes a
description of the finite spaces of messagesM and signatures Sig.
2. S is a probabilistic signature algorithm which on input m ∈ M and pk produces a
signature σ ∈ Sig. For convenience, we also write Ssk(m) instead of S(m, vk).
3. V is a deterministic verification algorithm which on input σ ∈ Sig ,m ∈ M and vk
outputs “accept” or “reject” indicating if σ is a valid signature on m. For conve-
nience, we also write Vvk(σ,m) instead of V(σ,m, vk).
4. If (sk, vk) is a possible outcome of KeyGen, then for all m ∈M we have Vvk(σ,m) =
“accept” iff σ has been produced via σ ←[ Ssk(m).
Example 2.3 (RSA Signatures) It has already been observed by Diffie and Hellman
in their seminal paper [DH76] that there is a dual signature scheme for each public key
encryption scheme build from a trapdoor one-way permutation like the RSA function (see
Chapter 4 for more on trapdoor one-way permutations). In the RSA case this leads to the
following signature scheme:
KeyGen : The key generation is the same as for the RSA encryption scheme (Example 2.1).
The verification key equals (n, e), whilst d is the signing key. Moreover, we have
M = Sig = Zn.
S : For m ∈M, the signature σ is defined as σ = md mod n
V : σ is a valid signature of m iff m = σe mod n is fulfilled.
Again, the above example is only of deterministic nature, although the definition supports
probabilistic signing. The standardized RSA-PSS [BR96]—one of the most popular digital
signature scheme today—is a probabilistic variant of the above described “plain” RSA
signature scheme5. Further well-known probabilistic signature schemes are the classical
El-Gamal [Gam84] and its variants.
In the following, we introduce different attack models and possible attack goals in order
to define the security of a signature scheme formally. We do not provide an exhaustive
overview, however (see [GMR88] instead).
2.3.1 Attack Models
As in the public key encryption case, we define different security levels by providing the
attacker with some sort of additional information. In any case, it is assumed that the
attacker knows the public data, i. e., the verification key and the system parameters. If
no further information is given to the adversary, the corresponding attack is denoted no
message attack, a. k. a. key-only attack.
5Indeed, PSS is an abbreviation of probabilistic signature scheme.
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On the contrary, in a message attack, the adversary is allowed to examine some valid
message/signature pairs. We distinguish the following scenarios in increasing order with
respect to severity:
Known-message attack: The adversary is given a set of valid message/signature pairs ran-
domly chosen by the challenger.
Generic chosen message attack: The adversary is allowed to choose a list of messages
m1, . . . ,mk and to query for the corresponding signatures before she knows the ver-
ification key. In addition, the queries have to be non-adaptively, i. e., the adversary
has to query the entire set at once.
Adaptive chosen-message attack: This is the most powerful attack. The adversary can use
the legitimate signer as a signing oracle, i. e., she may ask adaptive signature queries
after seeing the verification key.
2.3.2 Attack Goals
A signature scheme is broken if it is feasible for an attacker to forge a signature, i. e., to
come up with a signature/message pair that passes the verification test. We distinguish
the following cases in decreasing order with respect to dangerousness:
Total break: The adversary succeeds in computing the secret key.
Selective forgery: The adversary creates a valid signature for a message of her choice.
Existential forgery: The adversary creates any valid message/signature pair, without hav-
ing control over the message.
Needless to say, in case of a message attack the forged signature must be different from
any signature the adversary has been given earlier. As the signature algorithm may be
probabilistic, this requirement is somewhat vague. Is a new signature σ˜ on a message m
such that the adversary has been given m,σ during the attack regarded as a valid forgery
or not? As this kind of forgery usually does no harm, the answer is “No” in general. If
nevertheless the case where the answer is “Yes” should be captured, the phrase “strong”
is appended for clarification (e. g., sUF-CMA denotes strong existentially unforgeability
under chosen-message attacks).
For the sake of easy readability, we only define the most important and strongest notion
formally (obtained by combining the strongest attack with the weakest goal). All other
combinations of attack model/attack goal can be defined in an analogue way.
Definition 2.6 (UF-CMA) Let DS = (KeyGen,S,V) be a digital signature scheme and
let A be adversary against the existentially unforgeability of DS playing the following game:
GAME.UF:
Step 1. (sk, vk)←[ KeyGen(1k)
Step 2. For i = 1, . . . , n : {mi ←[ A(vk,m1, σ1, . . . ,mi−1, σi−1); σi ←[ Ssk(mi)}
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Step 3. (m˜, σ˜)←[ A(vk,m1, σ1, . . . ,mn, σn)
Here, n is of polynomial order of k. We define the advantage of the adversary A as
A = Pr[m˜ 6∈ {m1, . . . ,mn} and Vvk(m˜, σ˜) = “accept”].
Moreover, we define  as maxA(A), where the maximum is taken over all adversaries
modeled as probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines. DS is said to be existentially
unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA), if  is negligible in the
security parameter k.
2.3.3 The Hash-Then-Sign Paradigm
When inspecting Example 2.3 (plain RSA signatures) in more detail, two problems catch
the eye. First, this signature scheme seems to be quite weak regarding the above defined
security notions. Even with a key-only attack existential forgeries are easily obtained just
by choosing σ ∈ Zn at random, computing m = σe mod n and presenting σ as a forged
signature on m. With a chosen-message attack, the adversary can sign any message of her
choice due to the homomorphic properties of RSA: to signm, choose r ∈ Zn at random and
query the signing oracle on rem mod n. The signature md mod n is then easily obtained
by multiplying the oracles response with r−1 mod n.
The second problem is the limited message space Zn. Signing of messages of arbi-
trary length might be desirable. A presumed solution of both problems is the use of hash
functions. A hash function is an efficiently computable procedure that maps strings of
arbitrary length to strings of fixed length, say 256 bits. The most important property of
a hash functions is collision resistance (i. e., it is infeasible to find two different strings
mapping to the same value). In particular, it can easily be shown that—when ignoring
pathological cases—collision resistance implies one-wayness (i. e., given a randomly chosen
hash value, it is infeasible to find a pre-image).
The well-known hash-then-sign technique is now described as follows: Instead of sign-
ing a message m directly, compute the hash h of m and sign the hash value: σ = Ssk(h).
To verify if σ is a valid signature of m, compute the hash h of m and apply the regular
verification algorithm to σ and h. This approach has several benefits. First, the efficiency
is increased as hash functions in general are very fast, and the costly public-key signing
operation is now required for short hash values only. This effect is two-edged, however, be-
cause a sparse message space may lead to new insecurities. Therefore, Bellare and Rogaway
recommend to use a full domain hash, i. e., a hash function that maps strings uniformly
to the full domain of the signature scheme [BR93]. Second, messages of arbitrary length
can be signed. Third, the above described trivial attacks against plain RSA signatures do
not work any longer due to the one-wayness of the hash-function. Indeed, in the random
oracle model, the full domain hash version of RSA can be proven to be EF-CMA.
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Chapter 3
Improved and Explicit Security
Reduction for RSA-OAEP and
RSA-Paillier
In this chapter, we introduce a conceptually very simple and demonstrative algorithm for
finding small solutions (x, y) of the linear congruence ax+y = c mod n, where gcd(a, n) =
1. Our new algorithm is a variant of the Euclidian algorithm. Unlike former methods, it
finds a small solution whenever such a solution exists. Further it runs in time O((log n)3),
which is the same as the best known previous techniques, e. g., lattice-based solutions.
We then apply our algorithm to RSA-OAEP and RSA-Paillier to obtain better security
reduction proofs.
3.1 Introduction
Lattice reduction algorithms have been successfully applied to many branches of modern
cryptography. In particular, this methods can be used to construct small solutions (x, y)
of the linear modular congruence
ax+ y = c mod n, (3.1)
where the integers a and n are coprime, i. e., gcd(a, n) = 1.
In the random oracle model, the OAEP conversion is a technique to design a CCA
secure encryption scheme from any trapdoor one-way permutation [BR94]. We write f -
OAEP if f is the underlying trapdoor function. Today’s most famous cryptosystem—
RSA-OAEP—is a result of this work. By using lattice reduction for constructing small
solutions of equation (3.1), Fujisaki et al. showed that provided the RSA assumption
holds, RSA-OAEP is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-
CCA) in the random oracle model [FOPS01]. Their paper is based on previous work of
Bellare et al. [BR94] and Shoup [Sho02].
In the standard model, on the other hand, it is known that RSA-Paillier encryption
scheme is indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). Following the work
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of Sakurai et al. [ST02], Catalano et al. proved that the one-wayness of RSA-Paillier is
equivalent to that of RSA by using the above described technique with c = 0 [CGHGN01].
As motivated in Section 2.1.3, it is an important aim in cryptography to improve
security reduction proofs, because the proposed size of the security parameters of a cryp-
tosystem is directly influenced by the reduction costs.
In this chapter, we introduce a conceptually much simpler and demonstrative algorithm
for finding small solutions of equation (3.1). Our new algorithm is a variant of the Euclidian
algorithm. Unlike the lattice-based method, it exploits that the sought-after small solution
is non-negative. Further, it runs in time O((log n)3), which is the same as the lattice-based
method.
We then apply our algorithm to the security proof of RSA-OAEP to enhance the advan-
tage of the reduction algorithm. The proof of RSA-OAEP is divided into two parts [FOPS01].
First the CCA security of the general OAEP conversion scheme under the so-called partial-
domain one-wayness of the underlying trapdoor permutation is proved. Then, in the second
part, the homomorphic properties of RSA function are exploited to show the equivalence
of partial-domain one-wayness and full-domain one-wayness in the RSA case.
The second part, however, does not work for all values of a of equation (3.1). We call
a a bad value if there is no warrant that the method operates successfully. In [FOPS01],
Fujisaki et al. upperbound the number of bad values for a by the term 22k0+6, where k0
is the maximal bit-length of the sought-after small solution. Obviously, this result is not
optimal, especially if the bound k0 is close to half of k, the bit-length of n. One reason
for the non-optimal performance of the lattice-based method is that it does not exploit
all the information given about the sought-after solution. Namely, it takes no advantage
of the fact that the solution is non-negative, not only small in absolute value.
Using our proposed algorithm, we are able to upper-bound the number of bad values for
a by 22k0+1−2 log log k instead of 22k0+6.
Finally, for RSA-Paillier, we use our new algorithm to construct an alternative re-
duction proof, extending the important work of Catalano et al. [CNS02]. Based on the
analysis of our algorithm, we provide the exact security analysis while Catalano et al.
gave asymptotic results only.
Although the achieved improvements are not dramatic ones, we assume that our pro-
posed algorithm is a useful tool for analyzing appropriate security proofs rigorously. A
general difference between the old approaches and our solution is that previous meth-
ods are intended to find one small solution only. If there exists only one small solution
within the given bounds, then these methods succeed. Otherwise, the correct solution may
be missed. Our proposed algorithm, in contrast, constructs a well-defined small solution,
and, moreover, based on its analysis we are able to describe a method for finding all small
solutions. The latter is efficient unless there are exponentially many small solutions. For
cryptanalytic purposes, the known heuristic solutions work well enough, but in provable
security the new algorithm might be preferable due to its simplicity and transparency.
3.1.1 Related Work
The task of finding small solutions for linear modular congruences is not a new one in
cryptography. In 1985, De Jonge and Chaum developed an attack against some padding
3.2 Security Reduction Algorithms of RSA-OAEP and RSA-Paillier 23
techniques for RSA signature schemes [JC86], which was extended in 1997 by Girault
and Misarsky [GM97]. These attacks utilize an affine variant of the Euclidian algorithm
for solving two-variable linear modular equations with small solutions. But it has to be
stressed that this algorithm may fail, even if a unique small solutions exists.
If c = 0, it is possible to find small solutions by means of continued fractions. Again,
the Euclidian algorithm is used. But as before, this method is only heuristic, i. e., it does
not succeed with all input. We review this method in Section 3.3.3.
Our algorithm, on the contrary, works for arbitrary inputs.
3.2 Security Reduction Algorithms of RSA-OAEP and RSA-
Paillier
In this section, we review the reduction proofs of the CCA security of RSA-OAEP and
the one-wayness of RSA-Paillier. In both cases, we are confronted with the problem of
finding small solutions of modular congruences. We sketch the existing solutions which
utilize lattice reduction methods.
3.2.1 RSA-OAEP
The OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) conversion technique, introduced
by Bellare and Rogaway in 1994 [BR94], is an encryption method which can be instantiated
with any trapdoor one-way permutation. We write f -OAEP if f is the underlying trapdoor
function. The further ingredients of OAEP are a 2 round Feistel network1, an appropriate
padding, some randomization and two hash functions modeled as random oracles. The
overhead compared to plain RSA only consists of some extremely fast hashing and xor
operations. Bellare and Rogaway were able to prove that f -OAEP is plaintext aware
under the one-wayness assumption of f . Plaintext awareness is a security property which
originally was defined for the random oracle setting only. Recently, analogue notions for the
standard model have been proposed [BP04]. Informally speaking, an encryption scheme
is plaintext aware if there exists a so called plaintext-extractor who is able to simulate
the answers of the decryption oracle on any ciphertext constructed by the adversary. The
intuition behind this notion is that an adversary against a plaintext aware scheme is unable
to construct valid ciphertexts in a way different from picking some message and encrypting
it. This implies that a decryption oracle does not provide the adversary with additional
power, because she does not gain any new information by querying it. Thus, it was believed
that plaintext awareness establishes security against chosen-ciphertext attacks, and this is
the way Bellare and Rogaway argued to substantiate IND-CCA security for f -OAEP.
Surprisingly, in 2001 Shoup detected a gap in the original security proof [Sho02]: The
plaintext-extractor may fail in simulating the decryption oracle’s answers on ciphertexts
that have been designed by an adversary who knows any valid ciphertext (not produced
by herself). But the challenge ciphertext given the adversary is a valid one, and thus, the
original proof given by Bellare and Rogaway only provides weakly plaintext awareness,
which means that the plaintext-extraction only works correctly if the adversary has no
access to the decryption oracle after receipt of the challenge ciphertext. Consequently,
1Feistel networks are well-known in the context of symmetric block ciphers like DES.
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their arguments only prove f -OAEP being semantically secure against chosen ciphertext
attacks of lunchtime type(IND-CCA1) under the one-wayness assumption of f . Even worse,
assuming the existence of a special kind of trapdoor one-way functions, Shoup proposed an
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against the OAEP scheme instantiated with a particular
trapdoor one-way permutation. In addition, Shoup was able to show that trapdoor one-
way functions with the demanded special property exist with high probability if trapdoor
one-way functions exist at all. Consequently, Shoup’s considerations make it very unlikely
that the OAEP scheme can be proved to be IND-CCA2 under the one-wayness assumption
of the underlying trapdoor permutation alone.
Fortunately, it took not long to fix the security proof. A close look at Shoup’s attack
reveals that the adversary has to partly invert the trapdoor function (i. e., deduce s1 from
f(s1, s2)) in order to break the indistinguishability of the entire scheme. This observation
leads to the definition of partial-domain one-wayness: A trapdoor permutation f is said
to be partial-domain one-way, if it is hard to compute s1 from the knowledge of f(s1, s2).
Indeed, it was possible to prove the CCA security of the general OAEP conversion scheme
under the partial-domain one-wayness of the underlying trapdoor permutation [FOPS01].
Note that partial-domain one-wayness is a stronger requirement than its full-domain pen-
dant, hence, the corrected result is weaker than the original claim. But in the important
special when instantiated with the RSA function, it turned out that due to the homo-
morphic properties of RSA partial-domain one-wayness implies full-domain one-wayness.
Consequently, the original strong security result actually holds for RSA-OAEP. In the
following, we sketch the latter proof:
First, we introduce some notations. If x is a natural number, we write [x]l for the l
most significant bits and [x]l for the l least significant bits of the binary representation
of x, respectively. Let n be a k−bit RSA modulus and fix k0 < k/2. Suppose there is an
algorithm I—the partial inverter—that on the input C = me mod n returns the integer
x := [m]k−k0 . We show how to solve the RSA problem (compute m from C = me mod n)
using I as a subroutine: Pick any a ∈ Z×n at random and run I on the inputs C and
C ′ := Cae mod n. Because of the homomorphic properties of the RSA function we know
that C ′ is the encryption ofma mod n. Hence, I determines the k−k0 most significant bits
of m and ma mod n, respectively. We define u := [m]k−k0 , r := [m]k0 , v := [ma mod n]k−k0
and s := [ma mod n]k0 . Thus, we have
m = u · 2k0 + r mod n and ma = v · 2k0 + s mod n,
leading to
v · 2k0 + s = a · (u · 2k0 + r) mod n
⇒ ar = s+ c mod n, c = (v − ua) · 2k0 mod n. (3.2)
Solving this linear modular congruence yields the unknown value r = [m]k0 , which
completes the recovery of m.
However, the RSA-OAEP security proof is not tight. One problem lies in the random
oracle part of the entire proof. In this proof, the partial inverter I is constructed by using
the IND-CCA adversary A against RSA-OAEP as a subroutine. Unfortunately, I does
not determine u = [m]k−k0 exactly; instead, I constructs a set S with u ∈ S, where the
magnitude of S equals the number of queries that A sends to one of her random oracles.
Thus, for each of the (#S)2 possible combinations u, v taken from the output-sets S of
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the two I-runs, we get a linear modular congruence in the two unknowns r and s, where
0 ≤ r, s < 2k0 < √n. Therefore, the reduction cost is quadratic in #S. This is the main
reason why the RSA-OAEP security proof is not meaningful for real-life parameters. Of
course, an improvement of the congruence-solving-step will not affect this problem. Hence,
it is an important future task to find a reduction proof where only one I-run is needed.
In the following, we call x, y a small solution of the congruence (3.2) iff 0 ≤ x, y < 2k0
holds. We explain how Fujisaki et al. find a small solution using the Gaussian reduction
algorithm2 (see also Figure 3.1). At first, compute a reduced basis (U, V ) of the lattice
T : constructed solution
T0: target solution
−T
T0 − T
T
T0
La,N :
Figure 3.1: Lattice solution from Fujisaki et al. [FOPS01]
La,n = {(x, y) ∈ Z2 | ax = y mod n} using the Gaussian algorithm. As we can easily find
a sufficiently short basis of La,n—take, e. g., the vectors (1, a) and (1, a+ n)—this can be
done in time O((log n)3). Let T0 be a small solution and T be any solution of eq. (3.2). To
find T = (x˜, y˜), we can choose x˜ as we like and then compute y˜ = ax˜ − c mod n. Define
l = 2k0+2 and assume that La,n is a so-called l-good lattice, meaning that there exists no
non-zero lattice vector shorter than l. This choice of l together with the properties of a
reduced basis guarantee two important facts: in the first place, T0 is unique as a small
solution of eq. (3.2). Secondly, the coefficients of T0 in the basis (U, V ) are smaller than
1/2 in absolute value. Thus, the coefficients (in (U, V )) of the lattice point T0 − T can
be constructed simply by taking the closest integers to the coefficients of −T . This is a
consequence of the uniqueness of basis representation. From knowledge of T and T0 − T ,
we can easily construct T0.
But as stated above, this method only works if the randomly chosen a yields an l-good
lattice. Note that for fixed n, La,n is uniquely determined even by a single vector v ∈ La,n.
Thus, there are at most pi22k0+4 < 22k0+6 possible lattices containing a non-zero vector
shorter than l = 2k0+2, and the number of bad values for a is bounded above by 22k0+6.
Consequently, the probability of choosing a bad value is smaller than 22k0+6−k. Therefore,
the total advantage of this reduction is greater than ε′ = ε(ε− 22k0+6−k), where ε denotes
the advantage of the partial inverter I. Note that ε′ is non-negligible in k = log n if ε is
non-negligible in k and if k0 is adequate smaller than k, i. e., if there is a rational number
0 < t < 1/2 such that k0 < tk.
2Gaussian reduction can be regarded as a generalization of the Euclidian algorithm in dimension 2. For
all results concerning lattice theory see [MG02].
26 Improved and Explicit Security Reduction for RSA-OAEP and RSA-Paillier
3.2.2 RSA-Paillier
In Section 2.2, we introduced the Paillier cryptosystem from Eurocrypt 1999 (Exam-
ple 2.2). In 2001, Catalano et al. proposed the variant RSA-Paillier to speed up the en-
cryption process. Recall that the Paillier encryption of m ∈ Zn is computed as Epk(m) =
(1 +mn)rn mod n2, where r ∈ Z×n is a random nonce. The idea of Catalano et al. was to
replace the exponent n with an ordinary (small) RSA exponent e. Using a simple trick,
decryption (different from original Paillier) is possible, too. The new scheme is faster in en-
cryption, comparable in decryption, but unfortunately the homomorphic property breaks
down.
In 2002, Sakurai and Takagi proved that RSA-Paillier is one-way if and only if the
Hensel-lifting problem is hard [ST02], where the Hensel-lifting problem is defined as com-
puting re mod n2 from a given ciphertext re mod n and an RSA public key (n, e). More-
over, Sakurai and Takagi introduced a reduction algorithm for solving the RSA problem
using the Hensel-lifting oracle as a subroutine, thus the one-wayness of RSA was reduced
to the one-wayness of RSA-Paillier. But unfortunately, this algorithm was not particularly
efficient (i. e., for each bit of the secret message two oracle-calls were needed), and it could
be proved to achieve a non-negligible advantage only in case of a perfect Hensel-lifting
oracle. A short time later, Catalano et al. were able to show that the RSA problem could
be solved by calling the (potentially non-perfect) Hensel-lifting oracle only twice [CNS02].
We shortly explain their technique in the following.
Assume that a random RSA ciphertext C = re mod n is given. We show how to
reconstruct r given C, n, e using Hensel lifting. First, we obtain re mod n2 by invoking the
Hensel lifting oracle. Then we query the Hensel lifting oracle on aere mod n for a randomly
chosen integer a ∈ Z×n . We receive µe mod n2, where µ = ar mod n. There is an integer
z such that ar = µ(1 + zn) mod n2 holds, and modulo n it can be computed from the
equation aere = µe(1+ezn) mod n2, because e, n, a, re mod n2, and µe mod n2 are known.
Now consider the two-dimensional lattice L = {(R,U) ∈ Z2 | aR = U(1 + zn) mod n2}.
Using standard lattice reduction techniques we can find a vector (r′, µ′) ∈ L∩[1, . . . , n−1]2
in polynomial time of log n. As the sought-after vector (r, µ) is an element of L, too, we have
the relationship r′µ = rµ′ mod n2. Moreover, due to the size constraints 0 < r, r′, µ, µ′ <
n, we conclude that in fact equality holds over the integers, i. e., r′µ = rµ′. Thus—if
w. l. o. g. we assume r > r′, µ > µ′—we deduce that r and µ are multiples of r′/ gcd(r′, µ′)
and µ′/ gcd(r′, µ′), respectively, where in both cases the factor equals gcd(r, µ). As with
overwhelming probability this factor is sufficiently small, it can be found efficiently by an
exhaustive search.
Catalano et al. showed that their method works in time polynomial in log n with a
non-negligible advantage, but they gave no concrete bounds.
3.3 The Proposed Reduction Algorithm
Let n be a natural number, 0 < a < n, 0 ≤ c < n, and gcd(a, n) = 1. In this section, we
develop the new algorithm Lin Cong for finding small solutions of the two-variable linear
modular congruence
ax = y + c mod n. (3.3)
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To be more concrete, we introduce an algorithm for finding so-called x-minimal solutions
of eq. (3.3).
Definition 3.1 (x-minimal solution) The pair (xˆ, yˆ), 0 ≤ xˆ < n, 0 ≤ yˆ < B is called a
x-minimal solution of eq. (3.3) with respect to the bound B, 0 < B < n, if (xˆ, yˆ) possesses
the following properties:
1. axˆ = yˆ + c mod n.
2. xˆ fulfills the x-minimality condition: If (xalt, yalt) is a solution of the congruence
(3.3) where 0 ≤ yalt < B holds, then we have xˆ ≤ xalt.
Note that due to the condition gcd(a, n) = 1, for each fixed B there is exactly one x-
minimal solution of eq. (3.3) w. r. t. B.
As a second step, we will propose an efficient variant of the algorithm with complexity
O((log n)3). One application of the new algorithm is to replace the lattice based methods
used in the reduction proofs described above.
Algorithm 1 presents the outline of our proposed algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Lin Cong (Outline)
Input: a, c, n,B, where 0 < a,B < n, 0 ≤ c < n, and gcd(a, n) = 1
Output: xˆ, yˆ such that axˆ = yˆ + c mod n and xˆ ≥ 0 is minimal with respect to the
property 0 ≤ yˆ < B
a′ ← a; c′ ← c; n′ ← n;1
y′ ← −c′ mod n′;2
while y′ ≥ B do3
(a′, n′)← (−n′ mod a′, a′); /*parallel assignment */4
c′ ← c′ mod n′; y′ ← −c′ mod n′;5
yˆ ← y′; xˆ← a−1(yˆ + c) mod n;6
return (xˆ, yˆ)7
Before proving its correctness formally, we state some technical remarks and describe the
idea of the proposed algorithm.
First note that gcd(a′, n′) = gcd(a, n) = 1 and a′ < n′ holds in any iteration. Therefore,
we observe that a′ = 0 is only possible if the corresponding n′ (the old value a′ in the
previous iteration) equals 1. If this were the case, in line 5 of this previous iteration we
would have computed y′ = 0 and the algorithm would have terminated. Consequently, the
assertion a′ ← −n′ mod a′ is always defined.
Let (xˆ, yˆ) be the unique x-minimal solution of eq. (3.3) w. r. t. B. We show that Algo-
rithm 1 (Lin Cong (Outline)) on the inputs a, c, n,B returns (xˆ, yˆ). To be more precise, the
algorithm finds yˆ and then computes the corresponding xˆ = a−1(yˆ + c) mod n. The main
idea of the algorithm is to reduce the original problem to a smaller instance and to iterate
this process. This is done as follows: From axˆ = yˆ + c mod n we deduce axˆ = yˆ + c+ kn
for a suitable k ∈ Z. Euclidian division yields n = aq + r with 0 ≤ r < a and a positive
integer q. Hence, we have
axˆ = yˆ + c+ kn = yˆ + c+ k(aq + r)⇒ −rk = yˆ + c+ a(kq − xˆ)
⇒ −rk = yˆ + c mod a (3.4)
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Therefore, we have constructed the new linear modular congruence (3.4) with the new
module a in the role of n and the new factor −r = −n mod a in the role of a. A solution
of congruence (3.4) is given by (k, yˆ) = (axˆ−yˆ−cn , yˆ). The crucial point is the observation
that this solution is the x-minimal solution w. r. t. B of (3.4), which we will justify soon.
We define the following sequences by iterating this process:
n0 = n a0 = a c0 = c x0 = xˆ
ni+1 = ai ai+1 = −ni mod ai ci+1 = ci mod ni+1 xi+1 = aixi−yˆ−cini
Note that the first three columns exactly describe the corresponding sequences produced
by the algorithm Lin Cong (Outline). For this reason, we denote by fLin Cong the transfor-
mation (ni, ai, ci) 7→ (ni+1, ai+1, ci+1). Let us write congi for the linear modular congru-
ence defined with the parameters ai, ci and ni according to the ith iteration of algorithm
Lin Cong (Outline)3:
congi ≡ aix = y + ci mod ni.
Inductively, we conclude that the value xi occurring in the last column leads to a solution
(xi, yˆ) of congi. Moreover, we can deduce the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 Let (xi, yˆ) be the x-minimal solution of congi w.r.t. B and let xi > 0. Then
(xi+1, yˆ) is the x-minimal solution of congi+1 w.r.t. B. In particular, the y-value of the
current x-minimal solution w.r.t. B does not change during the transformation fLin Cong,
as long as xi is non-negative.
Proof First, we prove an auxiliary claim about a kind of “solution lifting”:
Let (x, y) be a solution of congi+1. Then the pair
(
y+ci+xni
ai
, y
)
is a solution of congi. If
in addition 0 ≤ x, y < ni+1 holds then 0 ≤ y+ci+xniai ≤ ni is fulfilled.
Note that the value ai = ni−1 cannot be zero, since otherwise iteration (i+ 1) would not
have been reached. First, we show y+ci+xniai ∈ Z. The recursion formulas define ni+1 = ai
and ci+1 = ci mod ni+1 = ci mod ai. Hence there is an integer l such that ci+1 equals
ci + lai. As (x, y) is a solution of congi+1 we conclude
ai | y + ci+1 − xai+1 = y + (ci + lai)− x(−ni mod ai) ⇒ ai | y + ci + xni
It follows immediately that
(
y+ci+xni
ai
, y
)
is an integer solution of congi.
Now assume 0 ≤ x, y < ni+1 = ai. We have
y + ci + xni ≤ y + ci + (ai − 1)ni < ai + ni + (ai − 1)ni = ai + aini
Therefore, we conclude y+ci+xniai < ni + 1, which finishes the proof of the auxiliary claim.
Now we are ready to proof the main lemma: Assume that (xalt, yalt) is a solution of
congi+1 where 0 ≤ xalt < ni+1 and 0 ≤ yalt < B. Our goal is to show xalt ≥ xi+1 ≥ 0.
First we prove that xi+1 is non-negative. Note that ai > 0 must hold because otherwise
the iteration (i+1) of the while loop would not have been reached. From the definition of
3In particular, if the exit condition −cj mod nj < B holds, then congi should be undefined for i > j.
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xi+1 = aixi−yˆ−cini and the condition xi > 0, we therefore conclude yˆ+ci+xi+1ni = aixi > 0.
Assume xi+1 < 0. Hence, we have
yˆ + ci > ni ⇒ yˆ > ni − ci ≥ −ci mod ni. (3.5)
Since (0,−ci mod ni) is a solution of congi, ineq. (3.5) contradicts the preconditions,
namely (xi, yˆ) being the x-minimal solution of congi w. r. t. B and xi > 0. Consequently,
we must have xi+1 ≥ 0.
From the auxiliary claim, we conclude that the pair(
yalt + ci + xaltni
ai
, yalt
)
is a solution of congi, in particular, we have 0 ≤ yalt+ci+xaltniai ≤ ni. As (xi, yˆ) is the
x-minimal solution of congi w. r. t. B, we deduce
yalt + ci + xaltni
ai
− xi ≥ 0
⇒ xalt ≥ aixi − yalt − ci
ni
. (3.6)
In the case of yalt ≤ yˆ this immediately leads to the desired result xalt ≥ xi+1 = aixi−yˆ−cini .
Thus, we consider the case yalt > yˆ. Looking at the difference between xi+1 and the
righthand side of eq. (3.6), we observe
xi+1 − aixi − yalt − ci
ni
=
−yˆ + yalt
ni
<
B
ni
< 1. (3.7)
Note that the last inequality must hold since in the case of ni ≤ B the iteration (i + 1)
of the while loop would not have been reached. Therefore, we finally conclude xalt ≥ xi+1
from eq. (3.6), eq. (3.7) and the fact that both of xalt and xi+1 are integers. uunionsq
Lemma 3.1 implies that with each iteration of the while loop, the transformation fLin Cong
constructs a smaller instance of the problem of finding the x-minimal solution, since the
sequence of the moduli ni is strictly monotone decreasing. This problem, however, is trivial
in the following case:
Definition 3.2 (Zero-minimum condition) Let a, c, n,B be integers, where 0 < a,B <
n, 0 ≤ c < n, and gcd(a, n) = 1 hold. The congruence ax = y+ c mod n satisfies the zero-
minimum condition with respect to B, if −c mod n < B holds.
In fact, it is an easy observation that the x-minimal solution of the congruence ax =
y + c mod n w. r. t. B is given by the pair (0,−c mod n) iff ax = y + c mod n satisfies
the zero-minimum condition w. r. t. B. The aim of the algorithm Lin Cong (Outline) is to
convert the original congruence into a congruence satisfying the zero-minimum condition
w. r. t. B. This is done using the transformation fLin Cong, which does not affect the y-value
of the current x-minimal solution w. r. t. B.
Indeed, we can prove the correctness of algorithm Lin Cong (Outline):
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Theorem 3.1 Algorithm 1 (Lin Cong (Outline)) is correct, i. e., given integers a, c, n,B,
where 0 < a,B < n, 0 ≤ c < n, and gcd(a, n) = 1 holds, the algorithm terminates and
outputs the unique x-minimal solution (xˆ, yˆ) of the congruence ax = y + c mod n with
respect to the bound B (see Definition 3.1).
Proof Let yi denote the y-value computed by the algorithm Lin Cong (Outline) in the ith
iteration of the while loop. Note that per definition this value yields the solution (0, yi) of
congi. For each i = 0, 1, 2, . . . the following holds: Either congi satisfies the zero-minimum
condition w. r. t. B and consequently (0, yi) is the x-minimal solution of congi w. r. t. B.
Or xi, the x-value of the x-minimal solution of congi, is greater zero and Lemma 3.1 tells
us that (xi+1, yˆ) equals the x-minimal solution of congi+1 w. r. t. B. As the sequence of the
moduli ni is strictly monotone decreasing, there must be an i ≥ 0 such that congi satisfies
the zero-minimum condition w. r. t. B. If this iteration is reached (i. e., we have yi < B
for the first time), then (0, yi) = (xi, yˆ) must hold because according to Lemma 3.1 we
know that the y-value of the x-minimal solution w. r. t. B remained changed. Obviously,
the x-value computed in line 6 is the correct one. uunionsq
3.3.1 Algorithm Lin Cong
Analyzing algorithm Lin Cong (Outline) we observe that the parallel assignment in line 4
describes a variant of the Euclidian algorithm (set (a, b) ← (−b mod a, a) instead of set
(a, b)← (b mod a, a) for a ≤ b). Obviously, the result remains the same, but unfortunately
the variant is less efficient. In particular, in the worst case we need a−1 steps (to see this,
try a = b− 1), which is by far not fast enough. But some modifications may be helpful: A
closer look at the recursion formula (a, b) ← (−b mod a, a) discloses that problems occur
if b− a << a holds. In the subsequent steps, the difference b− a will be subtracted from a
and b until the resulting a is smaller than b−a. This procedure may take too long time. Its
result will be (a mod (b− a), b− k(b− a)), where k equals a÷ (b− a) (here, x÷ y denotes
the Euclidian quotient of x and y). Therefore, we gain a notable speedup by the following
case differentiation:
if b− a ≥ a then set (a, b)← (−b mod a, a)
else set (a, b)← (a mod b− a, b− k(b− a)) with k = a÷ (b− a).
But we need to be a little careful if we wish to assign this idea to the original algorithm
(with a′ in the role of a and n′ in the role of b). In detail, we must not ignore a reduction
of the value c′ which would have occurred in line 5 of one of the skipped steps. A possible
way out is to skip fewer steps, i. e., we subtract n′ − a′ until the resulting a′ is smaller
than n′ − a′ or c′ is greater than the resulting n′. We will see in a while that these
modifications are good enough to yield a polynomial running time (in log n). But before
doing so, we have to face a last problem: It is possible that the value yˆ we are seeking
for would be computed in one of the skipped steps. Note that in each skipped step the
value y′ = −c′ mod n′ is reduced by the amount n′ − a′ (This is true because for c′ < n′,
we have −c′ mod n′ = n′ − c′, and due to the considerations above, the value c′ remains
constant). Hence, if the resulting y′ exceeds the bound B, all the “invisible” values y′
computed during the skipped steps do so, too. This means that it is possible to miss the
sought-after value yˆ only in the last while cycle before termination. So we avoid missing
the correct yˆ by doing the following: If steps have been skipped during the last while cycle,
add n′ − a′ to the current value y′ until y′ + k(n′ − a′) exceeds B for the first time. Then,
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set yˆ = y′ + (k − 1)(n′ − a′) and compute the corresponding xˆ-value as usual.
Algorithm 2 is the result of these considerations.
Algorithm 2: Lin Cong
Input: a, c, n,B, where 0 < a,B < n, 0 ≤ c < n, and gcd(a, n) = 1
Output: xˆ, yˆ such that axˆ = yˆ + c mod n and xˆ ≥ 0 is minimal with respect to the
property 0 ≤ yˆ < B
a′ ← a; c′ ← c; n′ ← n;1
y′ ← −c′ mod n′;2
while y′ ≥ B do3
diff← n′ − a′;4
if diff < a′ and diff < n′ − c′ then5
k ← min{a′ ÷ diff, (n′ − c′)÷ diff};6
(a′, n′)← (a′ − k · diff, n′ − k · diff); /*parallel assignment */7
flag← 18
else9
(a′, n′)← (−n′ mod a′, a′); /*parallel assignment */10
flag← 011
c′ ← c′ mod n′; y′ ← −c′ mod n′12
if flag = 1 /*The sought-after value yˆ may have been missed */13
then14
k ←
⌈
B−y′
diff
⌉
− 1; yˆ ← y′ + k · diff15
else16
yˆ ← y′17
xˆ← a−1(yˆ + c) mod n;18
return (xˆ, yˆ)19
We can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2 a) The complexity of Algorithm 2 (Lin Cong) is O((log n)3).
b) Let a, c, n,B be integers, where 0 < a,B < n, 0 ≤ c < n, and gcd(a, n) = 1 holds.
Algorithm 2 (Lin Cong) on the inputs a, c, n,B finds the x-minimal solution (xˆ, yˆ) of
the congruence ax = y+ c mod n with respect to the bound B. In particular, it finds
a small solution upperbounded by B whenever such a small solution exists.
Proof From the discussion above, we conclude that on each input Algorithm Lin Cong
computes the same output as its slower variant Lin Cong (Outline). Thus, the second part
of the theorem is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.1. It remains to show that
Algorithm Lin Cong runs in polynomial time. We distinguish four cases
1. The condition in line 5 is not fulfilled due to n′− a′ = diff ≥ a′. Hence, the else-case
in line 10 is entered. From n′ ≥ 2a′ we deduce that the assignment n′ ← a′ at least
halves the value of n′.
2. The condition in line 5 is not fulfilled due to n′ − a′ = diff ≥ n′ − c′. Hence, the
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else-case in line 10 is entered and n′ is assigned to a′. Because of a′ ≤ c′ the reduction
of c′ modulo n′(= a′) in line 12 at least halves the value of c′.
3. The condition in line 5 is fulfilled and the value k computed in line 6 equals a′ ÷
(n′−a′). In this case, the assignment a′ ← a′−k(n′−a′) done in line 7 is equivalent
to a′ = a′ mod (n′ − a′). As we have n′− a′ < a′, this assignment at least halves the
value of a′.
4. The condition in line 5 is fulfilled and the value k computed in line 6 equals (n′−c)÷
(n′ − a′). The value of k is chosen in order to achieve that n′ − (k + 1)(n′ − a′) ≤ c′
holds. Hence, the reduction of c′ modulo n′ in line 12 of the following while cycle at
least halves the value of c′.
Summing up, we conclude that at least in each second while cycle at least one of the values
a′, c′ and n′ is at least halved. Note that the algorithm terminates if a′ = 0, c′ = 0 or n′ = 1
holds. Thus, the number of while cycles is bounded above by log a+ 2 log c+ log n. Each
step during the while loop can be done in O((log n)2). Consequently, the time complexity
of the algorithm Lin Cong is O((log n)3). uunionsq
3.3.2 Finding All Small Solutions
In this paragraph, we show that algorithm Lin Cong can be modified to find all small
solutions (x, y) of the linear modular congruence (3.3). Here, we call (x, y) a small so-
lution, if 0 ≤ x, y < √n is satisfied. The time needed for computing all small solutions
is O((log n)3) + lO(log n), where l is the number of small solutions. The most important
observation is that there is a quite simple relationship between all the small solutions in
the case of c = 0. The general case c 6= 0 can be easily derived from the special case. We
will see that in both cases all small solutions are located on the same line.
The Case c = 0
Let (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) be two different small solutions of
ax = y mod n, gcd(a, n) = 1, (3.8)
i. e., we have
ax0 = y0 mod n and ax1 = y1 mod n,
leading to
x0y1 = x1y0 mod n.
Due to the size-constraints we deduce that this relationship even holds in Z. Consequently,
all small solutions are located on the same line through the origin. Hence, to get all of these,
we simply have to compute all integer multiples (kxˆ, kyˆ), k ∈ Z≥0, kxˆ < √n, kyˆ < √n,
where (xˆ, yˆ) is the smallest non-zero solution of eq. (3.8). This solution can be constructed
using algorithm Lin Cong. However, if we run Algorithm Lin Cong on an input with c = 0,
then it will terminate at once with the result (0, 0). But we are seeking for a non-zero
solution, hence, we exploit the relationship ax = y mod n ⇔ a(x − 1) = y − a mod n.
Namely, we run Lin Cong on the input (a, n− a, n,√n), get the result (x′, y′), and return
(xˆ, yˆ) := (x′ + 1, y′). Theorem 3.1 shows that (xˆ, yˆ) indeed yields the smallest non-zero
solution of eq. (3.8).
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The Case c 6= 0
Let (xˆ, yˆ) be the small solution computed by algorithm Lin Cong on the input (a, c, n,
√
n)
and let (xalt, yalt) be a different small solution. In particular, the difference (xalt−xˆ, yalt−yˆ)
is a non-zero solution of eq. (3.8). As xˆ is minimal, we know xˆ < xalt. Thus, we conclude
0 < xalt − xˆ <
√
n,−√n < yalt − yˆ <
√
n. We distinguish two cases:
1. If yalt > yˆ holds, then (xalt − xˆ, yalt − yˆ) is a small solution of congruence (3.8) and
can be found as described above.
2. Otherwise, (xalt − xˆ, yalt − yˆ) is a solution of congruence (3.8), too, but only small
in absolute value (with a negative y-component). It is easy to see that we can find
all solutions (x, y), 0 ≤ x < √n,−√n < y ≤ 0 of congruence (3.8) by computing
all small solutions of (−a)x = y mod n as usual and then altering the signs of the
y-components.
Note that at most one of these two cases may appear: Assume there are two additional
small solutions (xalt1, yalt1) and (xalt2, yalt2) with yalt1 > yˆ and yalt2 < yˆ. Then, the three
differences (xalt1 − xˆ, yalt1 − yˆ), (xalt2 − xˆ, yalt2 − yˆ), and (xalt1 − xalt2, yalt1 − yalt2) form
a non-degenerate triangular. This contradicts the fact that they are located on the same
line through the origin.
Moreover, we can easily verify that for any solution (xˆ, yˆ) of the congruence (3.3) and
for any solution (x, y) of the corresponding congruence (3.8), the pair (xˆ+kx, yˆ+ky) also
forms a solution of (3.3) for any integer k ∈ Z .
All these observations lead to Algorithm 3.
In line 2, we use algorithm Lin Cong to compute the small solution with the minimal x-
coordinate xˆ. If even xˆ exceeds the bound
√
n, then obviously no small solution exists at
all. The pair (x0, y0) computed in line 6 equals the smallest non-zero solution of congruence
(3.8). As we have seen above, each sum of (xˆ, yˆ) and an integer multiple of (x0, y0) yields
a solution of ax = y + c mod n. But as xˆ is minimal, we only have to consider factors
k ≥ 1. If there is at least one small solution (xˆ + kx0, yˆ + ky0), we know that all small
solutions have to be of this shape. Hence, the while loop from line 8 to line 10 finds all
remaining small solutions and the algorithm terminates in line 11. Otherwise we compute
the smallest non-zero solution of ax = y mod n with a negative y-component (lines 12
and 13) and proceed in the same way as before.
Summing up, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3 Let a, c, n be integers, where 0 < a, c < n, and gcd(a, n) = 1 holds. Al-
gorithm 3 (Lin Cong All) finds all solutions (x, y), 0 ≤ x, y < √n of the linear modular
congruence ax = y + c mod n in time O((log n)3) + lO(log n), where l is the number of
these solutions.
3.3.3 Comparison with the Continuous Fraction Method
Another frequently used method for finding small solutions of linear modular congruence
with vanishing affine coefficient c is obtained by the continued fraction expansion. We call
this method the Euclidean reduction (see [HW79] for the comprehensive treatment). To
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Algorithm 3: Lin Cong All
Input: a, c, n, where 0 < a, c < n, and gcd(a, n) = 1
Output: S = {(x, y) | ax = y + c mod n, 0 ≤ x, y < √n}
S ← {};1
(xˆ, yˆ)← Lin Cong(a, c, n,√n);2
if xˆ ≥ √n then return S and halt;3
append (xˆ, yˆ) to S;4
(x′, y′)←Lin Cong(a, n− a, n,√n);5
(x0, y0)← (x′ + 1, y′);6
k ← 1;7
while xˆ+ kx0 <
√
n and yˆ + ky0 <
√
n do8
append (xˆ+ kx0, yˆ + ky0) to S;9
k ← k + 110
if #S > 1 then return S and halt;11
(x′, y′)← Lin Cong(n− a, a, n,√n);12
(x0, y0)← (x′ + 1,−y′);13
k ← 1;14
while xˆ+ kx0 <
√
n and yˆ + ky0 ≥ 0 do15
append (xˆ+ kx0, yˆ + ky0) to S;16
k ← k + 117
return S18
resume, this method finds all fractions p/q nearby a rational number α (i. e., we have
|α − p/q| < 1/(2q2)), where the fractions p/q come in their lowest terms. Assume that
we want to find small solutions that do not exceed
√
n of the congruence ax = y mod n,
where gcd(a, n) = 1 holds. As we have already shown in Section 3.3.2, all these solutions
are located on the same line through the origin. Therefore, there exists a solution (xˆ, yˆ)
such that gcd(xˆ, yˆ) = 1 is fulfilled. From axˆ = yˆ mod n we conclude that there is an integer
k such that axˆ = yˆ + kn. We have
a
n
− k
xˆ
=
yˆ
nxˆ
. (3.9)
If 2xˆyˆ < n holds, the upper-bound of yˆ/nxˆ is 1/2xˆ2. If in addition the rational number
k/xˆ is irreducible, i. e., gcd(k, xˆ) = 1, we can find the integer xˆ and thus yˆ by using
the Euclidian reduction method with α = a/n. Note that gcd(k, xˆ) = 1 holds because
gcd(xˆ, yˆ) = 1 is satisfied: If gcd(k, xˆ) = 1 were not true, there were an integer δ > 1 such
that gcd(k, xˆ) = δ. From axˆ− nk = yˆ, we had δ | yˆ and hence, δ | gcd(xˆ, yˆ), contradicting
gcd(xˆ, yˆ) = 1.
Summing up, we can use this method if we know that the product 2xˆyˆ does not exceed n.
Since the asymptotic computational complexity is the same, we prefer the use of algorithm
Lin Cong, which finds xˆ, yˆ, even if 2xˆyˆ < n is not fulfilled.
3.4 Security Reduction Analysis using the Proposed Algorithm 35
3.4 Security Reduction Analysis using the Proposed Algo-
rithm
In this section, we show how Algorithm 2 (Lin Cong) may be applied to the reduction
proofs of RSA-OAEP and RSA-Paillier. In the case of RSA-OAEP, we will upper-bound
the number of bad values a by 22k0+1−2 log log k, compared to the former bound 22k0+6.
Regarding to RSA-Paillier, we will give an explicit reduction algorithm based on the
work of Catalano et al. [CNS02]. We will achieve reduction time 2t+O((log n)3ε−2) and
advantage ε′ > ε2/5, where t and ε are the time and the advantage of the Hensel-lifting
oracle, respectively.
3.4.1 Application to RSA-OAEP
In Section 3.2.1, we have described the reduction proof given by Fujisaki et al. [FOPS01].
Remember that they have constructed the following congruence
ax = y + c mod n, c = (v − ua) · 2k0 mod n, (3.10)
where u and v are built of the k−k0 most significant bits of m or ma mod n, respectively.
In the RSA-OAEP case we call (x, y) a small solution of the congruence (3.10) iff 0 ≤
x, y < 2k0 holds. The congruence (3.10) is known to have the small solution (r, s), where
r is built from the remaining k0 least significant bits of m.
In Section 3.2.1, we have already seen that the lattice based method only works if
the randomly chosen value a yields an l- good lattice. In contrast, algorithm Lin Cong
always finds a small solution, provided a small solution exists at all. But it has to be
stressed, that referring to the lattice method the choice of a good value a ensures that
there exists exactly one small solution. This is an important property, because if the small
solution (r, s) is not unique, there is of course no warrant that the solution computed
with our algorithm is the correct one. A possible way out is to use algorithm Lin Cong All
instead, which computes all small solutions, and to test each of them. But this is only
efficient if the set of small solutions is not too big. Let l be a natural number. We want
to upperbound the probability that the number of small solutions does not exceed l. As
we have seen in Section 3.3.2, each small solution is of the shape (xˆ+ kx0, yˆ+ ky0), where
(xˆ, yˆ) is the x-minimal solution computed by the algorithm Lin Cong and (x0, y0) is either
the shortest vector of {(x, y) | ax = y mod n, 0 < x, y < 2k0} or it is the shortest vector
of {(x, y) | ax = y mod n, 0 < x < 2k0 ,−2k0 < y < 0}. Hence, there are at most l small
solutions of equation (3.10), iff the congruence ax = y mod n has no solution (x, y), where
0 < x < 2k0/l,−2k0/l < y < 2k0/l. (3.11)
We call a a bad value, if there exists a solution of ax = y mod n fulfilling the size constraints
(3.11). If (3.11) holds for (x, y), then there is exactly one a such that (x, y) is a solution of
ax = y mod n, namely a = x−1y mod n. Note that due to the size constraints no problems
of computing modular inverses occur. Hence there are at most 22k0+1/l2 bad values of a.
The maximal number is 22k0+1 for l = 1.
Therefore, in case of using the lattice solution the probability to choose a bad value
a is at least 25 times greater compared with the corresponding probability in case of
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using algorithm Lin Cong All. We finish with the following theorem that is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 3.3 and the considerations above:
Theorem 3.4 Assume there is an adversary that on input n, e,me mod n returns the
k − k0 most significant bits of m with advantage ε and in time t, where where 2k0 < k
holds and (n, e) is an RSA public key with |n|2 = k. Let l ≤ (log n)2 be any natural number.
Then with advantage ε′ > ε(ε− 22k0+1−k/l2) and in time 2t+O((log n)3) we can compute
a set S with m ∈ S and #S ≤ l.
If we set l = log log n, then it is still possible to check all values r ∈ S in time O˜((log n)3)
and we obtain the following corollary4:
Corollary 3.1 Assume there is an adversary that on input n, e,me mod n returns the
k− k0 most significant bits of m with advantage ε and in time t, where 2k0 < k holds and
(n, e) is an RSA public key with |n|2 = k. Then we can break the RSA problem related to
(n, e) with advantage at least ε(ε− 22k0+1−2 log log k−k) and in time 2t+ O˜((log n)3).
Note that this achievement is the more valuable, the smaller the difference k − 2k0 is. In
the case of PKCS #1 v2.0, however, k0 is much smaller than k/2. Therefore in this case,
the result is mainly of theoretical interest.
3.4.2 Application to RSA-Paillier
In Section 3.2.2, we have described the reduction proof given by Catalano et al. [CNS02].
Recall that they have constructed the following congruence
Ax = y mod n2, A = a(1 + zn)−1 = a(1− zn) mod n2, (3.12)
which is known to have the solution (r, µ), where r, µ are elements of Zn and r is the sought-
after RSA message. Hence, (r, µ) is a small solution of eq. (3.12) and can be constructed
as described in Section 3.3.2, where we have seen how to find all small solutions. To be
concrete, Algorithm 2 (Lin Cong) on the input (A,n2−A,n2, n) finds the smallest non-zero
solution of the congruence (3.12) and all other small solutions come as integer multiples
of this special solution.
Hence, Algorithm 4 describes an efficient method to solve the RSA problem with the
aid of a Hensel-lifting oracle. From the results of Catalano et al. [CNS02] and Saku-
rai/Takagi [ST02] discussed in Section 3.2.2, we conclude that this algorithm also provides
a reduction from the RSA problem to the one-wayness of the RSA-Paillier cryptosystem.
Obviously, the running time of this algorithm is O((log n)3) plus the time needed for
calling the Hensel-lifting oracle twice. To receive the original value r, we have to test if
(kr)e = c mod n holds, where the multiplier k runs from 1 to the (unknown) number
gcd(r, µ), µ = ar mod n. In the following, we upper-bound the probability that gcd(r, µ)
is not sufficiently small. We exploit the following estimate (see [NZ76]):
pi2
3
(
2n2 − 2n
4n2 + 4n+ 1
)
<
n∑
i=1
1
i2
<
pi2
3
(
2n2 + 2n
4n2 + 4n+ 1
)
.
4Here, O˜ denotes the soft O notation, which ignores logarithmic factors. As we have log logn = o(logn),
this measurement is reasonable for practical purposes.
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Algorithm 4: OW RSA Paillier
Input: (n, e) RSA public key, c RSA ciphertext, OHensel Hensel-lifting oracle
Output: Message r < n such that c = re mod n or an integer divisor of r
t← OHensel (c);1
a←[ Z×n /*a is chosen uniformly at random from Z×n */2
s← OHensel (aec mod n);3
v ← taes−1 mod n2;4
z ← (v−1)n e−1 mod n;5
A← a(1− zn) mod n2;6
(xˆ, yˆ)← Lin Cong(A,n2 −A,n2, n);7
return xˆ+ 18
Hence, we have
#{(a, b) ∈ [1, . . . , n]2 | gcd(a, b) > B} <
n∑
i=B+1
n2
i2
<
n2pi2
3
(
2n2 + 2n
4n2 + 4n+ 1
− 2B
2 − 2B
4B2 + 4B + 1
)
<
n2pi2
3
(
1
2
− 2B
2 − 2B
4B2 + 4B + 1
)
.
A simple computation shows
1
2
− 2B
2 − 2B
4B2 + 4B + 1
<
1
B
.
Therefore, we finally conclude
#{(a, b) ∈ [1, . . . , n]2 | gcd(a, b) > B} < 4n
2
B
.
The values r and µ are independently chosen and uniformly distributed elements of Zn.
Replacing 5ε−2 for B, we therefore deduce that the probability that gcd(r, µ) exceeds 5ε−2
is bounded above by 4ε2/5.
This leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 3.5 Let (n, e) be an RSA public key and let OHensel be the Hensel-lifting oracle
that computes re mod n2 for given re mod n with advantage ε and in time t. Using OHensel
as a subroutine, we can break the RSA problem with advantage ε′ > ε2/5 and in time
2t+O((log n)3ε−2).
Example 3.1 (Reduction algorithm OW RSA Paillier) We finish with a small exam-
ple of reduction algorithm OW RSA Paillier. We choose the public key of the RSA-Paillier
cryptosystem as (n, e) = (9359629, 7). In our case, n2 equals 87602655017641. Let C =
2592708 be the target ciphertext. We intend to find the integer r such that C = re mod n
using the oracle OHensel .
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In line 1, we query C to oracleOHensel , and we obtain t = OHensel (C) = 37278188147938.
In line 2, a random integer a ∈ Z×n is generated, and we choose a = 5973500. In line 3, we
compute µe = aeC mod n, ask it to oracle OHensel (µe mod n), and we obtain µe mod n2 =
59913274976876. In lines 4 and 5, an integer z with ar = µ(1 + zn) mod n2 is com-
puted, and in our case, we calculate z = 9040417. In line 6 we obtain the linear equation
Ar = µ mod n2 for A = 35049167803493 and two unknown variables 0 < r, µ < n.
In the following, we solve this linear equation using Algorithm 2 (Lin Cong). We list
the intermediate values of n′, a′, c′ and y′, where n′, a′ and c′ are initialized with n2, A,
and n2 − A, respectively. The while loop terminates if y′ < n holds. Algorithm Lin Cong
computes values xˆ and yˆ, which in our case equal r − 1 and µ.
n′ a′ c′ y′
87602655017641 35049167803493 52553487214148 35049167803493
35049167803493 17544848392838 17504319410655 17544848392838
17544848392838 40528982183 17504319410655 40528982183
40528982183 4200892401 36328089782 4200892401
4200892401 1479941827 2720950574 1479941827
1479941827 238933080 1241008747 238933080
238933080 192589733 46343347 192589733
53559692 7216345 46343347 7216345 ← loop exit
The output values are (1835097, 7216345) = (r − 1, µ). In particular, we successfully find
r = 1835098.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we revisited the security reduction algorithms related to the RSA-OAEP
and the RSA-Paillier cryptosystems. These algorithms exploit techniques of finding small
solutions of linear modular equations. The standard algorithms for solving this task are
lattice-based (Gaussian reduction) or based on continued fractions (Euclidean reduction).
We proposed an efficient alternative algorithm and showed its preferences. In the case of
RSA-OAEP, we were able to enhance the advantage of the reduction proof. For RSA-
Paillier, the previous solution gave qualitative results only (i. e., existence of a polynomial
time reduction with non-negligible advantage). The use of our new algorithm, in contrast,
provides the complete security reduction proof, including explicit bounds for time costs
and the achieved advantage.
Chapter 4
A New Rabin-type Trapdoor
One-way Function and Its
Applications
Public key cryptography has been invented to overcome some key management problems
in open networks. Although nearly all aspects of public key cryptography rely on the
existence of (trapdoor) one-way functions, only a very few candidates of this primitive
have been observed yet. In this chapter, we introduce a new trapdoor one-way function
based on the hardness of factoring integers of p2q-type. We point out similarities between
the proposed function and Rabin-type modular squaring. Most interestingly, two novel
trapdoor one-way permutations can be derived from our approach. Moreover, we develop
several applications to homomorphic encryption, hybrid encryption, fail-stop signature
schemes and trapdoor commitments.
4.1 Introduction
Informally, a one-way function is a function that is “easy” to compute but “hard” to
invert. If there exists some token of information that makes the inversion also an easy
task, then we call the function trapdoor. Trapdoor one-way functions (in particular the
bijective trapdoor one-way permutations) are used as building blocks for various kind
of cryptographic schemes, e. g., asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, and private
information retrieval. There is no doubt that the concept of trapdoor one-way functions
is of particular importance especially in public key cryptography. Nevertheless, just a
relatively small number of promising candidates can be found in the literature. Promising
here means that a presumed hard problem such as the factorization of large integers can
be reduced to the one-wayness of the trapdoor function in question. As not even the pure
existence of one-way functions can be proved today1, this kind of provably secure trapdoor
one-way functions is the best alternative solution at present.
1Interestingly, the current knowledge in complexity theory does not even allow to prove the existence
of one-way functions assuming P 6= NP. On the other hand, it is known that the existence of one-way
functions implies P 6= NP.
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4.1.1 Previous Work
The oldest and still best known candidate trapdoor one-way permutation is the RSA func-
tion, invented 1971 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (see Example 2.1). RSA is defined as
modular exponentiation with exponents coprime to the order of the multiplicative residue
group [RSA78]. The factors of the modulus can serve as a trapdoor to invert the RSA
function, but the opposite direction is unknown. Thus, RSA is not provably equivalent to
factoring, and there are serious doubts that this equivalence holds indeed [BV98]. Anyway,
as the RSA problem has been extensively studied for decades, nowadays inverting the RSA
function is widely accepted as a hard problem itself. Slightly later, Rabin observed that
the special case of modular squaring leads to the desired equivalence to factoring [Rab79].
Modular squaring, however, is not a permutation, it is four-to-one (in case of a two-factor
modulus). This drawback can be overcome: squaring modulo a Blum integer2 n is a per-
mutation of QR(n), where QR(n) := {x ∈ Z×n | ∃y : y2 = x mod n} denotes the group of
quadratic residues modulo n. The resulting trapdoor permutation is referred to as Blum-
Williams function in the literature, and an extension (exponent 2e, where e is coprime
to λ(n)) is denoted Rabin-Williams function. More factorization-based trapdoor permuta-
tions were proposed by Kurosawa et al. [KIT88], Paillier [Pai99a,Pai99b], and Galindo et
al. [GMMV03]. A survey on trapdoor permutations including some less established candi-
dates can be found in [PG97].
4.1.2 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we introduce a rather simple trapdoor one-way function equivalent to
factoring integers of the shape n = p2q. As many previous candidates, our proposed
trapdoor function is also a variant of the RSA function, namely in our case the public
exponent is the same as the modulus n = p2q. On the domain Z×n , the function x 7→
xn mod n is p-to-one, but restricted to the subgroup of n-th residues modulo n, it is indeed
a permutation. These properties are similar to those of the Blum-Williams permutation
(where n-th residues are replaced by quadratic residues). Analogical to the quadratic
residuosity assumption, we assume that without knowledge of the factorization of n, it is
hard to distinguish n-th residues from non-residues, whereas it is efficient if the factors
of n are known. However, the restricted domain has some shortcomings, which also apply
to Blum-Williams and Rabin-Williams functions: in practical applications, the data has
to be preprocessed into the set of n-th, resp. quadratic residues. Supposably, this is one
reason why the RSA function (with domain Zn) is by far more widespread in commercial
applications than Rabin-type functions. But fortunately, we can prove that for n of p2q-
type the set of n-th residues is isomorphic to Z×pq, thus our proposed trapdoor function also
provides a bijection between the easy-to-handle domain Z×pq and the set of n-th residues. No
such property is known for Rabin-type functions. Consequently, our trapdoor permutation
can be used to encrypt arbitrary strings like keys. We provide an application in Section 4.4.
Further advantages of our trapdoor one-way function in contrast to Rabin-type modular
squaring accrue from the fact that the magnitude of the kernel is larger. This provides a
higher degree of freedom in finding pre-images, and therefore offers the construction of fail-
stop signatures (see Section 4.5) and trapdoor commitments (see Section 4.6). Moreover,
we can extend our analysis to a Paillier-like function operating in the group Z×
n2
for n of
2A Blum integer is a product of two distinct primes each congruent to 3 modulo 4.
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p2q-type. Interestingly, it turns out that in this case we are able to reduce factoring to the
one-wayness of Paillier’s encryption scheme, whilst the one-wayness of Paillier’s original
scheme relies on a non-standard assumption only (see Section 4.3).
As in this chapter we give numerous applications to rather different cryptographic
domains, more detailed motivations and full descriptions of our contributions in the par-
ticular fields are postponed to the respective sections.
4.2 A Trapdoor One-way Permutation Equivalent to Fac-
toring
In this section, we introduce a new trapdoor one-way function and two associated trapdoor
one-way permutations. We also give a short account on the mathematical background in
order to deepen the understanding about the special properties of the group Z×n for n of
p2q-type.
For the sake of completeness, we formally define the notion of trapdoor one-way func-
tion , resp. permutation.
Definition 4.1 (Collection of Trapdoor One-way Functions) Let I be a set of
indices such that for each i ∈ I the sets Di and D˜i are finite. Let F = {fi | fi : Di −→
D˜i}i∈I be a family of functions. Then F is said to be a collection of trapdoor one-way
functions if
1. There exists a polynomial p and a probabilistic polynomial time key generator KeyGen
such that KeyGen on input 1k (the security parameter) outputs a pair (i, ti) where
i ∈ {0, 1}k ∩ I, |ti|2 < p(k). The data ti is denoted the trapdoor information of fi.
2. The domains Di are samplable: There exists a probabilistic polynomial time sampling
algorithm S that on input i ∈ I outputs x ∈ Di uniformly chosen at random.
3. The elements of F are easy to evaluate: There exists a deterministic polynomial time
evaluator Eval that on input i ∈ I, x ∈ Di outputs fi(x).
4. Inverting the elements of F is easy if the trapdoor information is known: There
exists a deterministic polynomial time inverter Inv such that for all x ∈ Di we have
fi(Inv(ti, fi(x))) = fi(x).
5. Inverting the elements of F is hard if the trapdoor information is unknown: For
every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm AI the following is negligible in k:
Pr[(i, ti)←[ KeyGen(1k);x←[ Di; x˜←[ AI(fi(x)) : fi(x˜) = fi(x)].
Trapdoor one-way permutations are bijective trapdoor one-way functionstrapdoor one-way
permutation.
Definition 4.2 (Collection of Trapdoor One-way Permutations) Let I be a set
of indices such that for each i ∈ I the sets Di and D˜i are finite and of the same order. Let
F = {fi | fi : Di −→ D˜i}i∈I be a family of bijections. Then F is said to be a collection
of trapdoor one-way permutations if F is a collection of trapdoor one-way functions as
specified in Definition 4.1 above.
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Remark 4.1 1. When speaking of trapdoor one-way functions, resp. permutations we
may omit the phrase “one-way” for the reader’s convenience.
2. In contrast to strictly mathematical parlance, we do not require that permutations
are maps onto itself.
3. In case of trapdoor permutations the value computed by the inverter must equal the
original pre-image x in properties 4. and 5. of Definition 4.1.
4.2.1 The Proposed Trapdoor One-way Function
Throughout this section, let p, q be primes with p - q− 1 and q - p− 1. We define n = p2q.
All of our constructions are based on the following group homomorphism:
Definition 4.3 (The homomorphism h) Let p, q be primes with p - q − 1, q - p− 1 and
n = p2q. Then we define:
h : Z×n −→ Z×n
x 7→ xn mod n
The reason why we do not use standard RSA moduli is the observation that in Z×n with
n = p2q there are elements of order p:
Lemma 4.1 Let p, q be primes with p - q − 1 and n = p2q. Define the set S as
S := {x ∈ Z×n |x = 1 + kpq for an integer k, 0 < k < p}.
Then S consists of exactly the elements of multiplicative order p in Z×n .
Proof Let x be an element of multiplicative order p in Z×n . Then we have
xp = 1 mod n ⇒ (xp = 1 mod p ∧ xp = 1 mod q)
⇒ (x = 1 mod p ∧ x = 1 mod q).
Hence, pq | x− 1, and we conclude x ∈ S.
On the other hand, we have 1 6∈ S and from the binomial expansion formula it is obvious
that for all x ∈ S the equality xp = 1 mod n must hold. Thus, the assertion follows. uunionsq
From Lemma 4.1, we can easily deduce that each element of order p in Z×n reveals the
factorization of n. On this fact we will base the one-wayness of our proposed trapdoor
functions. Next, we analyze the relationship between the homomorphism h and the set S:
Lemma 4.2 Let h and S be defined as above. Then we have
ker(h) = {1} ∪ S.
Proof Note that as p is the only non-trivial common factor of n and ϕ(n) = p(p−1)(q−1),
we must have
xn = 1 mod n ⇐⇒ x = 1 ∨ ordn(x) = p.
Hence, the kernel of h consists of 1 and exactly the elements of multiplicative order p in
Z×n , i. e., the elements of S as defined in Lemma 4.1. uunionsq
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As therefore the magnitude of the kernel of h is exactly p, we obtain
Corollary 4.1 The homomorphism h as defined above is p-to-1.
Next, we will prove that h is collision-resistant, as a collision leads to a non-trivial element
of ker(h).
Theorem 4.1 For x, y ∈ Z×n we have
xn = yn mod n ⇐⇒ h(x) = h(y) ⇐⇒ x = y mod pq.
Proof “⇐”: Let y = x+kpq for k ∈ Z. Then, (x+kpq)n = xn+nxn−1kpq = xn mod n.
“⇒”: xn = yn mod n leads to xy−1 ∈ ker(h), consequently xy−1 = 1 mod pq using
Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2.
uunionsq
Thus, we can factor n if we can find collisions of h. Before stating this result explicitely,
we formally define the p2q factorization assumption:
Definition 4.4 (p2q Factorization Assumption) Define I(k) = {n = p2q | p, q ∈
PRIMES(k), p - q − 1, q - p − 1, p 6= q}. Then the p2q Factorization Assumption states
that for any PPA A the following quantity (called A’s advantage) is negligible in k:
Pr[n←[ I(k) : A(n) = (p, q)].
In Section 4.2.2, we analyze the reliability of the p2q Factorization Assumption.
Corollary 4.2 If the p2q Factorization Assumption holds, then the homomorphism h is
collision-resistant.
Proof Assume that A is a polynomial time algorithm that on input n determines x, y ∈
Z×n with x 6= y and h(x) = h(y). From Theorem 4.1, we conclude gcd(x−y, n) = pq, which
completely reveals the factorization of n. uunionsq
In the following, we introduce two restrictions of h that turn out to be trapdoor permu-
tations. For this purpose, we formally define the set of n-th residues modulo n.
Definition 4.5 (N-R(n)) Let N-R(n) = {x ∈ Z×n |x = yn mod n for a y ∈ Z×n } = im(h)
denote the set of the n-th residues modulo n.
N-R(n) is a subgroup of Z×n of order (p−1)(q−1) (as there are exactly ϕ(pq) = (p−1)(q−1)
pairwise different n-th residues modulo n, namely the elements {xn mod n |x ∈ Z×pq}).
Now we can state the main results of this section:
Theorem 4.2 1. Let I = {n = p2q | p, q ∈ PRIMES, p - q−1, q - p−1, p 6= q} be a set
of indices. The family F = {h(n)}n∈I is a collection of trapdoor one-way functions,
where h(n) is defined as
h(n) : Z×n −→ N-R(n)
x 7→ xn mod n.
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2. Let I be defined as above. The family FN-R = {h(n)N-R}n∈I is a collection of trapdoor
one-way permutations, where h(n)N-R is defined as
h
(n)
N-R : N-R(n) −→ N-R(n)
x 7→ xn mod n.
3. Let I be defined as above. The family Fpq = {h(n)pq }n∈I is a collection of trapdoor
one-way permutations, where h(n)pq is defined as
h(n)pq : Z×pq −→ N-R(n)
x 7→ xn mod n.
In all cases, the trapdoor is the factorization of n and the one-wayness is based on the
p2q Factorization Assumption. We omit the superscript (n) whenever it is clear from the
context.
Proof 1. Properties 1. to 3. of Definition 4.1 are obviously fulfilled. Define d =
n−1 mod ϕ(pq) (note that gcd(n, ϕ(pq)) = 1). Then it is easy to see that (h(x))d =
x mod pq holds for all x ∈ Z×n . Thus, d (resp. the factorization of n) can be utilized
as a trapdoor to invert h, which shows property 4. Note that we always obtain the
minimum of all pre-images (from Theorem 4.1, we conclude that there is exactly
one pre-image smaller than pq). The one-wayness (property 5.) is a consequence of
Corollary 4.2: To factor n with access to an oracle that inverts h, we choose an ele-
ment x ∈ Z×n at random and query the oracle on h(x) = xn mod n. With probability
1−1/p, the oracle will answer a pre-image x˜ 6= x mod n. Thus, x and x˜ collide under
h, and from Corollary 4.2 we deduce that gcd(x− x˜, n) = pq reveals the factorization
of n.
2. We first show that the hN-R are indeed permutations. Define d as above. Let x be
an element of N-R(n), i. e., x = yn mod n for an appropriate y ∈ Z×n . Then we have
(xn)d = yn
2d = x mod n, because of n2d = n mod ϕ(n) (equality holds modulo p
and modulo ϕ(pq)). Thus, x 7→ xn mod n is a permutation of N-R(n). The remaining
properties can be shown along the lines of the preceding proof.
3. The considerations in 1. particularly imply that (hpq(x))d = x mod pq holds for all
x ∈ Z×pq. Moreover, we have #Z×pq = (p − 1)(q − 1) = #N-R(n). Thus, hpq is a
bijection. Again, the remaining properties can be shown along the lines of the proof
given in 1.
Remark 4.2 The fact that modular exponentiation with n = p2q can be inverted uniquely
modulo pq has been implicitly exploited in [Pai99b], where Pascal Paillier introduced a
trapdoor permutation based on the Okamoto-Uchiyama trapdoor mechanism. However,
the results and the proof techniques used in [Pai99b] are substantial different from our
proposal. In particular, Paillier does not utilize the one-wayness of raising to the n-th
power, which is a central tool in our constructions.
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4.2.2 The Hardness of the p2q Factoring Problem
Recently, the use of p2q type moduli (resp. more general pkq) attracted much attention
in cryptography. For example, the modulus p2q is used in the famous family of EPOC
cryptosystems (based on Okamoto-Uchiyama homomorphic encryption) [FKM+00,OU98,
OP00] and in the signature scheme ESIGN [FOM91], whereas moduli pkq can be utilized
to enhance the decryption speed in RSA-type encryption schemes [Tak98,Tak04].
Numerous researchers tried to exploit the special form of those integers to find faster
factorization methods [AM94, PO96, BDHG99]. But unless the exponent k in pkq is not
too large, the most efficient methods for factoring n = pkq are still Lenstra’s elliptic curve
method (ECM) [Len87], its improvements [PO96], and the general number field sieve
(GNFS) [LL93]. More precisely, if the size of the smallest prime factor of n exceeds some
bound, the GNFS is the method of choice3. Consequently, if n is sufficiently large (i. e.,
exceeding 1000 bits), the special form n = p2q causes no problem, because in contrast to
ECM the runtime of the GNFS only depends on the size of n, not on the size of its smallest
prime factor. Concluding, although it is not known if factoring n = p2q is more tractable
than factoring n = pq or not, the p2q Factorization Assumption is well-investigated and
therefore can be regarded as fairly weak.
4.2.3 Comparison
We want to point out the similarities among exponentiation modulo n = p2q and Rabin-
type modular squaring. In both cases, we have a group homomorphism with a non-trivial
kernel (of size four in case of Rabin and of size p in our case). Moreover, one-wayness
holds because each non-trivial kernel element reveals the factorization of the modulus.
Obviously, the Blum-Williams permutation on quadratic residues corresponds to our per-
mutation hN-R on n-th residues. In the case of modular squaring, however, to the best
of our knowledge there is no analogue to the bijection hpq. The latter is interesting for
practical applications, as no preprocessing into the set of n-th residues is necessary. In par-
ticular, hpq can be used to encrypt arbitrary strings like keys. We provide an application
in Section 4.4. Further advantages of our proposal are due to the fact that the magnitude
of the kernel is larger. To confirm this statement, we will construct fail-stop signatures in
Section 4.5 and trapdoor commitments in Section 4.6 from the homomorphism h. In sum-
mary, our proposal suffers from one obvious disadvantage (efficiency), but it also features
lots of less conspicuous advantages compared to Rabin-type modular squaring.
To emphasize the analogy to Rabin-type modular squaring even more, we assume that
without knowledge of the factors of n distinguishing N-R(n) from Z×n is hard (cf. the
well-known quadratic residuosity assumption).
Definition 4.6 (Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption) Define I(k) =
{n = p2q | p, q ∈ PRIMES(k), p - q − 1, q - p − 1, p 6= q}. Then the Decisional Com-
posite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA) states that for any polynomial time distinguisher
A the following quantity (called A’s advantage) is negligible in k:
|Pr[n←[ I(k);x←[ Z×n : A(x) = 1]− Pr[n← [ I(k);x←[ Z×n : A(xn mod n) = 1]|
3The currently largest factor found with ECM consists of 66 decimal digits (April 2005), whilst the
current GNFS record is the factorization of a 200 decimal digits RSA modulus (May 2005).
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Given p and q, however, deciding n-th residuosity is efficient.
Theorem 4.3 For all x ∈ Z×n , x > 1 we have
x ∈ N-R(n) ⇐⇒ xp−1 = 1 mod p2.
Proof First we show an auxiliary proposition:
x ∈ N-R(n) ⇐⇒ x(p−1)(q−1) = 1 mod n.
From p - q − 1, q - p − 1 we deduce gcd((p − 1)(q − 1), n) = 1. Hence there exists z ∈ Z
with z(p− 1)(q− 1) = 1 mod n, leading to −z(p− 1)(q− 1)+ 1 = kn for a suitable k ∈ Z.
Thus, we have
x(p−1)(q−1) = 1 mod n⇒ x−z(p−1)(q−1)+1 = x mod n
⇒ (xk)n = x mod n.
This finishes the proof of the auxiliary proposition, as the opposite direction is straight-
forward.
Therefore, we have the following for x > 1:
x ∈ N-R(n) ⇐⇒ x(p−1)(q−1) = 1 mod n
⇐⇒ x(p−1)(q−1) = 1 mod p2 and x(p−1)(q−1) = 1 mod q (4.1)
⇐⇒ x(p−1)(q−1) = 1 mod p2 (4.2)
⇐⇒ x(p−1) = 1 mod p2. (4.3)
Note that (4.2) ⇒(4.1) holds because x(p−1)(q−1) = 1 mod q is true for all x ∈ Z×n . From
gcd(q − 1, ϕ(p2) = 1) we deduce (4.2) ⇒(4.3). uunionsq
Table 4.1 summarizes the above considerations.
Z×n −→ N-R(n) for n = p2q
x 7→ xn mod n
Z×n −→ QR(n) for n = pq
x 7→ x2 mod n
group homomorphism
p-to-1 4-to-1
non-trivial kernel element reveals factorization of n
restriction to N-R(n) is permutation restriction to QR(n) is permutation
restriction to Z×pq is permutation no analogue known
hard to distinguish N-R(n) and Z×n hard to distinguish QR(n) and Z×n
above distinction is easy of factors of n are known
Table 4.1: Comparison between proposed trapdoor function and Rabin-type modular
squaring
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4.3 Application to Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption schemes provide the possibility of computing the ciphertext of
an appropriate combination of two messages from the ciphertexts of these messages only.
Here, combination usually refers to a group operation such as modular addition, modular
multiplication, or XOR. Thus, homomorphic encryption enables a third party to operate
on the underlying messages without decrypting the ciphertexts, in particular without
knowledge of the secret key. Although this property implies malleability and therefore
a homomorphic encryption scheme can never meet the strongest security notion IND-
CCA2, there are nevertheless several applications for homomorphic encryption as building
blocks for cryptographic protocols like electronic voting, private information retrieval, and
threshold cryptography.
Previous Work
In their seminal paper from 1984, Goldwasser and Micali introduced the notion of semantic
security and presented the first cryptosystem meeting this requirements [GM84]. Their
proposed probabilistic cryptosystem is additively homomorphic but suffers from a very
limited bandwidth (the encryption is performed bit-wise). Over the intervening years this
scheme has been improved several times, where the most notable ameliorations came from
Benaloh-Fischer [CF85] and Naccache-Stern [NS98]. However, the actual breakthrough
in the field of semantically secure additive homomorphic encryption has been achieved
by Okamoto-Uchiyama and Paillier with a different approach. Namely, their idea was to
change the group structure from Z×n with a RSA modulus n to Z×n with n = p2q (Okamoto-
Uchiyama [OU98]), resp. to Z×
n2
(Paillier [Pai99a]). Both works gained recognition not
only for presenting practical solutions to homomorphic encryption, but also for pointing
out the rich mathematical structure of the groups Z×n with n = p2q, resp. Z×n2 , n = pq.
Whilst the assumptions on which IND-CPA security relies seems to be comparable for both
schemes (p-subgroup assumption versus decisional composite residuosity assumption), this
is not the case for one-wayness: Okamoto-Uchiyama’s cryptosystem can be proved one-
way if factoring integers p2q is hard, but for Paillier’s scheme, no security proof based
on a standard intractability assumption has been observed yet4. In the following, several
variants of Paillier’s original scheme have been described, e. g., RSA-Paillier [CGHGN01],
that significantly reduces the encryption costs and that is one-way under the standard
RSA-assumption as shown in Section 3.2.2. However, the one-way reduction is not tight
and the scheme is not homomorphic any more.
Our Contributions
Our contribution in this section is the development of a factorization-based variant of
Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme. Our concept is to study Paillier’s original en-
cryption function in a different group, i. e., instead of Z×
n2
with an RSA modulus n we
consider the group Z×
n2
with the Okamoto-Uchiyama modulus n = p2q. Based on the anal-
ysis of the trapdoor one-way function introduced in Section 4.2.1, we are able to show that
the proposed cryptosystem is one-way under the p2q Factorization Assumption. Moreover,
4In [Pai99a], Paillier based the one-wayness of his scheme on the composite residuosity assumption, but
this assumption is merely a paraphrase of the designated one-wayness property.
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the new scheme inherits all the nice properties of Paillier’s original one, such as semantic
security, additively homomorphic property and efficiency. Unfortunately, the new scheme
inherits the most serious drawback of Okamoto-Uchiyama’s cryptosystem, too, namely
it is vulnerable to a simple chosen ciphertext attack of lunchtime-type (in general, this
seems to be the flip-side of the coin regarding factorization-based one-wayness, see e. g.,
textbook Rabin). This problem has to be dealt with on the protocol level. Paillier’s orig-
inal scheme is neither provably secure against lunchtime attacks, nor there are successful
attacks known today.
4.3.1 Basic Notions and Definitions for Homomorphic Encryption
The most important notions regarding public key encryption have already been presented
in Section 2.2. Therefore, we only define the special case of homomorphic encryption and
present an example.
Definition 4.7 (Homomorphic Encryption) The probabilistic public key encryption
scheme (KeyGen, E ,D) is said to be
homomorphic, if the message space is a group (G, ◦G), the ciphertext space is a group
(H, ◦H) and for any m1,m2 ∈ G we have
Epk(m1 ◦G m2) = Epk(m1) ◦H Epk(m2).
entirely homomorphic, if the space of randomness used for encryption and the message
space form a group (G, ◦G), the ciphertext space is a group (H, ◦H) and for any
(m1, r1), (m2, r2) ∈ G we have
Epk((m1, r1) ◦G (m1, r2)) = Epk(m1; r1) ◦H Epk(m2; r2).
Remark 4.3 The definition of entirely homomorphic is as general as possible. In common
examples, the message space and the space of randomness can also be described by two
separate groups. Our proposed scheme, however, meets the above specified requirement.
For most applications, homomorphic encryption is sufficient.
In Section 2.2.3, we have already observed that Paillier’s encryption scheme is entirely
homomorphic with G = Zn×Z×n and (m1, r1)◦G (m1, r2) = (m1+m2 mod n, r1r2 mod n2)
due to gm1+m2 mod n(r1r2)n = (gm1r1)(gm2rn2 ) mod n
2 (recall that n divides the order of g
modulo n2).
We additionally provide a second example that is important for the rest of this section.
Example 4.1 (Okamoto-Uchiyama Encryption Scheme) We briefly sketch the
Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption scheme from Eurocrypt 1998 [OU98]. Let n be of the shape
n = p2q for two large primes p, q. Consider the Sylow group Γp = {x ∈ Zp2 |x = 1 mod p}
of Z×
p2
. The crucial observation is that the L-function defined on Γp as Lp(x) = (x− 1)/p
provides additive homomorphic properties. The encryption scheme is described as follows:
KeyGen : On the input 1k (security parameter) choose p, q ∈ PRIMES(k), p 6= q and
define n = p2q. Furthermore choose h ∈ N-R(n), and g ∈ Z×n with p | ordp2(g).
The public key equals (n, h, g, k), whilst p is the secret key. Moreover we haveM =
{0, 1}k−1, C = Zn.
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E : Choose a random value r ∈ Zn. For m ∈ M, the ciphertext is computed as c =
gmhr mod n.
D : A ciphertext c ∈ C is decrypted in the following way: c′ = cp−1 mod p2, gp = gp−1 mod
p2,m = L(c′)L(gp)−1 mod p.
The correctness is deduced from the additive homomorphic properties of the L-function
because we have c′ = gmp mod p2 and gp ∈ Γp. To enhance the decryption cost, the value
gp is usually precomputed and stored in the secret key. In [OU98] it is shown that breaking
the one-wayness of this scheme is as hard as factoring the modulus. Moreover, the scheme
is IND-CPA under the p-subgroup assumption.
4.3.2 The Proposed Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Our new encryption scheme is based on the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4 Let n = p2q for primes p, q > 3 with p - q − 1, q - p − 1. The map f :
Z×n × Zn −→ Z×n2 , (r,m) 7→ rn(1 +mn) mod n2 has the following properties:
1. f is well-defined, i. e., if r = r′ mod n and m = m′ mod n holds, then it follows that
rn(1 +mn) = r′n(1 +m′n) mod n2 is true.
2. f is homomorphic in r and m, i. e., f(r1r2,m1 +m2) = f(r1,m1)f(r2,m2).
3. f(r,m) = f(r + ipq,m− ir−1pq) for i ∈ Z, hence f is p-to-one.
4. im(f) = {x = x0 + nx1 ∈ Z×n2 |x0 ∈ N-R(n), x1 ∈ Zn}.
5. The restrictions fm = f |Z×n×Zpq and fr = f |Z×pq×Zn are one-to-one.
6. fr : Z×pq × Zn −→ Z×n2 is a group homomorphism with respect to the group operation◦r on Z×pq × Zn:
(r1,m1) ◦r (r2,m2) = (r1r2 mod pq︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:rpq
,m1 +m2 + lr−1pq pq mod n),
where 0 ≤ l < p is defined via r1r2 = rpq + lpq mod n.
7. fm : Z×n ×Zpq −→ Z×n2 is a group homomorphism with respect to the group operation◦m on Z×n × Zpq:
(r1,m1) ◦m (r2,m2) = (r1r2 − lpq mod n,m1 +m2 mod pq︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:mpq
),
where 0 ≤ l < p is defined via m1 +m2 = mpq − (r1r2)−1lpq mod n.
Proof 1. Straightforward (use (r + in)n =
∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
rn−j(in)j = rn mod n2).
2. Straightforward computation.
50 A New Rabin-type Trapdoor One-way Function and Its Applications
3. We have
f(r + ipq,m− ir−1pq) = (r + ipq)n(1 + (m− ir−1pq)n)
=
 3∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
rn−j(ipq)j
 (1 + (m− ir−1pq)n)
=
(
rn + nrn−1ipq +
n(n− 1)
2
rn−2(ipq)2 +
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
6
rn−3(ipq)3
)
(1 + (m− ir−1pq)n)
= (rn + nrn−1ipq)(1 + (m− ir−1pq)n)
= rn + n(rn−1ipq + rnm− rnir−1pq) = rn(1 +mn) = f(r,m) mod n2
Note that the second step is true, because n2 = p4q2 is an integer divisor of (ipq)j for
j > 3. The fourth step holds because n divides n(n−1)/2 as well as n(n−1)(n−2)/6
(n is odd and either n− 1 or n− 2 is a multiple of 3).
4. - 7. are more or less immediate consequences of 3. and 2.
uunionsq
We can now define our proposed encryption scheme as a variant of Paillier’s scheme de-
scribed in Example 2.2.
KeyGen : Let k be a security parameter. Choose p, q ∈ PRIMES(k) such that p - q−1, q -
p − 1, p 6= q and define n = p2q. Compute d = n−1 mod (p− 1)(q − 1) and let l be
chosen such that 2l < pq < 2l+1.
The public key is pk = (n, l), and the secret key is sk = (d, p, q). Moreover, set
M = {0, 1}l, C = Z×
n2
.
E : To encrypt a message m ∈ M, choose r ∈ Z×n at random and compute the ciphertext
as c = rn(1 +mn) mod n2.
D : To decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ C, first compute r = cd mod pq. Then m is recovered as
m = Ln(r−nc mod n2) mod pq, where the L-function is defined as Ln(x) = x−1n .
We can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.5 1. The proposed encryption scheme is correct.
2. The proposed encryption scheme is entirely homomorphic, i. e., we have
Epk(m1; r1)Epk(m2; r2) = Epk((m1, r1) ◦ (m2, r2)),
where ◦ is the group operation on Z×n × Zpq as defined in Theorem 4.4(7).
3. The proposed encryption scheme is OW-CPA under the p2q Factorization Assump-
tion.
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Proof 1. Let c = rn(1 + mn) mod n2 be a ciphertext for m ∈ Zpq and r ∈ Z×n .
Define r˜ = cd mod pq. From Theorem 4.4(5) we know that f is one-way if the
space of randomness or the space of messages is restricted modulo pq. Therefore,
we obtain p different messages modulo n if we compute Ln(r−ni c mod n
2) for ri :=
r˜ + ipq mod n2, i = 0, . . . , p − 1. However, Theorem 4.4(3) tells us that all these
messages are congruent modulo pq. Hence, Ln(r˜−nc mod n2) uniquely recovers the
original m < pq.
2. See Theorem 4.4(7).
3. Assume that there is a PPA A winning GAME.OW as described in Definition 2.3
with non-negligible probability ε. We show how to factor n by playing the following
modified game with A: First, we choose m′ ∈ Zn and r ∈ Z×n at random and build
the fake ciphertext c′ = rn(1+m′n) mod n2. In step 4, A is given the public key n, l
and the challenge c′. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: We have |m′ mod pq|2 ≤ l. From Theorem 4.4(3), we conclude that in this
case the distribution of c′ is exactly the same as the distribution of the original
ciphertexts. Moreover, we deduce that c′ = Epk(m′ mod pq; r′) holds for an
appropriate r′ ∈ Z×n with r = r′ mod pq. Thus, A will return m′pq := m′ mod pq
with probability ε. From the choice of m′, we observe that m′ > pq holds with
probability 1− 1/p. Thus, we factor n via gcd(n,m′ −m′pq) = pq.
From the definition of l, we conclude that this case holds with probability
greater than 1/2.
Case 2: We have |m′ mod pq|2 > l. In this case, c′ is not an element of the regular
ciphertext space and we cannot predict the adversary A’s advantage in the
modified game.
Therefore, we factor the modulus with advantage at least ε2(1− 1/p).
uunionsq
Remark 4.4 Although the group operation that makes the scheme entirely homomor-
phic is non-standard, we want to point out that for almost all applications the follow-
ing homomorphic property of the proposed scheme is sufficient: Epk(m1; r1)Epk(m2; r2) =
Epk(m1 +m2 mod pq; r) for some r ∈ Z×n .
We now show that the proposed scheme is indistinguishable against passive adversaries
under the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA) introduced in Defi-
nition 4.6 lifted to the domain Z×
n2
. This assumption—abbreviated DSCRA for Deci-
sional Squared Composite Residuosity Assumption hereafter—states that n-th residues
in Z×
n2
are indistinguishable from non-residues. As each x ∈ Z×
n2
has a unique n-adic
decomposition x = x0 + nx1 mod n2, 0 ≤ x0, x1 < n, x0 ∈ Z×n , and because we have
xn = (x0+nx1)n = xn0+
(
n
1
)
xn1 = x
n
0 mod n
2, the following equality holds: {xn mod n2|x ∈
Z×
n2
} = {xn mod n2|x ∈ Z×n }. Thus, to obtain the DSCRA from Definition 4.6, we only
have to replace x ←[ Z×n by x ←[ Z×n2 in the left probability, and A(xn mod n) = 1 byA(xn mod n2) = 1 in the right probability. Recall that this assumption only differs from
Paillier’s original security assumption in the type of the modulus (p2q instated of pq). As
long as factoring integers of p2q type is supposed to be as hard as factoring integers of pq
type, there is no reason to believe that the tractability of DSCR problem depends on the
type of the modulus.
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Theorem 4.6 The proposed scheme is IND-CPA if and only if the Decisional Squared
Composite Residuosity Assumption holds.
Proof To prove that the proposed scheme is IND-CPA under the DSCRA, we construct a
distinguisher D which breaks DSCRA using the adversary A against the indistinguishabil-
ity of the proposed scheme as a subroutine. Assume that A wins GAME.IND as described
in Definition 2.4 with non-negligible probability. Let x ∈ Z×
n2
be an instance of the DSCR
problem. D plays the following modified game with A. In step 2, D runs A on the public
key and obtains a state information st and two different messages m0,m1 ∈ M. Then D
chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} at random, computes c = x(1+mbn) mod n2, and runs A on (st, c)
(step 4). D returns 1 (indicating that x is a n-th residue modulo n2) if A’s answer is b,
otherwise, D returns 0. If x is an n-th residue modulo n2, than c is a valid cipher of m0
(distributed as original ciphertexts), and consequently the modified game and the original
game are perfectly indistinguishable from A’s point of view. Otherwise, c is a random
element of Z×
n2
(independent from everything A knows), and A’s advantage must equal
1/2. Thus, the overall advantage of D equals ε/2, where ε is the non-negligible advantage
of A in winning GAME.IND.
To prove the opposite direction, we sketch how a distinguisher D of DSCRA with non-
negligible advantage ε can be used to break the indistinguishability of the proposed scheme.
The adversary A against IND-CPA play GAME.IND as follows: In step 2, A chooses two
different messages m0,m1 ∈ M and a bit b ∈ {0, 1} at random. Given the challenge
c ∈ Z×
n2
in step 5, A queries D on c(1 − mbn) mod n2 and returns b if the answer is 1,
1− b otherwise (note (1+mbn)−1 = (1−mbn) mod n2). With a similar argumentation as
above we conclude that the advantage of A equals ε/2. uunionsq
4.3.3 Comparison
Summing up, we showed that by replacing the modulus n = pq with n = p2q in Paillier’s
scheme one obtains an encryption scheme with the following properties:
• The proposed scheme is one-way under a weak standard assumption (namely factor-
ing n = p2q).
• The security reduction is tight.
• The proposed scheme is IND-CPA under the same security assumption as Paillier’s
original one.
• The proposed scheme is still homomorphic.
• The only drawback of the new scheme is that as the Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption
it is vulnerable to a simple chosen ciphertext attack of lunchtime-type.
We recapitulate our results in Table 4.2. As the efficiency is similar in all schemes, we do
not compare encryption/decryption costs.
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Scheme Assumption (OW) Assumption (IND-CPA) CCA1-secure
Okamoto-Uchiyama FACT p-subgroup NO
Paillier composite residuosity DSCR unknown
Proposed FACT DSCR NO
Table 4.2: Comparison of homomorphic encryption schemes
4.4 Application to CCA Secure Hybrid Encryption
Although the concept of public key cryptography (a. k. a. asymmetric cryptography) is
pretty appealing and has many organizational advantages, secret key cryptography (a. k. a.
symmetric cryptography) is still much more efficient. Thus, for practical applications the
combination of both concepts, i. e., hybrid encryption is quite popular.
Previous Work
Combining symmetric and asymmetric encryption has been widely used in practice, al-
though most constructions accrued from ad-hoc considerations and were not rigorously
analyzed. In provably secure cryptography, hybrid encryption first played a role in the
context of generic constructions for CCA secure public key encryption [BR94, FO99a,
FO99b, OP01]. These techniques exploit Vernam’s one-time pad and random oracles to
enhance the security of weakly secure public-key primitives like OW-CPA and IND-CPA
secure encryption. In [FO99b], Fujisaki and Okamoto were the first to analyze the pos-
sibility of replacing the one-time pad by any symmetric encryption meeting appropriate
security requirements. Unfortunately, the random oracle paradigmrandom oracle model is
a crucial requirement for all these conversions.
Beside the technique of applying specific generic constructions to suitable asymmetric
and symmetric primitives, a more general solution of hybrid encryption has been intro-
duced by Cramer and Shoup in [CS04]. In this paper, Cramer and Shoup formalize the so-
called KEM/DEM framework where KEM is a probabilistic asymmetric key-encapsulation
mechanism, and DEM is a symmetric encryption scheme (a data encapsulation mechanism)
used to encrypt messages of arbitrary length with the key given by the KEM. As said be-
fore, such combinations of public and secret key schemes have been folklore for years, but
Cramer and Shoup for the first time gave a rigorously analyzed formal treatment of this
subject. Note that a KEM is not the same as a key agreement protocol: the encapsulated
key is designated to be used once only, therefore the DEM is only required to be secure
in the one-time scenario. For more details on security definitions and requirements the
reader is referred to [CS04]. Roughly speaking, if both the KEM and the DEM part are
CCA-secure, then the same holds for the whole KEM/DEM scheme.
At Eurocrypt 2005, Abe et al. enhanced Cramer and Shoup’s framework by introducing
the notion of a Tag-KEM, which is a KEM equipped with a special piece of information,
the tag [AGK05]. In their novel framework for hybrid encryption, this tag as part of
an CCA-secure Tag-KEM is assigned to protect the non-malleability of the DEM part.
Consequently, for the CCA-security of the whole Tag-KEM/DEM hybrid scheme with an
CCA-secure Tag-KEM, it is only required that the DEM part is secure against passive
adversaries. This is an obvious improvement compared to the KEM/DEM framework, but
the flip-side of the coin is that proving a Tag-KEM to be CCA-secure is somewhat more
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involved than the analogue proof for a “plain” KEM.
Our Contributions
In [AGK05], the authors provide some generic constructions for Tag-KEMs built from
combinations of primitives like KEM, MAC, hash-functions and public key encryption. A
generic construction from trapdoor permutations, however, is not given. In the following,
we construct a new Tag-KEM based on our proposed trapdoor permutation hpq and prove
its CCA-security in the ROM. These considerations can be easily generalized to arbitrary
trapdoor permutations, provided the permutations’ domain can be identified with the set
of bit-strings of a certain length (as it is the case for hpq). Then we show how this leads to
a CCA-secure hybrid encryption scheme in the Tag-KEM/DEM framework. Finally, we
compare our novel scheme with the members of the well-known EPOC family [FKM+00,
OP00]. We choose these schemes as a candidate because they all rely on the Okamoto-
Uchiyama trapdoor mechanism introduced in Example 4.1, which like ours is based on the
p2q Factorization Assumption. However, as EPOC-1 has a worse security reduction than
EPOC-2 and a similar performance, we focus on EPOC-2 and EPOC-3.
4.4.1 Basic Notions and Definitions for Hybrid Encryption
Informally, hybrid encryption can be defined as a branch of public key encryption schemes
that uses symmetric encryption as a black box to enhance efficiency of the entire con-
struction. Symmetric encryption can be defined similarly to Definition 2.1, except that
there is only a single key used for both encryption and decryption. In addition, symmetric
encryption is deterministic. Instead of providing formal definitions for hybrid encryption,
we start with giving some well-known examples to illustrate the concept.
Example 4.2 (REACT) A common approach for designing CCA secure hybrid encryp-
tion is to apply generic conversions to appropriate primitives. We sketch the REACT
conversion technique proposed by Okamoto and Pointcheval (for details see [OP01]). It
is composed of a symmetric encryption scheme (Esym,Dsym), a public key encryption
scheme (KeyGenasym, Easym,Dasym), a key derivation function KDF and a hash function
H. The key generation for the hybrid scheme is the same as in KeyGenasym. In addition,
appropriate system parameters are selected. Let rLen be the key-length of (Esym,Dsym).
Encryption and decryption are performed as follows:
Epk(m) :
r ←[ {0, 1}rLen
K := KDF(r)
c1 ← [ Easympk (r)
c2 := EsymK (m)
c3 := H(r,m, c1, c2)
Return c = (c1, c2, c3)
Dsk(c) :
(c1, c2, c3) := c
r := Dasymsk (c1)
K := KDF(r)
m := DsymK (c2)
if H(r,m, c1, c2) 6= c3 return ⊥ and halt
Return m
First, a random string r is selected and put into the key derivation function to obtain a
random session key K. In addition, r is encrypted with the asymmetric scheme to c1. Then
the message m is encrypted using the symmetric scheme with the secret key K, the result
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is c2. Finally, a checksum H(r,m, c1, c2) is added to complete the ciphertext. Decryption
is done in the obvious way.
Okamoto and Pointcheval prove the following security statement: If (Esym,Dsym) is
one-time secure and (KeyGenasym, Easym,Dasym) is OW-PCA, then the resulting REACT
scheme is IND-CCA in the ROM (both of KDF and H are modeled as random oracles).
One-time security for symmetric encryption is defined similar to IND-CPA (in particular,
the symmetric key is used once only). PCA denotes plaintext-checking attack. In this
model, the adversary has access to an oracle that on input a message m and a ciphertext
c answers if c is a possible encryption of m. Of course, this oracle is only helpful if the
encryption is probabilistic, otherwise the adversary can answer the queries herself. Thus,
in the deterministic scenario, OW-PCA is equivalent to one-wayness under the weakest
attack, i. e., chosen-plaintext-attack (CPA). The benefit of REACT is that the security
reduction is tight and that the decryption process is very fast, as only the computation
of a single hash-value is necessary to check if the ciphertext is well-formed. In previous
conversion techniques like Fujisaki-Okamoto [FO99b, FO99a], a costly re-encryption was
necessary to fulfill this purpose.
Example 4.3 (EPOC-3) The most popular encryption scheme obtained from the RE-
ACT conversion is EPOC-3, the outcome of the application to Okamoto-Uchiyama en-
cryption introduced in Example 4.1. It is remarkable that although the one-wayness of the
Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption scheme is equivalent to factoring integers p2q, the security
of the converted scheme is only based on the probably stronger Gap-High-Residuosity
Assumption (informally, this assumption states that factoring is infeasible even with the
help of an Okamoto-Uchiyama plaintext checking oracle). This is due to the fact that
Okamoto-Uchiyama is probabilistic and thus OW-PCA is not equivalent to OW-CPA5.
We do not give a more detailed description of EPOC-3 here, because it is easily obtained
by combining Example 4.2 with Example 4.1.
The Tag-KEM/DEM framework for hybrid encryption
In the following, we review some formal definitions related to the above described Tag-
KEM/DEM framework [AGK05]. We focus on those notions that are necessary for pre-
senting our own results in the subsequent section.
Definition 4.8 (Tag-KEM) A Tag-KEM is defined as a quadruple (TKEM.Gen,
TKEM.Key,TKEM.Enc,TKEM.Dec) of polynomial time algorithms such that the follow-
ing holds:
1. TKEM.Gen is a probabilistic algorithm which on input 1k (the security parameter)
produces a pair (pk, sk) of public and secret key. For notational simplicity, we assume
that the public key pk implicitly includes a description of all the relevant spaces and
additional tools like hash functions, if applicable.
2. TKEM.Key is a probabilistic algorithm which on input pk outputs a one-time key dk
for the designated DEM and a key carrier ω.
5One could ask why the randomization is not removed before applying REACT (this would lead to the
enciphering c = gm mod n, and the same decryption as in the original scheme). But note that in this case,
we cannot reduce factoring to the one-wayness as before, because the distributions of {gm mod n |m > p}
and {gm mod n |m < p} are not necessarily the same.
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3. TKEM.Encpk is a probabilistic algorithm which on input (ω, τ) encrypts the embedded
one-time key dk along with a tag τ to the cipher Ψ.
4. TKEM.Decsk is a deterministic algorithm which on input (Ψ, τ) decapsulates Ψ along
with the tag τ and reconstructs dk.
5. If (pk, sk) is a possible outcome of TKEM.Gen and τ is a possible tag, then we have
TKEM.Decsk(TKEM.Encpk(ω, τ), τ) = dk for all (ω,dk)←[ TKEM.Key(pk).
CCA-security of a Tag-KEM requires that an adversary with adaptive oracle access to
TKEM.Decsk has no chance to distinguish whether a given one-time key dk is encapsulated
in a challenge (Ψ, τ) or not, even if the tag τ is chosen by the adversary herself. As usual,
this is defined via an appropriate game:
Definition 4.9 (CCA Security of Tag-KEM) Let KD be the key space of an appro-
priate DEM, let O denote access to the decapsulation oracle TKEM.Decsk(., .) and to the
random oracles, if applicable, and let AT be an adversary against Tag-KEM playing the
following game:
GAME.TKEM:
Step 1. (pk, sk)←[ TKEM.Gen(1k)
Step 2. ν1 ←[ AOT (pk)
Step 3. (ω,dk1)←[ TKEM.Key(pk),dk0 ←[ KD, b←[ {0, 1}
Step 4. (τ, ν2)←[ AOT (ν1,dkb)
Step 5. Ψ←[ TKEM.Encpk(ω, τ)
Step 6. b˜←[ AOT (ν2,Ψ)
In Step 6. the adversary is restricted not to query the decapsulation oracle on the challenge
(Ψ, τ), but queries (Ψ, τ˜) for τ 6= τ˜ are permitted. The values ν1, ν2 are internal state
informations. We define the advantage of the adversary AT as AT =
∣∣∣Pr[b˜ = b]− 12 ∣∣∣ and
 as maxAT (AT ), where the maximum is taken over all adversaries modeled as polynomial
time Turing machines. Tag-KEM is said to be CCA-secure, if  is negligible in the security
parameter k.
4.4.2 The Proposed Tag-KEM
In the following we show how to build a CCA-secure Tag-KEM from the trapdoor per-
mutation hpq introduced in Section 4.2.1. These considerations can be generalized easily
to obtain a generic construction of CCA-secure Tag-KEM from trapdoor permutations,
provided the permutations’ domain can be identified with the set of bit-strings of a cer-
tain length. The latter is the case for our proposed trapdoor permutation and the RSA
function, but not for the Blum-Williams, resp. Rabin-Williams permutation.
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TKEM.Gen(1k): Let k be a security parameter. Choose p, q ∈ PRIMES(k) with p -
q − 1, q - p− 1, p 6= q. Build the product n = p2q, compute d = n−1 mod ϕ(pq), and
let rLen be chosen such that 2rLen < pq < 2rLen+1. Select a key derivation function
KDF which maps bit-strings into the key-space of the designated DEM and a hash-
function H, which outputs bit-strings of length hashLen. Return a pair (pk, sk) of
public and secret key, where pk = (n, rLen,KDF,H) and sk = (d, p, q).
TKEM.Key(pk): Choose ω ∈ {0, 1}rLen uniformly at random, compute dk = KDF(ω)
and return (ω,dk).
TKEM.Encpk(ω, τ): Given the key carrier ω and a tag τ , compute c1 = ωn mod n, c2 =
H(ω, τ) and return Ψ = (c1, c2).
TKEM.Decsk(Ψ, τ): Given the encapsulated key Ψ and a tag τ , parse Ψ to c1, c2 and
compute r = cd1 mod pq. If |r|2 > rLen or H(r, τ) 6= c2, then return ⊥, return
KDF(r), otherwise.
In the first step, a key pair is generated. Then a one-time key dk for the DEM part is
constructed by applying a key derivation function to a random bit string. Note that the
role of KDF is not only to format the bit string according to the key space of the designated
DEM, but also KDF is required to destroy all algebraic relations between its input and
the encapsulated key. In the security proof, both of KDF and H are modeled as random
oracles. In the step TKEM.Encpk, the one-time key (which in some sense is embedded in
ω) is encrypted together with the tag τ . Finally, using TKEM.Decsk, the one-time key dk
can be recovered from the encapsulation Ψ and the tag τ .
Remark 4.5 In the decapsulation procedure, it is necessary to check if r indeed meets the
length requirements (|r|2 ≤ rLen), because otherwise a simple chosen-ciphertext attack
can be mounted to obtain the secret factor pq by binary search [JQY01].
We can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.7 If factoring integers of the shape n = p2q is hard, then the Tag-KEM
defined above is CCA-secure in the random oracle model. More formally: If there exists an
adversary AT attacking the proposed Tag-KEM in the random oracle modelrandom oracle
model as in Definition 4.9
- in time t,
- with advantage ,
- querying the random oracle representing the key derivation function at most qK times,
- querying the random oracle representing the hash function at most qH times,
- invoking the decapsulation oracle at most qD times,
then there exists an adversary AFact who factors n = p2q in time t′ and with advantage
′, where
t′ ≤ t+ tgcd(qH) + thpqqD,
′ ≥
(
− qK
KLen
− 2qD
hashLen
− qD
n+ hashLen
)(
1− 1
p
)
,
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where tgcd is the time needed to perform a gcd computation with inputs O(n), thpq is the
time needed to evaluate hpq, and KLen, hashLen are the output lengths of KDF and the
hash function H, respectively.
Proof We prove Theorem 4.7 using a series of games. Let AT be an attacker against
the CCA-security of the proposed Tag-KEM and let y∗ be defined as y∗ = hpq(ω∗) for
ω∗ ∈ Z×pq. In each game “Game i”, let Si be the event that the attacker correctly guesses
the hidden bit b. Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary does not ask
the same query more than once to the decapsulation oracle.
Game 0: This is the original attack game as defined in Definition 4.9. Thus, we have
AT = |Pr[S0]− 1/2|. (4.4)
Game 1: This game is the same as above, with the exception that the random oracles
are simulated as follows6:
KDF: An initially empty list KList is prepared. Given a query x, the following
steps are performed: If (x,K) is in KList, then return K. Otherwise randomly
generate K ′, a bit-string of length KLen, add (x,K ′) to KList, and return K ′.
H: An initially empty list HList is prepared. Given a query (x, τ), the following
steps are performed: If ((x, τ), hash) is in HList, then return hash. Otherwise,
randomly generate hash′, a bit-string of length hashLen, add ((x, τ), hash′) to
HList, and return hash′.
From the ideal assumptions to the random oracles in Game 0, we deduce that Game
0 and Game 1 are perfectly indistinguishable. Hence, we conclude
Pr[S0] = Pr[S1]. (4.5)
Game 2: This game is the same as above, with the only difference that the challenge
Ψ∗ := (y∗, c∗2) is fixed at the beginning of the game, where c∗2 is a randomly gen-
erated bit-string of length hashLen. It is easy to see that Game 1 and Game 2 are
indistinguishable from the adversary’s point of view if none of the following events
takes place:
• The adversary ever queries the oracle H on ω∗. We call this event Ask2.
• The adversary ever queries the KDF oracle on x with KDF(x) = dkb, where
dkb is the challenge key given to the adversary in Step 4. The probability of
this event is upperbounded by qK/KLen.
• The decapsulation oracle is queried on (Ψ∗, τ), where τ is the tag on which the
adversary wishes to be challenged. From the restrictions on the adversary, this is
only allowed before Step 6. In this case, however, Ψ∗ is hidden to the adversary
and thus the probability of this event is upperbounded by qD/(n+ hashLen).
• The decapsulation oracle is queried on (Ψ∗, τ ′), where τ 6= τ ′ and H(ω∗, τ ′) = c2
holds (i. e., (Ψ∗, τ ′) is a valid encapsulation). The probability of this event and
¬Ask2 is upperbounded by qD/hashLen.
6This affects the adversary’s oracle queries as well as the generation of the challenge encapsulation.
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As the challenge in Game 2 is independent from everything the adversary knows, we
conclude
Pr[S2] =
1
2
. (4.6)
To compare Game 1 and Game 2, we use the following Lemma from [Sho04b]:
Lemma 4.3 (Difference Lemma) Let A,B, F be events defined in some probabil-
ity distribution, and suppose that A∧¬F ⇐⇒ B∧¬F . Then |Pr[A]−Pr[B]| ≤ Pr[F ].
From this lemma, we conclude
|Pr[S1]−Pr[S2]| ≤ Pr(Ask2) + qK/KLen + qD/(n+ hashLen) + qD/hashLen. (4.7)
Game 3: This game is the same as above, except that instead of having access to the
“real” decapsulation oracle, the adversary’s queries are responded using the following
simulation: If a query (Ψ, τ) is given, then the following steps are performed: Parse
Ψ to (c1, c2). Search HList, if there is an entry ((x, τ), hash) with |x|2 ≤ rLen and
hpq(x) = c1. If yes and if hash = c2, then return KDF(x) (simulated as above).
Otherwise return ⊥.
Let E3 be the event that the adversary invokes the decapsulation oracle on a valid
query ((c1, c2), τ) without h−1pq (c1) having been asked to H. Obviously, we have
Pr[E3] ≤ qD/hashLen. If ¬E3 is true, then Game 2 and Game 3 are perfectly indis-
tinguishable from the adversary’s point of view. Define Ask3 as the event that the
adversary ever queries H or KDF on ω∗. Again using the Difference Lemma, we have
|Pr[Ask2]− Pr[Ask3]| ≤ qD/hashLen. (4.8)
It remains to bound Pr[Ask3]. For that reason, we describe an adversary AFact against
the p2q factorization problem with advantage ′ ≥ Pr[Ask3]. Adversary AFact proceeds
at follows: On input n, AFact chooses r ∈ Zn at random and computes y∗ = rn mod n.
Then AFact lets the adversary AT run Game 3 on the public key n. In Step 4, a randomly
generated bit-string of length KLen is passed to AT . When AT invokes the encapsulation
oracle in Step 5, the challenge Ψ∗ := (y∗, c2) with a randomly generated bit-string c2 of
length hashLen is responded to AT . The oracle queries are responded by AFact exactly as
in Game 3 except the following modification of the H oracle:
H: Given a query (x, τ), the following steps are performed: If ((x, τ), hash) is in HList,
then return hash. Otherwise compute gcd(r − x, n). If gcd(r − x, n) is a non-trivial
factor of n, return this factor and halt. Randomly generate hash′, a bit-string of
length hashLen, add ((x, τ), hash′) to HList, and return hash′.
It is obvious that AFact perfectly simulates the attack environment of AT in Game 3
and finds a non-trivial factor of n with probability ′ ≥ Pr[Ask3](1 − 1/p) (The attack
may fail if r < pq holds, which occurs with probability 1/p. Also note that the events
r < pq and Ask3 are independent, because the distributions of {xn mod n |n ∈ Z×n } and
{xn mod n |n ∈ Z×pq} are identical.). Thus, we conclude
Pr[Ask3] ≤ 
′
1− 1/p. (4.9)
Finally, from the equations (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.7), (4.8), and (4.9), the assertion follows.
uunionsq
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Remark 4.6 The gcd-trick exploited in the proof above is due to Fujisaki [Fuj01]. The
benefit here is that hpq evaluations are replaced by cheaper gcd-computations.
4.4.3 The Proposed Hybrid Encryption Scheme
In [AGK05], the generic Tag-KEM/DEM framework is formally defined. To avoid lengthy
recurrences, we do not review this framework, but we only describe the concrete hybrid
encryption scheme that is obtained when combining our proposed Tag-KEM with an
appropriate DEM. The interested reader is referred to [AGK05] for the general treatment.
Let (Esym,Dsym) be any one-time secure symmetric cryptosystem.
Key Generation: The key generation is the same as in TKEM.Gen(.).
Encryption and decryption is performed as follows:
Epk(m) :
ω ←[ {0, 1}rLen
dk := KDF(ω)
τ ←[ Esymdk (m)
Ψ := (ωn mod n,H(ω, τ))
Return (Ψ, τ)
Dsk(Ψ, τ) :
parse Ψ to (c1, c2)
r := cd1 mod pq
if |r|2 > rLen or H(r, τ) 6= c2 return ⊥ and halt
m := DsymKDF(r)(τ)
Return m
Note that the DEM ciphertext of the messagem encrypted with the encapsulated one-time
key serves as the tag. Thus, non-malleability of the DEM part is intuitively fulfilled because
a CCA-secure Tag-KEM provides integrity of the tag. From the results of [AGK05], we
derive
Theorem 4.8 If the p2q Factorization Assumption holds and if (Esym,Dsym) is one-time
secure, then the proposed hybrid encryption scheme is CCA-secure in the random oracle
model. More precisely, we have hy ≤ 2KEM + DEM , where hy, KEM and DEM denote
the maximum advantage of an attack against the CCA security of proposed hybrid encryp-
tion scheme, against the CCA security of our new Tag-KEM, and against the one-time
security of (Esym,Dsym), respectively.
In the above theorem, CCA-security of hybrid encryption is defined in the standard sense
specified in Definition 2.4. Note that the reduction to factoring is tight.
Remark 4.7 Interestingly, the proposed hybrid encryption scheme is very similar to the
scheme obtained from applying the REACT-conversion to hpq (see Example 4.2). The only
difference in the REACT-case is that the inputs of the hash function H would be m,ω
and c1. This is a small disadvantage because it decreases the efficiency and it is necessary
to recover m before the second integrity check can be performed. Note that reject-timing
attacks like [ST03,Den02] are possible if the timing difference between two different reject
events is too large. In this attack, the adversary can find the secret key if she is able to
distinguish the two different kinds of rejections of invalid ciphertexts. However, this threat
can be easily dealt with on the implementation level (for instance by using a flag). As the
trapdoor function hpq is deterministic, the REACT version of our scheme can be tightly
reduced to factoring, too. In particular, this remark shows that the advantages of our
scheme compared to the members of the EPOC family result from the better suitability
of our trapdoor permutation, not from the use of the Tag-KEM/DEM framework.
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4.4.4 Comparison
In this section, we give a brief comparison of hybrid encryption schemes using the Okamoto-
Uchiyama techniqueOkamoto-Uchiyama encryption scheme and our proposed hybrid en-
cryption scheme. We choose the Okamoto-Uchiyama trapdoor mechanism as a candidate,
because like ours it is based on the p2q Factorization Assumption. In Example 4.3, we have
already introduced EPOC-3, which is the outcome of applying the REACT conversion to
Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption.
A further well-known conversion technique has been proposed by Fujisaki and Okamoto
in 1999 [FO99b]. It can be applied to any one-way function and one-time secure symmet-
ric encryption scheme. Again, the resulting hybrid encryption scheme is IND-CCA in the
ROM. The instantiation of this technique with Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption is denoted
EPOC-2. In contrast to EPOC-3, EPOC-2 is CCA secure under the p2q-factoring assump-
tion in the ROM. Although in general the security reduction of the Fujisaki-Okamoto
conversion technique is not very tight, Fujisaki observed a tight reduction proof tailored
to the special application EPOC-2 [Fuj01]. A disadvantage of EPOC-2 is that in the de-
cryption phase a re-encryption is necessary as an integrity check. For efficiency reasons,
this re-encryption is only performed modulo q instead modulo n (accepting a small error
probability). Nevertheless, the decryption is less efficient than in case of EPOC-3. There
is also a second drawback due to the re-encryption: poor implementation makes EPOC-2
vulnerable against reject-timing attacks [ST03,Den02] as described in Remark 4.7. Here,
the two kinds of rejection events are the enciphered text not meeting the length restrictions
on the one hand, or failure of the re-encryption test on the other hand. As the latter in-
volves the costly public key operations and hence takes a suitable amount of time, careless
implementation makes it possible for an adversary to distinguish between the two cases
by measuring the time of rejection.
Table 4.3 summarizes the most important parameters regarding security and perfor-
mance. The efficiency of encryption and decryption is measured in modular multipli-
cations, where MM (k) denotes a modular multiplication modulo a k-bit number. We
do not distinguish between multiplications and squarings, and we assume that a modu-
lar exponentiation with a k bit exponent takes approximately 3k/2 modular multiplica-
tions, whilst a double exponentiation as necessary for performing the Okamoto-Uchiyama
encryptionOkamoto-Uchiyama encryption scheme takes approximately 7k/4 modular mul-
tiplications using standard techniques. We have not considered exponent recoding tech-
niques, which are applicable in our scheme due to the fixed exponents. Chinese remainder-
ing is taken into account if possible. Hashing, evaluations of the key derivation function
and the symmetric key operations are not measured, because these magnitudes are com-
parable in all schemes. For evaluating the public key sizes, we compare n, g, h on the
EPOC-2/3 side with n in our proposed scheme. The secret key sizes are the same (p, gp for
EPOC-2/3, resp. p, d for our proposed scheme). All quantities are measured in terms of the
security parameter k (i. e., the bit-length of the prime factors p, q). In case of EPOC-2/3,
we assume that rLen = k and hashLen ≥ 2k hold (these are the values determining the
exponent sizes).
As modular multiplication is quadratic in the length of the modulus, we conclude that
our scheme is the most efficient one in decryption, whilst in encryption it is slightly less
efficient than EPOC-2/3. Furthermore, the public key is 3 times shorter in our proposed
scheme, and the underlying security assumption is optimal (as it is the case for EPOC-2).
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Scheme Assumption encrypt decrypt pk sk
EPOC-2 FACT ≥ 7k/2 MM (3k) ≈ 3k/2 MM (2k) + 7k/4 MM (k) 9k 3k
EPOC-3 Gap-HR ≥ 7k/2 MM (3k) ≈ 3k/2 MM (2k) 9k 3k
Proposed FACT ≈ 9k/2 MM (3k) ≈ 3k MM (k) 3k 3k
Table 4.3: Comparison of hybrid encryption schemes
Another advantage of our scheme is the following: If one-time pad is used for the symmetric
part, then the message length in our scheme is 2k compared to k in EPOC-2/3. This is
because the bandwidth of hpq is twice as large as the bandwidth of the Okamoto-Uchiyama
encryption.
4.5 Application to Fail-stop Signature Schemes
Digital signatures were introduced to replace handwritten signatures in the electronic
world, i. e., the aim of a digital signature is to authenticate authorship of the signed mes-
sage. The security of traditional signature schemes relies on a computational assumption.
Provided that this assumption holds, no one but the owner of the secret signing key should
be able to produce signatures that can be verified using the corresponding verification key.
But an adversary who breaks this assumption is able to sign any message of her choice,
such that the forged signatures pass the verification test, and the legal signer Alice has no
chance to convince the recipient Bob (or a judge) that the signature in question has not
been created by herself. To overcome this problem, fail-stop signature (FSS) schemes were
invented. In a FSS scheme, the signer is protected against computationally unbounded ad-
versaries in the following sense: If the signer is given a forged signature (i. e., a signature
passing the verification test but not created by herself), then with overwhelming proba-
bility the signer is able to prove that the underlying computational assumption has been
broken and the protocol is stopped (hence the name fail-stop signature). Of course, a
signer who breaks the underlying problem herself may exploit this mechanism to produce
signatures which she later proves to be forgeries, i. e., she can sign messages and disavow
her signatures later. Therefore, the security for the recipients of fail-stop signatures against
a cheating signer is still based on computational assumptions, whereas the signer is uncon-
ditionally secure7. As a consequence, FSS schemes are particularly suitable in asymmetric
constellations, where the recipient (e. g., a bank) is assumed to be much more powerful
than the signer (e. g., a private customer).
Previous Work
Fail-stop signature schemes have been invented by Pfitzmann andWaidner in 1989 [PW90].
Whilst the earliest solutions were rather inefficient (bit-wise signing), the first practical FSS
scheme has been observered soon [vHP93]. Luckily, van Heijst, Pfitzmann and Pedersen
were able to generalize the discrete logarithm-based construction from [vHP93] to a generic
construction based on a new primitive, the so-called bundling homomorphisms [vHPP92].
All subsequent provably secure FSS schemes known today follow that design.
7Note that this situation is dual to ordinary signature schemes, where the recipients are unconditionally
secure and the signer’s security relies on a computational assumption.
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In this section, we focus on FSS schemes where the underlying problem is related to the
integer factorization problem. Unfortunately, while there is an efficient FSS scheme based
on the discrete logarithm problem [vHP93], the situation regarding factorization based
FSS schemes is less satisfying. In 1991, the first factorization based FSS scheme has been
published [vHPP92] (see [PP97] for a revised version). This scheme – called vHPP scheme
in the following – is based on the intractability of factoring Blum integers n = pq with
p 6= q mod 8 (see Section 4.5.1 for a review of this FSS scheme). Until today, it is unknown
if factoring integers of this special form is as hard as factoring arbitrary RSA-moduli. In
addition, this scheme is quite complicated and the structure is not a “natural” one (the
construction is defined in a way that the proofs work, but looks cumbersome at the first
sight). Nevertheless, the vHPP scheme is the only previously known provably secure FSS
scheme that is based on the factorization assumption only. All other factorization related
FSS schemes are based on stronger assumptions or insecure. The first of these is [SSNP99],
it is based on the factorization assumption but unfortunately turned out to be not prov-
ably secure (see [SSN03]).
The scheme of Susilo et al. [SSNGS00] is based on the so-called strong factorization as-
sumption, which states that is is hard to factor n = pq even if an element g ∈ Z×P (for
P ∈ PRIMES and n | P − 1) of multiplicative order p is known. Note that this as-
sumption is in fact stronger than the factoring assumption, because there is no proof that
knowledge of g does not weaken the hardness of factoring. Indeed, this assumption is
considered as “quite unnatural” by Victor Shoup [Sho99]. Moreover, a successful attack
against the signer’s security was recently published by the author of this thesis [SS04].
The most recent factorization-related FSS scheme is [SSN03], which is in fact an analogon
of the discrete logarithm scheme [vHP93]. The scheme from [vHP93] utilizes two primes
p, q with q | p− 1, and its security is based on the subgroup discrete logarithm problem in
a q-element subgroup of the group Z×p . In [SSN03], the only difference is that the group Z×p
is replaced by Z×n , where n is an RSA modulus. Consequently, this scheme is based on the
subgroup discrete logarithm problem, too, and not on factoring as stated. In particular,
there is no reduction that breaking this scheme enables to factor n. The only connection
to factoring is that knowledge of the factors of n may weaken the schemes security, but
this is of course not the meaning of “factorization-based”.
Our contributions
Our major aim in this section is the development of a new factorization-based FSS scheme.
The proposed scheme is the first one based on the intractability of factoring integers of
p2q type. As in terms of computational complexity both schemes are comparable, our new
scheme provides a good alternative to the vHPP scheme.
Secondly, we point out that the generic construction using bundling homomorphisms
is too restrictive. Namely, we show that a natural extension of our novel scheme formally
does not meet the requirements demanded by van Heijst, Pedersen and Pfitzmann. These
requirements are sufficient to prove security, but—as we will see—they are not necessary.
Therefore, we propose an adjusted formulation of the general construction with relaxed
requirements still sufficient for security. These considerations may be of independent in-
terest, as, e. g., they also lead to a fix of the recently broken scheme [SSNGS00]. We finally
are able to show that the extension of our proposed basic scheme compares favorably with
the vHPP scheme.
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4.5.1 Basic Notions and Definitions for Fail-stop Signature Schemes
In this section, we briefly review the basic definitions related to FSS schemes. As ordinary
signature schemes, FSS schemes consist of algorithms for key-generation, signing and sig-
nature testing. A signature passing the signature test is called acceptable signature in the
following. Furthermore, to achieve the above mentioned extended security for the signer,
there is an algorithm for proving that a forgery has occurred and an algorithm for verifying
forgery proofs.
Definition 4.10 (Fail-stop Signature Scheme) A fail-stop signature scheme is a quin-
tuple (KeyGen,S,V,Proof , Test) of polynomial time algorithms such that (KeyGen,S,V) is
a digital signature scheme as specified in Definition 2.5 and, in addition, the following
holds:
1. Proof is a deterministic algorithm for proving forgeries. The input of Proof is a
(presumably forged) acceptable signature/message pair and the signing key sk, the
output is a bit-string proof.
2. Test is a deterministic algorithm which on input the public verification key and a
bit-string proof outputs “valid” or “invalid”, indicating if proof is accepted as a proof
of forgery or not.
A secure FSS scheme has to fulfill two different security properties (for a more formal
treatment see [PP97,PW90]):
• If an adversary knowing the public key and one correctly generated signature creates
an acceptable signature, then with overwhelming probability the legal signer is able
to present a valid proof of forgery. This property is referred to as security for the
signer and it is not based on a computational assumption.
• A computationally bounded signer should not be able to create signatures that
she later can prove to be forgeries. This property is referred to as security for the
recipients, and it relies on the scheme’s underlying hard problem.
In this section, we call a forged signature that can be proved to be a forgery a prov-
able forgery. The two security requirements have to be understood as independent and
hence there are two different security parameters γ and k, related to the signer’s and
the recipients’ security, respectively. The success probability of an unbounded adversary
to create non-provable forgeries is upper-bounded by 2−γ , whereas the advantage of a
cheating signer is a negligible function in k. Note that besides the possibility of proving
forgeries, a signature scheme where forging signatures is easy does not make sense. Fortu-
nately, it is proved in [PP97] that the above security requirements already imply that FSS
schemes meet the strongest notion of security related to traditional signature schemes:
existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks as specified in Defini-
tion 2.6. This proof can be sketched as follows: Assume that A is a successful attacker
against IND-CCA. Then Alice plays GAME.IND with A, responds all signature queries
using her secret key, and eventually, A returns a new acceptable message/signature pair.
The security for the signer implies that Alice can construct a valid proof of forgery for this
pair with overwhelming probability. Hence, Alice is able to publish this signature and to
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disavow it later, contradicting the security for the recipients. Note, however, that the basic
FSS schemes we are analyzing in this section are only one-time secure, meaning that the
number of the adversary’s signature queries is restricted to one. In particular, this implies
that the signer has to generate a fresh key pair for any new signature. It is possible to
extend this variant to sign multiple messages [vHP93,BP97].
Another consequence of the signer’s ability of disavowing forged signatures is that the
key generation becomes slightly more complex than in ordinary signature schemes. In
ordinary signature schemes, the key generation usually is a two-party protocol between
the signer and a center8. In FSS schemes, a good key must guarantee both, the signer’s as
well as the recipients’ security. Therefore, it is necessary that the recipient (or a third party
trusted by the recipient) is involved in the key generating process. For simplicity, we only
speak of a center in the following, capturing the cases that the center is a trusted third
party, a recipient or a risk-bearer like an insurance that suffers damages if the recipient
accepts invalid signatures. It is also possible to extend this model to multiple recipients
(see [PP97]). Hence, in general the key generation is again a two party protocol between
the signer and a center.
To simplify the situation with several signers, we only consider FSS schemes with
pre-key. In this model, first the center generates a pre-key on his own and publishes it.
Then each signer carries out a two-party protocol with the center to verify that the pre-
key is “good” and finally, each signer creates her key-pair consisting of public/private
key individually and publishes the public key. Note that there are general methods of
verifying a pre-key that work independent from particular FSS schemes [PW90]. Therefore,
a description of the pre-key verification protocol may be omitted when specifying a concrete
FSS scheme.
The General Construction Using Bundling Homomorphisms
In this section, we review a method of constructing FSS schemes with pre-key from
any family of bundling homomorphisms proposed by van Heijst, Pfitzmann, and Ped-
ersen [vHPP92].
Bundling homomorphisms can be understood as a special kind of collision-resistant hash
functions.
Definition 4.11 (Family of Bundling Homomorphisms) Let I be a set of indices
such that for each i ∈ I (Gi,+, 0) and (Hi, ∗, 1) are finite Abelian groups. We define
G = (Gi,+, 0)i∈I and H = (Hi,+, 0)i∈I . Let B = {hi |hi : Gi −→ Hi}i∈I be a family of
functions. Then B is said to be a family of bundling homomorphisms if
1. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time key generator g which on input (τ, k)
outputs an index i ∈ I specifying hi : Gi −→ Hi.
2. For each i ∈ I, the function hi : Gi −→ Hi is a group homomorphism.
3. For each i ∈ I, each y ∈ im(hi) ⊆ Hi has at least 2τ pre-images in Gi. 2τ is called
the bundling degree.
8The center has to convince the signer that the offered public key is indeed an outcome of KeyGen.
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4. The members of B are collision-resistant: For every probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm A, the following is negligible in k:
Pr[i←[ g(τ, k); (x, x˜)←[ A(i) : x˜ 6= x and hi(x˜) = hi(x)].
5. The elements of B are easy to evaluate: There exists a deterministic polynomial time
evaluator Eval that on input i ∈ I, x ∈ Gi outputs hi(x).
6. For each i ∈ I, there must be polynomial time algorithms for
• computing the group operations in Gi and Hi,
• testing membership in Gi and Hi, and
• selecting elements of Gi uniformly at random.
For i←[ KeyGen(τ, k), we call hi a (τ, k)-bundling homomorphism.
For better readability, we omit the subscript i whenever it is clear from the context. Fam-
ilies of bundling homomorphisms can be used to construct provably secure FSS schemes
with pre-key as follows:
Let B be a family of bundling homomorphisms with key generating function g and let γ, k
be two FSS security parameters. Then the components of a FSS scheme that is provably
secure according to γ and k are given as:
KeyGen: Define τ according to γ (details are given later). Then run g on (τ, k) to obtain
a (τ, k)-bundling homomorphism h : G −→ H. The groups G,H and h will serve as
the pre-key.
For pre-key verification, the signer has to be convinced that h is a group homomor-
phism with bundling degree 2τ (e. g., using a zero-knowledge proof9).
Finally, the signer chooses two elements sk1, sk2 uniformly at random from G and
computes pki = h(ski), i = 1, 2. This determines the secret key sk = (sk1, sk2) and
the public key pk = (pk1,pk2).
S: The message spaceM is a suitable subset of Z. To sign a message m ∈M, the signer
computes
Ssk(m) := sk1+m sk2,
where m sk2 has to be understood as applying m times the group operation in G on
sk2.
V: An element σ ∈ G is an acceptable signature on m ∈ M iff h(σ) = pk1 ∗pkm2 holds,
where pkm2 has to be understood as applying m times the group operation in H on
pk2.
Proof : Assume that σ∗ is an acceptable signature on m which the signer wants to prove to
be a forgery. To do so, the signer computes her own signature σ = sk1+m sk2 on m.
If σ = σ∗ holds, then the proof of forgery fails; otherwise, she presents proof = (σ, σ∗)
as the proof of forgery.
9Note that there is no need to prove the collision-resistance of h, because the signer’s security does not
rely on this property.
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Test: A pair (x, x′) ∈ G × G forms a valid proof of forgery iff x 6= x′ and h(x) = h(x′)
hold.
Note that because of the homomorphic properties of h, each correctly generated signature
passes the signature verification test. Following the above construction, the collision re-
sistance of the bundling homomorphism can obviously be reduced to the security for the
recipients. Indeed, if a signer Alice can construct any valid proof of forgery, then she can
present this proof as a collision of the bundling homomorphism.
We now turn to the security for the signer. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the idea behind the
generic construction.
σ1
σ2
Ssk(m1
)
pass verification test
pk
Signature Space
create acceptable sigs
Ssk(m2)
Secret Key Space
Security for signer: A may obtain
Security for recipient: Signer can’t compute two different
elements of
, but not sk
sk
Figure 4.1: Scheme of Fail-stop Signatures
Assume that a signer Alice and a center follow the general construction. The crucial point is
that because of property 3, Definition 4.11, there are at least 22τ possible secret keys sk′ =
(sk′1, sk
′
2) matching Alice’s public key pk (in the sense that h(sk
′
i) = pki, i = 1, 2). Each
of these keys produces acceptable signatures. Therefore, an adversary A with unbounded
computational power may be able to invert h and to find secret keys matching Alice’s public
key, but A does not know which of the 22τ possibilities in fact equals Alice’s secret key.
However, the knowledge of a signature/message pair (σ,m) correctly generated by Alice
provides A with some extra information. In particular, as the equation sk1 = σ −m sk2
must hold in G, the number of possible secret keys reduces to 2τ . Alice is able to present a
valid proof of forgery if the forged signature on a messagem∗ differs from her own signature
on m∗, namely σ = sk1+m∗ sk2. Consequently, to measure A′s probability of generating
an unprovable forgery, we must find out how many of these possible keys produce the
signature σ on m∗. As some easy implications show (see [PP97]), this number is upper-
bounded by the magnitude of the set
T := {d ∈ G |h(d) = 1 ∧ (m−m∗)d = 0} (4.10)
In order to upper-bound A’s success probability, we have to consider the worst case, i. e.,
we must find the maximum number taken over all possible messages m∗ 6= m. Hence, we
obtain the following bound:
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Tmax := max
0 6=m′∈M
#{d ∈ G |h(d) = 1 ∧m′d = 0}, (4.11)
where m′ is substituted for m −m∗. Concluding, we have shown that a computationally
unbounded adversary A can construct 2τ possible secret keys of which at most Tmax enable
A to produce unprovable forgeries.
These considerations lead to the following theorem (see [PP97] for a comprehensive proof
in formal terms):
Theorem 4.9 (Security of the general construction) Let γ, k be security param-
eters and let B be a family of bundling homomorphisms. Let F be a FSS scheme following
the general construction above. Then we have
1. F is k-secure for the recipients.
2. If the bundling degree 2τ is chosen such that Tmax/2τ ≤ 2−γ, then F is γ-secure for
the signer.
Consequently, the general construction offers a convenient tool for designing FSS schemes.
Actually, to describe a FSS scheme based on the general construction, it is sufficient
to specify a family of bundling homomorphisms and to determine the message space,
the bundling degree and the number Tmax/2τ . In particular, the scheme’s underlying
hard problem equals the problem of collision-finding in the family of bundling homomor-
phisms. The above construction is the basis of all previously known provably secure FSS
schemes [PP97,SSNGS00,SSN03].
Example 4.4 (The vHPP Bundling Homomorphism) The following bundling homo-
morphism is the core of the previous factorization based fail-stop signature scheme due
to van Heijst, Pedersen, and Pfitzmann [vHPP92]. The foundation of this approach is the
concept of claw-free permutations, which was introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest
in 1988 [GMR88].
Let γ, k be the security parameters related to the signer’s and the recipients’ security,
respectively. Define the bundling degree τ := γ + ρ, where M := {0, 1, . . . , 2ρ − 1} is
the message space. On the input (γ, τ), the key generating function g chooses p, q ∈
PRIMES(bk/2c) with p = q = 3 mod 4 and p 6= q mod 8. Then the Abelian groups G
and H are defined as follows:
G := (Z2ρ × (±QR(n))/{1,−1}, ◦, (0, 1)), H := ((±QR(n))/{1,−1}, ∗, 1),
where the group operation ◦ on G is given as
(a, x) ◦ (b, y) := ((a+ b mod 2τ , xy4(a+b)÷2τ ).
Each element of H is a coset {x,−x}, which is identified with its smaller member (i. e.,
with x, if 0 ≤ x ≤ (n− 1)/2, and with −x, otherwise).
Finally, the bundling homomorphism h is defined by:
h : Z2ρ × (±QR(n))/{1,−1} −→ (±QR(n))/{1,−1}
(a, x) 7→ ±(4ax2τ ) mod n,
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where again the notation ±x in the image indicates that the coset {x,−x} is identified
with its smaller member.
It can be shown that the above construction is a family of bundling homomorphisms
under the assumption that factoring Blum integers n = pq with p 6= q mod 8 is infeasi-
ble [PP97,vHPP92]. Note that this bundling homomorphism is quite artificial, namely the
cumbersome group operation ◦ in G is only chosen in order to provide h with homomor-
phic properties. Concerning the groups G and H, there are two reasons for considering
the factor group modulo {1,−1} instead of QR(n). On one hand, this choice anticipates
the trivial collisions x2 = (−x)2 mod n, and on the other hand, it guarantees efficient
membership testing in H (and hence in G)10.
4.5.2 The Proposed Fail-stop Signature Scheme
In this section, we introduce a new factorization-based FSS scheme and provide a complete
security proof. We claim that the proposed construction is more simple and elemental than
the artificial construction defining the vHPP scheme. The basic variant of our proposed
scheme is an instance of the general construction described in Section 4.5.1. We will also
introduce a natural extension of the basic version, which compares favorably with the
vHPP scheme. Unfortunately, the generic security proof provided by the bundling homo-
morphism framework does not transfer completely to this extension. We will solve this
problem by adjusting the generic construction in a suitable way. With this adjustment in
mind, it is also possible to repair the recently broken FSS scheme from [SSNGS00].
The Basic Scheme
For the sake of completeness, we give the full description of our proposed scheme in the
one recipient model. For the extensions to multiple recipients see [PP97].
KeyGen : On the input (γ, k), the center defines τ := max(γ, bk/3c) and chooses p, q ∈
PRIMES(τ) with p - q−1, q - p−1, p 6= q. The Abelian groups according to n = p2q
are given as
G = H = (Z×n , ∗, 1).
The bundling homomorphism h is defined by
h : Z×n −→ Z×n
x 7→ xn mod n
Let l be chosen such that 2l < p < 2l+1 holds. The groups G,H, the homomorphism
h, and l will serve as the pre-key.
For pre-key verification, it is sufficient to assure the signer that n possesses a squared
factor of approximate bit-length γ (e. g., using a zero-knowledge proof).
Finally, the signer selects two elements sk1, sk2 ∈ Z×n uniformly at random and
computes pki = sk
n
i mod n, i = 1, 2. This determines the secret key sk = (sk1, sk2)
and the public key pk = (pk1,pk2).
10A number 0 ≤ x ≤ (n− 1)/2 belongs to H iff the Jacobi symbol ( x
n
) equals 1.
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S : The message space is defined as M = {0, 1, . . . , 2l}. To sign a message m ∈ M, the
signer computes
Ssk(m) := sk1 ∗ skm2 mod n.
V : An element σ ∈ Z×n is an acceptable signature on m ∈ M iff σn = pk1 ∗pkm2 modn
holds.
Proof : Assume that σ∗ is an acceptable signature onm∗ which the signer wants to prove to
be a forgery. To do so, the signer computes her own signature σ = sk1 ∗ skm∗2 mod n
on m∗. If σ 6= σ∗ holds, then the proof of forgery consists of (σ, σ∗). The proof of
forgery fails, otherwise.
Test : A pair (x, x′) ∈ Z×n ×Z×n forms a valid proof of forgery iff x 6= x′ and xn = x′n mod n
hold.
This construction follows the general construction introduced in Section 4.5.1. Indeed, we
can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.10 Let I = {n = p2q | p, q ∈ PRIMES, |p|2 = |q|2, p - q − 1, q - p− 1, p 6= q}
be a set of indices. Under the p2q Factorization Assumption, the collection B = {h(n)}n∈I
is a family of bundling homomorphisms, where h(n) is defined as
h(n) : Z×n −→ N-R(n)
x 7→ xn mod n.
Proof We have already proved in Corollary 4.1 that h is p− to−one and in Corollary 4.2
that h is collision-resistant under the p2q Factorization Assumption. Thus the assertion
follows, as the remaining requirements are obviously fulfilled. uunionsq
Theorem 4.10 implies the first part of the security proof for the new scheme:
Corollary 4.3 Under the p2q Factorization Assumption, the proposed scheme as defined
above is secure for the recipients.
To complete the security proof, we show the following theorem:
Theorem 4.11 The proposed scheme as defined above is secure for the signer.
Proof According to Theorem 4.9, we have to determine the number
Tmax := max
0 6=m′∈M
#{d ∈ G |h(d) = 1 ∧m′d = 0}
and show that Tmax/2τ ≤ 2−γ is fulfilled. Putting in the parameters of the proposed
scheme, we obtain
Tmax = max
0<m′<p
#{d ∈ Z×n | dn = 1 mod n ∧ dm
′
= 1 mod n} = 1,
because dn = 1 mod n implies d = 1∨ordn(d) = p (see Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2). Thus,
dm
′
= 1 mod n is fulfilled only for d = 1. Hence, we conclude Tmax/2τ ≤ 2−γ , because τ
was chosen as the maximum of γ and bk/3c. uunionsq
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The Extended Scheme
The question arises why we don’t use the natural message space Zn. Examining the pre-
ceeding proof discloses that forM = Zn the cardinality of Tmax would be p instead of 1 :
with the same reasoning as above, we have for m∗ ∈ Zn
p | m−m∗ ⇒ #T = #{d ∈ G | dn = 1 mod n ∧ dm−m∗ = 1} (4.12)
= #{d ∈ G | ordn(d) = p}
= p
p - m−m∗ ⇒ #T = #{d ∈ G | dn = 1 mod n ∧ dm−m∗ = 1} = 1, (4.13)
where T is defined as in eq. 4.10. Recall that T upperbounds the number of possible secret
keys (out of 2τ ) that enable the adversary to produce unprovable signature forgeries on
the message m∗. Summing up, if the message m∗ that the adversary chooses to forge and
the given message m are congruent modulo p, then the forgery proof proof constructed
by the signer following the protocol described in Section 4.5.1 may fail with probability
exceeding 2−γ (to be more precise, we can upperbound the adversary’s advantage by
p2−γ). On the other hand, if m∗ = m mod p holds, then the signer is able to factor the
modulus by computing p = gcd(n,m − m∗). Thus, if we allow an alternative forgery
proving mechanism—namely the presentation of two messages leading to a solution of the
underlying hard problem—then we can extend the message space to Zn.
In the following, we explain how the general framework has to be adjusted to take
the above considerations into account. Recall that FSS schemes are one-time signature
schemes, i. e. the adversary has notice of one valid signature/message pair (m,σ) created by
the legitimate signer. The crucial observation is that certain messages which the adversary
may select for signature forging enable the signer to solve the underlying problem. That
is, on these messages unprovable forgeries are a priori impossible. We call these messages
disclosing according tom, and we denote its union with DC(m). Indeed, when determining
the maximum amount of the set T from eq. (4.10), we only have to consider messages
m∗ 6∈ DC(m). Consequently, we redefine the set Tmax as follows:
Tmax := max
m6=m∗∈M; m∗ 6∈DC(m)
#{d ∈ G |h(d) = 1 ∧ (m−m∗)d = 0} (4.14)
In case of our proposed scheme, eq. 4.13 shows that the definition DC(m) = {m˜ ∈
Zn |m = m˜ mod p} suffices to provide security for the extended message space Zn. Indeed,
we have Tmax = 1, and consequently Tmax/2τ ≤ 2−γ as before.
In addition, an alternative forgery proving mechanism for the general construction
has to be specified as explained above. When presenting a proof of forgery, Alice indicates
which of the two mechanisms she has used. In case of our proposed scheme, given a forgery
(σ∗,m∗), Alice proceeds as follows: first, she constructs her own signature σ on the message
m∗. If σ 6= σ∗ holds, as usually she presents the pair (σ, σ∗) as a proof of forgery. Otherwise,
Alice indicates that she uses the alternative procedure and her proof of forgery consists
of (m′,m∗), where m′ is the message Alice has signed previously with her signing key sk.
The latter proof is checked by verifying that m∗ ∈ DC(m′) is fulfilled, or—in our concrete
instantiation—that gcd(m′ −m∗, n) is a non-trivial factor of n, respectively.
Note that this adjustment additionally requires that Alice keeps the signed message
in memory. As the analyzed FSS schemes are one-time schemes, however, this is a quite
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small additional overhead (Alice has to store the secret key for constructing original forgery
proofs anyway).
Remark 4.8 In [SSNGS00], the authors confused the sets T and Tmax and incorrectly
tried to prove the security of their scheme by showing that the cardinality of T is sufficiently
small. As shown in [SS04], this flawed application of the generic construction leeds to a
successful attack against the signer’s security. With the same ideas as described above, it
is possible to “re-prove” the security of the original scheme with an alternative forgery
proof mechanism.
4.5.3 Comparison
Table 4.4 provides a detailed comparison of the vHPP scheme and the proposed ones. As
usual, γ and k are the security parameters related to the signer’s and recipients’ security,
respectively. As it is common in the literature about FSS schemes, we relate the parameters
to the message length.
vHPP Scheme Proposed (basic var.) Proposed (ext. var.)
Message length ρ ρ = max(γ, k/3) ρ = max(3γ, k)
Sig. length γ + ρ+ k 3ρ ρ
Length of pk 2k 6ρ = max(6γ, 2k) 2ρ = max(6γ, 2k)
Length of sk 2(γ + ρ+ k) 6ρ 2ρ
Sign (#MM ) ρ ρ ρ
Verify (#MM ) < 2ρ+ γ < 4ρ < 4/3ρ
Assumption
Fact. of n = pq
p = q = 3 mod 4, p 6= q mod 8 Fact. of n = p
2q Fact. of n = p2q
Table 4.4: Comparison of factorization-based fail-stop signature schemes
Due to the interaction of the different parameters, a general evaluation is difficult. As a
rough guideline, in case of k > γ, the basic variant of the proposed scheme outperforms
the vHPP scheme in most points, whereas in case of k < γ the vHPP scheme is more
advantageous. But in both cases, the differences are not large. The extended variant of
the proposed scheme, however, can be easily verified to be the best among the three.
In the discussion above, we compared the proposed schemes with the vHPP scheme,
because these schemes are based on the factoring assumption. But is has to be mentioned
that signature generation is even more efficient in van Heijst and Pedersen’s discrete
logarithm scheme [vHP93]. This is due to the fact that the group G in this scheme is
additive, and therefore modular exponentiation is replaced by modular multiplication.
Therefore, important further work in this field is the development of a FSS scheme which
is either: based on a fairly weak factorization assumption and as efficient as the discrete
logarithm scheme.
4.6 Application to Trapdoor Commitment Schemes (Trap-
door Hash Families)
Commitment schemes are an important primitive in public key cryptography. Among
these, trapdoor commitment schemes play a leading role, especially in the context of zero-
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knowledge protocols.
Recently, trapdoor commitment schemes found new applications in a different setting,
namely in designing digital signature schemes with additional properties, as there are on-
line/off-line signatures, chameleon signatures and signcryption [ST01,KR00,ADR02]. We
will sketch these applications in Section 4.6.2.
In this new context, trapdoor commitment schemes are not longer described as a
protocol between the commiter and the receiver, but a functional oriented definition is
more convenient, and the term trapdoor commitment scheme is replaced by trapdoor hash
family, a. k. a. chameleon hash family. As pointed out by Krawczyk and Rabin [KR00], both
definitions are equivalent (for non-interactive trapdoor commitment schemes).
4.6.1 Basic Notions and Definitions for Trapdoor Hash Families
A trapdoor hash function is a special kind of hash function where no one else as the holder
of a trapdoor is able to construct collisions.
Definition 4.12 (Trapdoor Hash Family) A trapdoor hash family is a pair (KeyGen,H)
of probabilistic polynomial time key generation algorithm and a family of polynomial time
hash functions such that the following holds:
Key Generation: On input a security parameter 1k, the randomized algorithm KeyGen
outputs a pair (hk, tk) of hash and trapdoor key. The hash key hk uniquely specifies
an element hashhk of the family H.
Hash: The algorithm hashhk :M×R −→ H computes the hash value, where M and R
are the message space and the space of randomness, respectively.
Weak Altering: For each trapdoor key tk there is a polynomial time algorithm wAlttk :
M×R×M −→ R which given a message m, randomness r, and a target message m′
computes randomness r′ with hashhk(m; r) = hashhk(m′; r′). The pair ((m, r), (m′, r′))
is called a trapdoor collision.
The algorithm wAlttk enables the owner of the trapdoor key to compute a hash value
hashhk(m; r) = h and “alter” the meaning of h in any desired way (i. e., he can claim
that h is the hash value of an arbitrary message m′ ∈ M by presenting the randomness
r′ with hashhk(m′; r′) = h as a proof). For some applications, however, a strictly stronger
property turns out to be useful, namely the owner of the trapdoor key should be able to
alter a hash value arbitrarily even without knowledge of the pre-image values r,m. We
call this property strong altering11:
Definition 4.13 (Strong Altering) A trapdoor hash family (KeyGen,H) provides
strong altering if for each key (hk, tk) ← KeyGen(1k) there is a polynomial time algo-
rithm sAlttk : H×M −→ R with the following property: Given a hash value h ∈ H and
a target message m ∈ M, the algorithm sAlttk computes randomness r ∈ R such that
h = hashhk(m; r).
11In [ST01], this property is referred to as inversion property.
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The security of a trapdoor hash family requires that without knowledge of the trapdoor
key it should be hard to find collisions. Moreover, the hash pairs obtained by invoking the
altering algorithm should be indistinguishable from “real” hash pairs.
Definition 4.14 (Security of Trapdoor Hash Families) The trapdoor hash family
(KeyGen,H) is secure if the following properties hold:
Collision resistance: For any PPA A the following probability is negligible in k:
Pr[(hk, tk)← KeyGen(k), (r,m, r′,m′)← A(hk) :
(r,m) 6= (r′,m′) ∧ hashhk(m; r) = hashhk(m′; r′)]
Uniformity: The outcome of s/wAlttk is uniformly distributed in R provided that the
randomness input is also uniformly distributed in R.
4.6.2 Recent Applications for Trapdoor Hash Families
On-line/Off-line Signatures
A digital signature scheme possesses the on-line/off-line property if the signer is able to
perform the bulk of the computation off-line, i. e., before receiving the message that has
to be signed. In [ST01], Shamir and Tauman proposed a generic construction for trans-
forming a weakly secure signature scheme into a strong on-line/off-line signature scheme
improving an early proposal of Even, Goldreich and Micali [EGM96]. Informally, their idea
is the following: The signer runs two key generation algorithms: for an ordinary signature
scheme as well as for a trapdoor hash family (in particular, the signer holds the hash
trapdoor). In the off-line phase, the signer randomly selects r′ and m′ and constructs the
dummy hash value h = hashhk(m′; r′). She signs h and keeps the obtained signature σ and
the values r′,m′, h in memory. In the on-line phase, when the message m that has to be
signed is known, the signer invokes the altering algorithm to obtain randomness r with
hashhk(m; r) = h. The tuple (r, σ) then defines the signature of m. Signature verification is
straight-forward, as by construction σ is a valid hash-then-sign signature of m. Note that
only for executing the protocol weak altering is sufficient. The strong altering property,
however, leads to more powerful constructions (see Section 2.3 for security notions related
to digital signature schemes): instantiated with a signature scheme that is existentially un-
forgeable under generic chosen message attacks, the above construction (with a weak hash
family) is secure against adaptive chosen message attacks (EF-CMA). If strong altering is
possible, the original signature scheme only has to be unforgeable against known-message
attacks to ensure EF-CMA security of the converted online-oﬄine scheme. To sum up, we
are looking for a trapdoor hash family where strong altering is possible and weak alter-
ing is fast. Some previous constructions of trapdoor hash families provide strong altering
algorithms, but the weak altering is not particularly efficient [Gen04,FF02,KR00]. In con-
trast, Shamir and Tauman constructed a new trapdoor hash family with a very fast weak
altering mechanism, but lacking the strong altering property. In the following, we will give
the first trapdoor hash family that combines both properties: extremely fast weak altering
and the possibility of strong altering.
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Signcryption
In [ADR02] An et al. give a formal treatment of securely carrying out joint encryption
and signature in the public-key setting. Roughly speaking, the security goals here are
to protect the sender’s authenticity and the receiver’s privacy. In addition to examining
the classical “encrypt-then-sign” and “sign-then-encrypt” paradigms, An et al. propose
a new variant which they call “commit-then-encrypt-and-sign” (CtE&S). In this setting,
it is possible to perform the costly public-key operations (encrypt and sign) in parallel,
therefore saving computation time12. For the sake of uniformity, we describe the basic
procedure in hash-terminology: The sender hashes the message, then in parallel he signs
the hash and encrypts the message. Finally he transmits the hash data, the signature
and the ciphertext to the receiver. Decryption and verification is straight-forward. Until
now, the trapdoor has not been exploited. The benefit of a trapdoor hash family arises
if for signing Shamir-Tauman on-line/off-line signatures are used. Indeed, combined with
an on-line/off-line encryption scheme (e. g., hybrid encryption), a complete on-line/off-line
signcryption scheme can be obtained as follows: In the off-line phase, the sender creates
a fake hash hashhk(m′; r′), builds the signature σ of hashhk(m′; r′) and performs the off-
line encryption operations (e. g., constructing and encapsulating a session key). Once the
message m is known, the sender invokes the altering algorithm to obtain randomness r′
with hashhk(m′; r′) = hashhk(m; r), completes the encryption (e. g., encrypting m sym-
metrically with the session key) and finally transmits r, σ and the obtained ciphertext
c. The receiver encrypts c, gets m and verifies if σ is a valid signature of hashhk(m; r).
It has not been pointed out by An et al. that this procedure even enhances the security
of the original signature scheme. But along the lines of Shamir-Tauman’s security proof
it can be easily shown that a signature scheme secure against generic message attacks is
sufficient to receive an EF-CMA secure conversion. If the trapdoor hash family provides
strong altering, even security against random message attacks suffices.
Chameleon Signatures
The concept of chameleon signatures was introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin to simplify
undeniable signatures [KR00]. The aim of chameleon signatures is to distract the receiver
of a signature from revealing the signed message to any third party. To realize this, the
well-known hash-then-sign paradigm reviewed in Section 2.3.3 is used, but the conventional
hash function is replaced by a trapdoor hash. Here, only the receiver holds the secret trap-
door and is therefore able to forge valid signatures for messages of his choice by invoking
the altering algorithm. Consequently, no third party will be convinced of the validity of
any signature, because the receiver could have created it himself. On the other hand, the
signer is protected against an unhonest receiver who creates a fake valid signature, because
in this case the legitimate signer is able to present a collision of the trapdoor hash func-
tion with overwhelming probability. This enables the signer to deny the forged signature.
In [CGHGN01], Catalano et al. pointed out that on-line/off-line chameleon signatures can
be constructed when using an on-line/off-line trapdoor hash family.
12Note that the naive approach of just signing and encrypting a message in parallel and sending the
signature along with the ciphertext may violate the receiver’s privacy, because the signature may reveal
information about the message.
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4.6.3 The Proposed Trapdoor Hash Families
The Proposed Strong Trapdoor Hash Family with Fast Altering.
The following trapdoor hash family with fast altering can be compared to Shamir-Tauman’s
fast altering trapdoor hash family from [ST01]. Shamir and Tauman utilize the homomor-
phic one-way function x 7→ gx mod n, where n is a safe RSA modulus and g is an element
of maximal order λ(n) in Z×n . We will use the one-way homomorphism x 7→ xn mod n
for n = p2q. In both cases, the idea is that a non-trivial element of the function’s kernel
reveals the factorization of n (by providing a multiple of λ(n), resp. pq), which implies
collision resistance. The main difference is that only in our case the function is trapdoor,
which additionally provides the strong altering property.
Key Generation: Let k be a security parameter. On input 1k, choose p, q ∈ PRIMES(k)
with p - q − 1, q - p − 1, p 6= q, and set n = p2q. Define l such that 2l < pq < 2l+1
holds.
The hash key is hk = (n, l) and the trapdoor key is tk = (p, q). The message space
and the space of randomness are defined asM = {0, . . . , [n]k−l−1− 1} and R = Zpq,
respectively.
Hash: To hash a message m ∈ M, a value r ∈ Zpq is chosen uniformly at random and
hashhk(m; r) = (m||r)n mod n is computed, where m||r denotes the concatenation
of m and r.
We can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.12 Under the p2q Factorization Assumption, the above construction is a se-
cure trapdoor hash family with extremely fast weak altering and the strong altering property.
Proof 1. Extremely fast weak altering: From Theorem 4.1, we conclude that m′||r′ =
m||r mod pq is equivalent to hashhk(m′; r′) = hashhk(m; r), thus r = 2l+1(m′−m)+
r′ mod pq yields the desired result. r can be computed extremely fast as multiplica-
tion with 2l+1 is just a bit shift operation.
2. Strong altering: Let h be a possible hash value and letm be the target message. From
Theorem 4.1, we conclude that r = h1/n−2l+1m mod pq leads to h = hashhk(m; r) =
(m||r)n = (2l+1m+ r)n mod n.
3. Uniformity of altering: The considerations above show that for any hash value h
and any message m there is a unique r ∈ Zpq with h = hashhk(m; r). Consequently,
uniformity holds for both altering algorithms.
4. Collision resistance under the p2q Factorization Assumption: As hashhk(m : r) =
hashhk(m′; r′) is equivalent to (2l+1m+r)n = (2l+1m′+r′)n mod n, we have 2l+1m+
r = 2l+1m′ + r′ mod pq using Theorem 4.1. Due to the length-restrictions of m and
r, it is impossible that this equality holds modulo n, thus we must have gcd(m||r −
m′||r′, n) = pq.
uunionsq
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Remark 4.9 In terminology of commitment schemes, the above construction is a perfectly
hiding and computationally binding trapdoor commitment scheme. We further want to
point out that for the applications in on-line/off-line signature scheme, resp. signcryption,
the sender is also the trapdoor holder. Therefore, it is not a problem for him to choose
elements of Zpq uniformly at random. For more general applications, the randomness has
to be taken from the set {0, 1}l instead. In this case, however, the proposed scheme is not
longer perfectly binding. We assume that binding holds at least computationally.
The Proposed Strong Trapdoor Hash Family with On-Line/Off-Line Property.
Key Generation: Let k be a security parameter. On input 1k, choose p, q ∈ PRIMES(k)
with p - q − 1, q - p − 1, p 6= q, and set n = p2q. Define l such that 2l < pq < 2l+1
holds.
The hash key is hk = (n, l), and the trapdoor is the factorization of n. Set M =
{0, . . . , [n]k−l−1 − 1} and R = Zpq × Z×n .
Hash: To hash a message m ∈ M, one chooses two random values s ∈ Zpq, r ∈ Z×n
and computes hashhk(m; r, s) = (1 + (m||s)n)rn mod n2, where m||s denotes the
concatenation of m and s.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.13 Under the p2q Factorization Assumption the above construction is a se-
cure trapdoor hash family with strong altering and on-line/off-line property.
Proof 1. Strong altering: Let h be a possible hash value and let m be the tar-
get message. We show how to construct randomness s ∈ Zpq, r ∈ Z×n with h =
hashhk(m; r, s) = (1 + (m||s)n)rn = (1 + (2l+1m + s)n)rn mod n. From Theo-
rem 4.4(3), we know that there are rpq ∈ Z×pq,mpq ∈ Zpq, 0 ≤ i < p with h =
(1 + (mpq − ir−1pq pq)n)(rpq + ipq)n mod n2. The values rpq and mpq can be com-
puted from h: rpq = h1/n mod pq,mpq = Ln(r−npq h mod n2) mod pq. Thus, to achieve
h = hashhk(m; r, s), we have to find r ∈ Z×n , s ∈ Zpq, 0 ≤ i < p with
2l+1m+ s = mpq − ir−1pq pq mod n (4.15)
r = rpq + ipq mod n (4.16)
The first equation (4.15) uniquely determines s mod pq and i. From eq. (4.16), one
immediately computes r mod n.
2. Weak altering: From the considerations above we easily deduce the following pro-
cedure: Given m,m′ ∈ {0, . . . , [n]k−l−1 − 1}, r ∈ Z×n , s ∈ Zpq, the weak altering
algorithm computes r′ ∈ Z×n , s′ ∈ Zpq by solving the following system of modular
equations:
2l+1m+ s = 2l+1m′ + s′ − ir−1pq mod n
r = r′ + ipq mod n
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3. Collision resistance under the p2q Factorization Assumption: First, we observe that
hashhk(m; r, s) = hashhk(m′; r′, s′) is equivalent to (1 + n(2l+1m + s))rn = (1 +
n(2l+1m′ + s′))r′n mod n2. From Theorem 4.4(3), we therefore conclude
2l+1m+ s = 2l+1m′ + s′ − ir−1pq mod n for some 0 ≤ i < p and
r = r′ + ipq mod n
From the length restrictions of m,m′, s and s′ we deduce that i = 0 is impossible.
Thus, we can factor n by computing gcd(r − r′, n) = pq.
4. Uniformity of altering: From the consideration about strong altering we conclude
that for each message m ∈ M and each hash value h there is exactly one s ∈ Zpq
and one r ∈ Z×n satisfying hashhk(m; r, s) = h. Thus, the uniformity property trivially
holds for both altering algorithms.
5. On-line/off-line property: After the message m is retrieved, only one modular mul-
tiplication and one modular addition have to be performed, as the computation of
rnn mod n2 can be done in advance.
uunionsq
However, we still have to resolve a last problem: For sound execution the secret trapdoor
has to be known to the user of the hash function, because he must choose s uniformly
at random from Zpq. The same problem occurs in the factorization-based scheme from
[BCP03], where the randomness has to be sampled from Z×nλ(n)/2. But unfortunately, in a
chameleon hash signature scheme the trapdoor must be unknown to the signer/hasher, as
otherwise the signer is able obtain hash collisions and thus to deny her signatures. This
difficulty could be overcome by providing the user an upper bound of the secret numbers
pq resp. nλ(n)/2, but is has to be pointed out that proceeding in that way usually leads
to a loss of uniformity. But luckily, it turns out that in our case the problem can be solved
nevertheless: If the randomness s is sampled from the publicly known set {0, 1}l+1 instead
of Zpq, we can prove that the alleviated scheme fulfills the following relaxed uniformity
requirement, which fortunately is enough for designing secure chameleon signature schemes
(see [KR00]).
Definition 4.15 (Relaxed Uniformity for Trapdoor Hash Families) Let TH =
(KeyGen,H) be a trapdoor hash family and let A be an adversary playing the following
game:
GAME.UNI:
Step 1. (hk, tk)←[ KeyGen(1k)
Step 2. (m0,m1, st)←[ A(hk)
Step 3. b←[ {0, 1}
Step 4. r ←[ R
Step 5. h←[ hashhk(mb; r)
Step 6. b˜←[ A(h, st)
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The value st is an internal state information. We define the advantage of the adversary A
as A =
∣∣∣Pr[b˜ = b]− 12 ∣∣∣. Moreover, we define  as maxA(A), where the maximum is taken
over all adversaries modeled as probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines. TK is said
to meet the requirements of relaxed uniformity if  is negligible in the security parameter
k.
Lemma 4.4 Relaxed Uniformity holds for the alleviated scheme under the Decisional Com-
posite Residuosity Assumption.
Proof If s ∈ {0, 1}l+1, r ∈ Z×n are chosen uniformly at random, then for any two mes-
sagesm0,m1, the distributions of hashhk(m0; r, s) and hashhk(m1; r, s) are computationally
indistinguishable. This is an immediate consequence of the semantic security of the en-
cryption scheme described in Section 4.3 (Theorem 4.6). uunionsq
Remark 4.10 In terminology of commitment schemes, the above construction is a per-
fectly hiding and computationally binding trapdoor commitment scheme. For the allevi-
ated scheme both hiding and binding holds computationally.
4.6.4 Comparison
In this section, we compare previously known trapdoor hash families with our new con-
structions. In Table 4.5, we focus on schemes that are intended to be used in Shamir-
Tauman on-line/off-line signature schemes. Here, the most important property is efficient
weak altering. Furthermore, schemes allowing strong altering are preferable because they
lead to more powerful conversions. In the last column, we note if the secret trapdoor has to
be known to the sender. This is no problem in the suggested applications (on-line/off-line
signatures, on-line/off-line signcryption), but for more general applications those schemes
might be improper.
Scheme Assumption strong hash weak alt. user needs tk
[BK90] Discrete log NO ≈ 1 exp. ≈ 1 mult. NO
[KR00] FACT YES ≈ |m|2 mult. ≈ 5 mult. NO
[ST01] FACT NO 1 exp. 1 add. + bit shift YES
[BCP03] FACT NO ≈ 1 exp. ≈ 1 mult. YES
1. proposed FACT YES 1 exp. 1 add. + bit shift YES
Table 4.5: Comparison of trapdoor hash families suitable for [ST01]
In Table 4.6, we compare different constructions for on-line/off-line trapdoor hash families.
Here, it is notable that the need for the user to know the secret trapdoor excludes the
application chameleon signatures, therefore we designate the alleviated version of our
second scheme (where the randomness is sampled from {0, 1}l+1).
Scheme Assumption strong hash user needs tk
[CGHGN01] RSA(n, n) YES ≈ 1 exp. NO
[BCP03] FACT NO ≈ 1 exp. YES
2. proposed FACT YES ≈ 1 exp. NO
Table 4.6: Comparison of on-line/off-line trapdoor hash families
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In both tables, the assumption factoring refers to integers of p2q-type for the proposed
schemes and to RSA moduli, resp. Blum integers [KR00], else.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a new simple trapdoor one-way function and two associated
trapdoor permutations based on the hardness of factoring. As provably secure trapdoor
permutations are so rare and nevertheless of outstanding importance in public key cryp-
tography, the development of new candidates is a fundamental issue on its own. Moreover,
to constitute the claim that our proposed trapdoor function is not only of theoretical
interest, we constructed several applications.
First, we pointed out that combining Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme with
the Okamoto-Uchiyama modulus n = p2q yields a new homomorphic encryption scheme
that is one-way under the p2q Factorization Assumption.
Then, we introduced a novel CCA-secure hybrid encryption scheme to exploit that one
of our proposed trapdoor permutations can be used to encrypt arbitrary strings like keys.
To do so, we made use of the recently published Tag-KEM/DEM framework for hybrid
encryption. We were able to show that even our proposed ad-hoc construction is more
efficient than the members of the well-known EPOC family, which are based on the same
intractability assumption as our proposal.
Next, we revisited some FSS schemes based on factorization related assumptions. We
introduced a new FSS scheme based on the p2q Factorization Assumption and provided
a complete security proof in the bundling homomorphism framework. We also relaxed
this framework to obtain more powerful factorization-based FSS schemes. These consid-
erations may be of independent interest. Our new bundling homomorphism is more ele-
mental and artless than the previous factoring bundling homomorphism from the vHPP
scheme [PP97]. In addition, our entire construction compares favorably with the vHPP
scheme which is based on the hardness of factoring a special kind of Blum integers.
As a further application, we constructed two new factorization-based trapdoor hash
families. The first one provides as fast weak altering as Shamir-Tauman’s state-of-the-
art solution, but additionally allows strong altering, too, yet leading to more powerful
generic constructions of on-line/off-line signature schemes. The second one is the first
factorization-based trapdoor hash family that enables the construction of on-line/off-line
chameleon signatures (a previous construction exists based on the hardness of inverting
RSA(n, n)).
Part II
Efficient Implementation
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Chapter 5
Algorithms for Scalar
Multiplication in Abelian Groups
In modern cryptosystems, one of the most important basic operation is the scalar mul-
tiplication dg = g + . . .+ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
, where g is an element of an additively written Abelian
group (G,+) and d is an integer1. Note that this chapter is not intended to present
a comprehensive treatment of the subject, instead, we provide the background for our
own research presented in the subsequent chapters. Neither we describe scalar multi-
plication methods tailored to special groups (such as the use of normal bases in the
case of IFpn [vzG91, Sti90], or efficiently computable endomorphisms on suitable ellip-
tic curves [GLV01]), nor we deal with the subject of performing several multiplications
of same element g with various scalars (in this case, methods are known that involve a
relatively large amount of precomputation depending on g, but the final multiplications
are sped up significantly [BGMW93,LL94]).
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.1, we develop a common structure for
performing scalar multiplication, whereas concrete realizations are described in Section 5.2
for generic groups and in Section 5.3 for groups where inversion is easy.
5.1 The General Scheme of Scalar Multiplication
A non-zero positive integer d is uniquely represented by a binary string:
d =
n−1∑
i=0
di2i, di ∈ {0, 1}, dn−1 = 1.
Here, we also write d = dn−1|dn−2|...|d1|d0.
The most common method for performing scalar multiplication is the double-and-add
algorithm, which computes dg according to the bits di (therefore it is often called binary
1In this thesis, we only consider additively written groups because we will focus on elliptic curves in
the subsequent chapters. In multiplicatively written groups, the corresponding operation is denoted as
exponentiation.
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method). In general, we distinguish two main concepts, namely scanning the bits left-to-
right (l-t-r, see Algorithm 5), or right-to-left (r-t-l, see Algorithm 6), respectively.
Algorithm 5: Binary method, left-to-right
Input: a group element g, a non-zero n-bit scalar d = dn−1| . . . |d1|d0
Output: scalar multiplication dg
h← g;1
for i = n− 2 down to 0 do2
h← 2h;3
if di = 1 then h← h+ g4
return h5
Algorithm 6: Binary method, right-to-left
Input: a group element g, a non-zero n-bit scalar d = dn−1| . . . |d1|d0
Output: scalar multiplication dg
h1 ← g; h2 ← 0G;1
for i = 0 to n− 1 do2
if di = 1 then h2 ← h1 + h2;3
h1 ← 2h14
return h25
The efficiency of this procedure may be enhanced if precomputation is allowed. In this
case, we consider more general representations of the scalar, where each non-zero bit di
is not restricted to be 1, but is an element of a suitable digit set T of integers. We call
d =
∑n−1
i=0 di2
i a T -representation, if dn−1 6= 0 and di ∈ T ∪ {0} holds for each 0 ≤ i < n.
For brevity, we also write d = [dn−1, . . . , d1, d0]2 in this case. In general, T -representations
loose the property of uniqueness, as the example [1, 0, 1]2 = 5 = [2, 1]2 demonstrates.
The left-to-right double-and-add algorithm is easily adjusted to work with a T -represen-
tation of the scalar2, namely addition of g in step 4 is replaced with addition of the
precomputed elements dig, where di ∈ T is the appropriate digit of d.
Hence, a general scheme for scalar multiplication can be described as follows: in the
precomputation stage the points tg for t ∈ T are precomputed and stored, in the recoding
stage the scalar is rewritten to a T -representation, and in the evaluation stage eventually
the scalar multiplication is performed. Algorithm 7 illustrates this framework with a left-
to-right evaluation phase.
It is now easy to see that the important features of a T -representation are the number of
non-zero digits and the cardinality of T , because these quantities determine the required
time and memory consumption for computing dg, respectively. The more precomputed
elements are available, the less non-zero elements will remain in the recoded scalar, hence
the faster the evaluation stage can be performed. Consequently, we are confronted with
an optimization problem to determine a representation class with best trade-off between
2There is also a right-to-left method suitable for T -representations [Knu81,Yao76]. For several reasons
which are described in more detail in Section 6.4.1, the left-to-right evaluation stage is preferred in our
intended applications.
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Algorithm 7: T -supported scalar multiplication, l-t-r evaluation
Input: a group element g, a non-zero scalar d, a description of a digit set T
Output: scalar multiplication dg
Precomputation:
Compute tg for each t ∈ T1
Recoding:
Obtain a T -representation [dn−1, . . . , d1, d0]2 of d2
Evaluation:
h← g;3
for i = n− 2 down to 0 do4
h← 2h;5
if di 6= 0 then h← h+ dig6
return h7
high non-zero density and low memory consumption. In this context it is expedient to
remark that there is a simple but notable speed-up possible for groups where inversion
(i. e., subtraction) is easy (e. g., point groups of elliptic curves or class-groups of imaginary
quadratic number fields). In this case, if both t and −t are elements of T , it is sufficient to
precompute tg, as −tg can be generated on the fly. Consequently, for each precomputed
point we get one additional precomputed point virtually for free. Here, if T contains
negative digits as well, we speak of signed representations of the scalar.
A further improvement is possible if both recoding and evaluation are of the same type
(l-t-r resp. r-t-l). In this case, it is possible to merge both stages, which makes it needless
to store the entire recoded scalar as an intermediate result in working memory. For l-t-r
processing, this issue is dealt with in Chapter 6.
The characterizations of precomputation and recoding phase are left vague in Algo-
rithm 7, because these phases cannot be generalized easily. The precomputation phase
usually exploits an appropriate addition chain depending on the actual set T . For exam-
ple, in most of the subsequently considered algorithms, T equals the set of all odd numbers
below some bound 2k+1. In this case, the elements {g, 3g, . . . , (2k+1)g} can be computed
with only k + 1 additions as follows: First, compute 2g = g + g. Then, for i = 1, . . . , k
compute (2i+1)g = (2i− 1)g+2g. Note that both summands in the last sum are already
known, thus the sequence 1, 2, 3, 5, . . . , 2k + 1 forms an addition chain.
Now it remains to describe the recoding phase in more detail. As noted above, groups
where inversion is easy require a special treatment, because we can exploit signed repre-
sentations in this case. Therefore we distinguish these groups from the general case. As
the main emphasis of the subsequent Chapters 6 and 7 are signed methods, we examine
these techniques in more detail.
5.2 Known Solutions: The Generic Case
As noted in the preceeding section, the scalar multiplication algorithms within our scope
mainly differ in the recoding stage only. Consequently, we focus on various techniques
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for generating T -representations in the following. In this section, we restrict ourselves to
the case where T contains solely positive digits. The signed case will be considered in
Section 5.3.
The most established techniques for generating T -representations are window methods.
Loosely speaking, in the window method with width w successively w consecutive bits of
the binary scalar are scanned and, if necessary, replaced by a table-entry according to
T . Again, left-to-right and right-to-left processing of bits is possible. We distinguish fixed
window methods like the 2w-ary method, where the window segmentation of the binary
string is predetermined and the more advanced sliding window methods, where zero runs
are skipped. More precisely, in a sliding window scheme, a fixed width window “slides”
over the input bit stream, and, whenever the leftmost, resp. rightmost (referring to l-t-
r, resp. r-t-l scanning) window bit is non-zero, the appropriate replacement takes place.
Instead of recapitulating the algorithms (see [Knu81,MvOV96,Gor98] for this purpose),
we illustrate the differences by the following examples for w = 3 (the non-underbraced
bits are transfered unchanged):
23-ary, left-to-right: 101︸︷︷︸
005
110︸︷︷︸
006
001︸︷︷︸
001
011︸︷︷︸
003
110︸︷︷︸
006
000︸︷︷︸
000
110︸︷︷︸
006
001︸︷︷︸
001
011︸︷︷︸
003
011︸︷︷︸
003
0
23-ary, right-to-left: 1 011︸︷︷︸
003
100︸︷︷︸
004
010︸︷︷︸
002
111︸︷︷︸
007
100︸︷︷︸
004
001︸︷︷︸
001
100︸︷︷︸
004
010︸︷︷︸
002
110︸︷︷︸
006
110︸︷︷︸
006
width-3 sliding window, left-to-right: 101︸︷︷︸
005
110︸︷︷︸
030
00 101︸︷︷︸
005
111︸︷︷︸
007
0000 110︸︷︷︸
030
00 101︸︷︷︸
005
101︸︷︷︸
005
10
width-3 sliding window, right-to-left: 10 111︸︷︷︸
007
000 101︸︷︷︸
005
111︸︷︷︸
007
000 011︸︷︷︸
003
0 001︸︷︷︸
001
011︸︷︷︸
003
011︸︷︷︸
003
0
Note that the sliding window method halves the number of precomputed elements, because
only odd multiples are required. In contrast, the 2w-ary method generates a fixed pattern
0w−1 ? 0w−1 ? . . . , where ? ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2w−1}, which is desirable in some applications3.
It is also possible to do without the even precomputed elements in the 2w-ary method
(modified 2w-ary method, see [BSS99], p. 65), but the sliding window method utilizes the
precomputation table in a more effective manner4. Consequently, in the unsigned case
(i. e., T consists solely of positive integers), sliding window techniques are the method of
choice.
5.3 Known Solutions: The Case Where Inversion Is Easy
As said before, in groups where inversion is fast it is meaningful to consider signed T -
representations of the scalar. The precomputation effort reduces to the computation of |t|g
for all t ∈ T , because −tg can be derived from tg online. Unfortunately, the generation of
signed T -representations is less immediate than in the unsigned case. Overall, there are two
strategies. The first one is to construct a {−1,+1} representation of d (also called a signed
binary representation) and to apply window methods afterwards. Here, the most common
3Uniformity of the recoded scalar provides resistance against simple side channel attacks. There are
also methods to avoid the case ? = 0, and consequently to achieve a perfect uniform output [Mo¨l01].
4Roughly speaking, this effect can be qualified as using one bit larger sliding windows compared to
fixed windows with the same amount of precomputation. Indeed, the sliding window method with width
w achieves an asymptotic non-zero density of 1/(w + 1) compared to (1/w)(1 − 1/2w) for the 2w-ary
method [KYLH94].
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signed binary representation is NAF (non-adjacent-form, referring to the property that no
two consecutive bits are non-zero) [Rei60, INS00].
The second strategy is to generalize the NAF recoding for w > 2 in order to obtain
wNAF [Sol00, BSS99] (here, the non-adjacency property states that among any w adja-
cent bits, at most one is non-zero). According to [BSS99], this strategy is asymptotically
the optimal one for w > 3. We sketch both methods in the following. In Section 6.3.3,
alternative solutions for generating signed representations are analyzed.
5.3.1 NAF And Windowed NAF
As stated above, the signed binary representation NAF has been introduced by G. W.
Reitwiesner in 1960 [Rei60], and it is characterized by the property that among any two
adjacent digits, at most one is non-zero.
NAF can be obtained from the binary representation by applying the conversion
?|1|1 7→ ? + 1|0|1 repeatedly, where 1 denotes −1 and ? stands for any binary digit.
However, the carry-over +1 occurring in the first digit forces the recoding to be per-
formed from the least significant bit, i. e., right-to-left. Procedure NAF describes an easily
implementable NAF generation.
Procedure NAF(d)
Input: a non-zero scalar d = dn−1| . . . |d1|d0
Output: the NAF representation (νn, . . . , ν0) of d, where νi ∈ {0,±1}
i← 0; k ← d;1
while k > 0 do2
if k is odd then3
νi ← k mods 4;4
k ← k − νi;5
else νi ← 0;6
k ← k/2; i← i+ 1;7
return (νn, . . . , ν0)8
In line 4, we write ”b mods m” for the signed residue of b modulo m, that is: b mods m is
the unique integer a in Z which verifies (a ≡ b (mod m)) and −bm−12 c ≤ a ≤ bm2 c.
Reitwiesner was able to show that—ignoring leading zeros—each integer has a unique
NAF representation. For this reason, some authors call NAF a canonical signed binary rep-
resentation [EcKK94]. In addition, as shown among others by Jedwab and Mitchell [JM89],
NAF representation provides the minimal Hamming weight (by Hamming weight we un-
derstand the number of non-zero digits). The non-zero density of NAF is only 1/3, and
consequently, we save about 1/6 of additions required for evaluating dg if d is represented
as NAF instead of binary (the number of doublings is not affected). Therefore, the NAF
representation of the scalar is the optimal choice if signed methods are meaningful and no
precomputation is considered.
However, the situation is less clear if extra memory is available and precomputation
is admitted. In this case, general signed representations outperform signed binary rep-
resentations. As noted above, one strategy for constructing signed representations is the
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application of window methods to signed binary representations. But as signed binary
representation is redundant, the question arises which representation is the best for this
purpose. Indeed, this is assumed to be an open problem by De Win et al. [WMPW98].
As NAF provides the minimal Hamming weight among all signed binary representations,
it seems to be a good candidate [WMPW98,Ava02]. Algorithm 9 illustrates the resultant
scalar multiplication algorithm.
Algorithm 9: Sliding window applied to NAF [WMPW98]
Input: a group element g, a non-zero n-bit scalar d, a width w
Output: scalar multiplication dg
Precomputation:
g1 ← g; g2 ← 2g1;1
for j from 1 to
(
2w+(−1)w+1
3 − 1
)
do g2j+1 ← g2j−1 + g2;2
/*g2j+1 contains (2j + 1)g for each j in {0, . . . , 2
w+(−1)w+1
3 − 1} */
Recoding and Evaluation:
(νn, . . . , ν0)← NAF(d);3
h← 0G; i← n− 1;4
while i ≥ 0 do5
if νi = 0 then h← 2h; i← i− 1;6
else7
s← max(i− w + 1, 0);8
/*s is the index of the last digit of the new window */
Let t be the smallest integer such that t ≥ s and νt 6= 0;9
for k from 1 to i− t+ 1 do h← 2h;10
/*(computation of 2i−t+1h) */
if [νi, νi−1, . . . , νt]2 > 0 then11
h← h+ g[νi,νi−1,...,νt]2 ;12
if [νi, νi−1, . . . , νt]2 < 0 then13
h← h− g|[νi,νi−1,...,νt]2|;14
for k from 1 to t− s do h← 2h;15
/*(computation of 2t−sh) */
i← s− 1;16
return A17
Note that although the sliding window method in the evaluation stage can be performed
left-to-right, it is necessary to proceed right-to-left to obtain the NAF representation of d.
Thus, this whole representation has do be stored as an intermediate result. In Chapter 6,
we will develop a signed representation not suffering from this drawback.
5.3.2 wNAF
The natural generalization of NAF is wNAF which is defined as follows5.
5Alternative generalizations of Reitwiesner’s NAF recoding idea can be found in [Pro00,Avi61].
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Definition 5.1 (wNAF) A sequence of signed digits is called wNAF iff the following
three properties hold:
1. The most significant non-zero bit is positive.
2. Among any w consecutive digits, at most one is non-zero.
3. Each non-zero digit is odd and less than 2w−1 in absolute value.
It seems that wNAF has first been described by Miyaji, Ono and Cohen [MOC97]. The
algorithm proposed in [MOC97] is rather involved, and Solinas gave a more elegant descrip-
tion [Sol00]. Instead of applying window methods to signed binary representations, wNAF
is constructed directly from unsigned binary using a generalization of Procedure NAF.
Note that the original NAF is the same as wNAF for w = 2.
Procedure NAF(d,w)
Input: a non-zero scalar d = dn−1| . . . |d1|d0, a width w > 1
Output: the wNAF representation (νw[n], . . . , νw[0]) of d, where
νw[i] ∈ {0,±1,±3, . . . ,±2w−1 − 1}
i← 0; k ← d;1
while k > 0 do2
if k is odd then3
νw[i]← k mods 2w;4
k ← k − νw[i];5
else νw[i]← 0;6
k ← k/2; i← i+ 1;7
return (νw[n], . . . , νw[0])8
Recently, Muir and Stinson proved the well-known fact that the wNAF of an integer is
at most one digit longer than its binary representation [MS06]. In addition, Muir and
Stinson were able to show that wNAF provides the minimal number of non-zero digits
of all {±1,±3, . . . ,±2w−1 − 1}-representations (an alternative proof has been given by
Avanzi [Ava04]). This fact has been assumed to be true for years, but a formal proof
was only known for the case w = 2. Note that this property does not imply superiority
of wNAF compared with sliding window on NAF (see Section 5.3.1), because the latter
requires a larger digit set for the same width w. This results in a higher precomputation
effort, but it turns out that the evaluation stage is slightly faster than for wNAF. Indeed,
to compare both methods rigorously, one has to develop explicite formulae for the num-
ber of group operations necessary in precomputation and evaluation stage, moreover the
precomputation effort has to be adjusted for a fair comparison. This has been done by
Blake, Seroussi and Smart [BSS99] with the conclusion that wNAF is preferable for w > 3,
though the margin of difference is slim. The crucial point for determining the estimated
number of group additions in a wNAF supported evaluation stage is the observation that
the asymptotic non-zero density of wNAF equals 1/(w+1). This result has been indepen-
dently proved by Miyaji, Ono and Cohen [MOC97] on the one hand and by Solinas [Sol00]
on the other hand.
As the class wNAF is of high relevance for the subsequent chapters, we summarize its
most important features in
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Theorem 5.1 wNAF as defined in Definition 5.1 has the following properties:
1. Each positive integer possesses a wNAF representation.
2. The length of the wNAF representation exceeds the binary representation by at most
one digit.
3. wNAF provides the minimal number of non-zero digits of all T -representations for
T = {±1,±3, . . . ,±2w−1 − 1}.
4. The asymptotic non-zero density of wNAF equals 1/(w + 1).
For the sake of completeness, Algorithm 11 illustrates the scalar multiplication with
wNAF. Again, the recoding stage is done right-to-left, therefore it is not possible to merge
recoding and evaluation.
Algorithm 11: Scalar multiplication with width-w NAF [BSS99]
Input: a point g, a non-zero n-bit scalar d, a width w
Output: the point dg
Precomputation:
g1 ← g; g2 ← 2g1;1
for j from 1 to 2w−2 − 1 do g2j+1 ← g2j−1 + g2;2
/*g2j+1 contains (2j + 1)g for each j in {0, . . . , 2w−2 − 1} */
Recoding:
(νw[n], . . . , νw[0])← NAF(d,w);3
Evaluation:
Let c be the largest integer with νw[c] 6= 0;4
if νw[c] > 0 then h← gνw[c];5
if νw[c] < 0 then h← −g|νw[c]|;6
for i from c− 1 down to 0 do7
h← 2h;8
if νw[i] > 0 then h← h+ gνw[i];9
if νw[i] < 0 then h← h− g|νw[i]|;10
return h11
Chapter 6
MOF—A New Canonical Signed
Binary Representation With
Applications to Elliptic Curve
Cryptography
The most common method for computing scalar multiplication of random elements in
Abelian groups are sliding window schemes, which enhance the efficiency of the binary
method at the expense of some precomputation (see Chapter 5). In groups where inver-
sion is easy, signed representations of the exponent are meaningful because they decrease
the amount of required precomputation. The asymptotic best signed method is wNAF,
because it minimizes the precomputation effort whilst its non-zero density is optimal. Un-
fortunately, wNAF can be computed only from the least significant bit, i. e., right-to-left.
In connection with memory constraint devices, however, left-to-right recoding schemes are
by far more valuable.
In this chapter, we define the MOF (Mutually Opposite Form), a new canonical rep-
resentation of signed binary strings, which can be computed in any order. Therefore we
obtain the first left-to-right signed recoding scheme for general width w by applying the
width w sliding window conversion on MOF left-to-right. Moreover, the analogue right-
to-left conversion on MOF yields wNAF, which indicates that the new class is the natural
left-to-right analogue to the useful wNAF. Indeed, the new class inherits the outstand-
ing properties of wNAF, namely the required precomputation and the achieved non-zero
density are exactly the same.
6.1 Introduction
As the ubiquitous computing devices are penetrating our daily life, the importance of
memory constraint devices (e. g., smart cards) in cryptography is increasing. Note that
in connection with these devices, the most popular cryptosystems are based on elliptic
curve point groups [Kob87,Mil85], because elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) provide
high security with moderate key-lengths. Hence, ECC seems to be the future standard,
especially for hand-held devices which have scarce resources. The most important operation
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in ECC is scalar multiplication (i. e., the multiplication of an integer with a point of the
curve) which has been discussed in the preceeding chapter. Recall that scalar multiplication
of a random point is split into three phases: first, a fairly small amount of precomputation
depending on the particular point and the set T determined by the selected window
method has to be performed, then – in the recoding phase – the scalar is rewritten to a
T -representation, and finally – in the evaluation stage – the multiplication is done.
6.1.1 New Motivation for Memory-saving Scalar Multiplication Algo-
rithms
Modern smart cards are equipped with a few Kbytes RAM only and most of them are re-
served for OS and stack. Thus, cryptographic algorithms and especially elliptic curve scalar
multiplication should be optimized in terms of memory. In particular, we are reluctant to
consume memory except the necessary precomputation related to T .
As noted in Chapter 5, scalar recoding may be performed from the least significant
bit (right-to-left) and from the most significant bit (left-to-right), respectively. For the
purpose of ECC on memory constraint devices, however, we prefer left-to-right to right-
to-left recoding methods. The reason is as follows: In the case of elliptic curve scalar
multiplication, the left-to-right evaluation stage is the natural choice (see Section 6.4.1 for
details). If the scalar recoding is done right-to-left, it is necessary to finalize the recoding
and to store the entire recoded string in working memory before starting the left-to-right
evaluation stage. In other words, we require additional n-bit RAM for the right-to-left
recoding, where n is the bit size of the scalar.
On the contrary, if a left-to-right recoding technique is available, the recoding and
evaluation stage may be interleaved to obtain an efficient scalar multiplication on the fly,
without storing the recoded scalar at all. Therefore it is an important task to construct
a left-to-right recoding scheme, even if the size of T and the non-zero density are not
improved.
6.1.2 Left-to-Right and Carry-free Generation Of Signed Representa-
tions
In Chapter 5, we have seen that in the unsigned case applying a standard sliding window
scheme on the binary representation is the method of choice1. However, a nice property of
elliptic curves is that inversion is computed virtually for free. In this case, it is meaningful
to consider signed representations of the scalar. In Chapter 5 we recalled some standard
methods for generating signed representations, but unfortunately, due to the occurrence
of carry-overs, the recoding is restricted to be done right-to-left in all cases. Consequently,
all scalar multiplication strategies based on signed T -representations require O(n) bits of
additional working memory to store the recoded scalar as an intermediate result. Solely
in the case of w = 2, Joye and Yen proposed a left-to-right signed binary recoding algo-
rithm [JY00]. But it has been an unsolved problem to generate a left-to-right recoding
algorithm for a larger set T .
From Section 5.3.2, we know that the asymptotic non-zero density of wNAF is the
1Recall that we consider the case where neither the scalar nor the group element are known in advance,
and in addition we assume that some memory is available to store precomputed data.
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same as for the unsigned sliding window method on binary, namely 1/(w+1). Moreover, if
the latter is applied right-to-left, its output also fulfills the non-adjacency property (among
any w consecutive digits, at most one is non-zero). Therefore, wNAF can be seen as the
natural signed analogue of the standard sliding window method on binary, and we guess
that there could be a carry-free generation method for wNAF. Here, the term carry-free
refers to an algorithm that transforms the input string in situ, i. e., in each step only the
knowledge of a fixed number of consecutive input bits is necessary.
In this chapter, we solve solve both problems as follows: (1) we define a new canonical
representation class of signed binary. We call it MOF (Mutually Opposite Form) and prove
that each integer can be uniquely represented as MOF. But the outstanding property of
MOF is that it can be efficiently developed from a binary string right-to-left or left-to-
right, likewise. Consequently, analogue to the unsigned case, sliding window methods may
be applied to receive left-to-right and right-to-left recoding schemes for general width w.
Surprisingly, applying the right-to-left width w sliding window method on MOF yields
wNAF. The observation that in the unsigned case right-to-left sliding window yields an
unsigned string with non-adjacency property stresses the analogy between unsigned binary
and signed MOF. Therefore we achieve a carry-free wNAF generation, a benefit of its own.
(2) Our major aim is the development of a left-to-right recoding algorithm, and this is
achieved straightforwardly by applying the width w sliding window method left-to-right
on MOF. We call the so-defined class wMOF and prove that each integer can be uniquely
represented as a wMOF and that the asymptotic non-zero density of wMOF equals 1/(w+
1), which is the same as for wNAF. Therefore the classes wNAF and wMOF may be seen as
dual to each other. In general our proposed algorithm asymptotically requires additional
O(w) bits of RAM for storing intermediate results, which is independent from the bit
size n and dramatically reduces the required space compared with previous methods.
Consequently, due to its left-to-right nature, the new scheme is by far more convenient
with respect to memory consumption than previous schemes. Interestingly, a straight-
forward proof shows that for w = 2 the proposed method produces the same output as the
Joye-Yen recoding, but 2MOF is more efficient in terms of counting the number of basic
operations.
We finish this chapter with an explicit algorithm for on-the-fly elliptic curve scalar mul-
tiplication with wMOF, proving that the proposed schemes are indeed useful for practical
purposes.
6.1.3 Related Works
There is a large amount of literature available on efficient exponentiation techniques2
(see, e. g., the textbooks [Knu81, MvOV96] and the survey paper [Gor98]). In the fol-
lowing, we only cite selected results that are important within the scope of this chap-
ter. It was first pointed out by Morain and Olivos that NAF can be used to speed up
elliptic curve scalar multiplication [MO90]. De Win et al. suggested the application of
a sliding window scheme on NAF (NAF+SW) to obtain a signed representation with
smaller Hamming weight [WMPW98]. A different approach to construct lower-weighted
signed representations is the generalization of NAF recoding for w > 2 in order to ob-
tain wNAF [Sol00,BSS99]. Both recoding methods are of right-to-left type and have been
2Elliptic curve scalar multiplication is a special instance of exponentiation in Abelian groups.
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reviewed in Section 5.3. Before the submission of the paper [OSSST04a], which is the foun-
dation of this chapter, the only known left-to-right recoding technique was restricted to the
signed binary case [JY00]. But interestingly, several authors independently dealt with the
topic of left-to-right signed digit representations at the same time [Ava04,MS05,HKPR05].
In [HGPT05], Heuberger, Grabner, Prodinger and Thuswaldner introduce the so-called
alternating-greedy-expansion of integers, a left-to-right computable signed binary repre-
sentation that turns out to be the same as MOF in a different description (implemented
as a greedy algorithm). In a subsequent paper, Heuberger, Katti, Prodinger and Ruan
propose the application of window methods to the alternating-greedy-expansion, therefore
they rediscovered wMOF [HKPR05]. Avanzi also constructed a left-to-right algorithm that
produces wMOF [Ava04], but his description is by far less intuitive than ours. A further
difference is that Avanzi proves optimality3—i. e., minimal Hamming weight among all
representations with T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , 2w−1}—whereas we deduce the asymptotic non-zero
density of wMOF. Both results are of high value: the minimality fact shows that wMOF is
indeed the method of choice for the intended applications, whilst knowledge of the non-zero
density is required when analyzing the efficiency of wMOF supported scalar multiplica-
tion (the amount of non-vanishing digits determines the number of point additions to be
performed during the evaluation stage). A different approach has been published by Muir
and Stinson [MS05], namely they define a class of left-to-right computable minimal weight
representations, and they present a probabilistic algorithm for computing members of this
class. It is notable that wMOF is a possible outcome of this algorithm ( [Mui04], Section
3.6).
6.2 MOF: New Canonical Representation for Signed Binary
Strings
In this section, we present a new signed representation of integers, called the mutually
opposite form (MOF). We assume that MOF can serve as a new canonical signed binary
representation dual to unsigned binary for the following reasons:
1. For each non-negative integer, a MOF representation exists and is unique when
leading zeros are ignored.
2. The asymptotic non-zero density of MOF is 1/2 as for unsigned binary.
3. MOF and unsigned binary lead to analogue results when window methods are applied
to them.
Some authors call NAF a canonical representation [EcKK94], but this view is solely based
on the uniqueness of NAF encoding. We assume that the arguments in favor of MOF are
more convincing.
We start with a formal definition of MOF:
Definition 6.1 (MOF) The n-bit mutually opposite form (MOF) is an n-bit signed bi-
nary string that satisfies the following properties:
3This result is shown for wMOF as well as for wNAF.
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1. The signs of adjacent non-zero bits (without considering zero bits) are opposite.
2. The most non-zero bit and the least non-zero bit are 1 and 1¯, respectively, unless all
bits are zero.
Some zero bits are inserted between non-zero bits that have a mutually opposite sign.
An example of MOF is 01001¯010001¯0011¯0. For simplicity, we only deal with non-negative
integers in the following. If the most significant bit of MOF is not restricted to be positive,
negative integers can be encoded too. All of the following results easily carry over to this
case.
An important observation is that each positive integer can be uniquely represented by
MOF. Indeed, the following theorem is proved in [OSSST04a].
Theorem 6.1 Let n be a positive integer. There are exactly 2n pair-wise different signed
binary strings of length n + 1 that meet Definition 6.1. Thus, there is the bijective map
between elements of (n+ 1)-bit MOF and n-bit binary strings.
From this theorem, any n-bit binary string can be uniquely represented by (n+1)-bit
MOF. We obviously have the following corollary about the non-zero density of MOF.
Proposition 6.1 The average non-zero density of n-bit MOF is 1/2 for n→∞.
6.2.1 Converting Binary String to MOF
We show a simple and flexible conversion from n-bit binary string to (n+1)-bit MOF. The
crucial point is the following observation: The n-bit binary string d can be converted to a
signed binary string by computing µ = 2d	 d, where 	 stands for a bitwise subtraction.
Indeed, we convert d as follows:
2d = dn−1 | dn−2 | . . . | di−1 | . . . | d1 | d0 |
	 d = | dn−1 | . . . | di | . . . | d2 | d1 | d0
µ = dn−1 | dn−2 − dn−1 | . . . | di−1 − di | . . . | d1 − d2 | d0 − d1 | −d0.
Here the i-th signed bit of µ is denoted by µi, namely µi = di−1 − di for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
and µn = dn−1, µ0 = −d0. In [OSSST04a] it is proved that the signed representation µ is
MOF.
Proposition 6.2 The operation µ = 2d	 d converts a binary string d to its MOF µ.
Procedure MOF provides an explicit left-to-right conversion from Binary to MOF.
Procedure MOF(d)
Input: a non-zero integer d = dn−1|dn−2| . . . |d1|d0
Output: MOF representation (µn, . . . , µ1, µ0) of d, where µi ∈ {0,±1}
d−1 ← 0; dn ← 0;1
for i = n down to 0 do µi ← di−1 − di;2
return (µn, µn−1, . . . , µ1, µ0)3
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The assignments in the first line capture the cases µn = dn−1 and µ0 = −d0. In order to
generate the i-th bit µi, Procedure MOF stores just two consecutive bits di−1 and di. This
algorithm converts a binary string to MOF from the most significant bit in an efficient
way. Note that it is possible to convert a binary string to MOF right-to-left as well. Thus,
the MOF representation is highly flexible.
Remark 6.1 Interestingly, the MOF representation of an integer d equals the recoding
performed by the classical Booth algorithm for binary multiplication [Boo51]. The classical
Booth algorithm successively scans two consecutive bits of the multiplier A (right-to-left).
Depending on these bits, one of the following operations is performed:
No operation, if (ai, ai−1) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)},
Subtract multiplicand B from the partial product, if (ai, ai−1) = (1, 0),
Add multiplicand B to the partial product, if (ai, ai−1) = (0, 1),
where a−1 is defined as 0. Of course, the design goal of this algorithm was to speed
up multiplication when there are consecutive ones in the multiplier A, and to provide a
multiplication method that works for signed and unsigned numbers as well. To the best of
our knowledge, this representation never served as a fundament of theoretical treatment
of signed binary strings.
6.3 Window Methods on MOF
In this section, we show how to decrease the non-zero density of MOF by applying window
methods on it. First we consider the right-to-left width w sliding window method which
surprisingly yields the familiar wNAF. In contrast to previously known generation meth-
ods, the new one is carry-free, i. e., in each step the knowledge of at most w+1 consecutive
input bits is sufficient.
Then we define the dual new class wMOF as the result of the analogue left-to-right
width w sliding window method on MOF. This conversion leads to the first left-to-right
signed recoding scheme for general width w.
6.3.1 Right-to-Left Case: wNAF
There are several algorithms for generating wNAF, for example see [BSS99,MOC97,Sol00],
but each method needs carry-overs. Note that in the worst case all remaining bits are af-
fected by the carry, therefore the previously known wNAF algorithms can not be considered
as local methods. By inspecting the wNAF generation procedure given in Section 5.3.2
closely, we observe that this generation can be seen as the natural signed analogue to
the right-to-left sliding window method on (unsigned) binary (here, mod instead of mods
is computed). Indeed, the latter method produces a representation that fulfills the non-
adjacency requirement. Consequently, we conjecture that there might be a signed binary
representation that produces wNAF when handled with sliding window conversions. In
this section, we point out that MOF serves for this purpose.
In order to describe the proposed scheme, we need the conversion table for width w.
First, we define the conversions for MOF windows of length l, where the first and the last
bit is non-zero:
6.3 Window Methods on MOF 97
0| . . . |0|2l−2 + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
←[

1|1¯|0| . . . |0|0|1
1|1¯|0| . . . |0|1|1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
0| . . . |0|2l−2 + 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
←[

1|1¯|0| . . . |0|1|0|1
1|1¯|0| . . . |0|1|1|1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
. . .
. . . 0| . . . |0|2l−1 − 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
←[

1|0| . . . |0|1|1|1
1|0| . . . |0|1|0|1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
0| . . . |0|2l−1 − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
←[

1|0| . . . |0|0|1
1|0| . . . |0|1|1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
In addition, we have analogue conversions with all signs changed. To generate the complete
table for width w, we have to consider all conversions of length l = 2, 3, . . . , w. If l < w
holds, the window is filled with leading zeros.
Example 6.1 (Conversion table for 4NAF) In the case of w = 4, we use the fol-
lowing table Table ←−4SW for the right-to-left sliding window method:
0001← [ { 00010011 0003←[
{
0101
0111 0005←[
{
1101
0111 0007← [
{
1001
1011
0001← [ { 00010011 0003←[
{
0101
0111 0005←[
{
1101
0111 0007← [
{
1001
1011
In an analogue way Table ←−wSW is defined for general w. Based on this table, Algorithm 13
provides a simple carry-free wNAF generation.
Algorithm 13: Carry-free right-to-left Generation from Binary to wNAF
Input: a width w, a non-zero n-bit binary string d = dn−1|dn−2| . . . |d1|d0
Output: wNAF representation νw = (νw[n], . . . , νw[0]) of d, where
νw[i] ∈ {0,±1,±3, . . . ,±2w−1 − 1}
dn+w−2 ← 0; dn+w−3 ← 0; . . . ; dn ← 0; d−1 ← 0; i← 0;1
while i ≤ n do2
if di−1 = di then3
νw[i]← 0; i← i+ 14
else5
/*The MOF window begins with a non-zero digit righthand */
(νw[i+ w − 1], νw[i+ w − 2], . . . , νw[i])←6
Table ←−wSW (di+w−2 − di+w−1, di+w−3 − di+w−2, . . . , di−1 − di);
i← i+ w7
return (νw[n], . . . , νw[0])8
Obviously, the output of Algorithm 13 meets the notations of Definition 5.1, therefore it is
wNAF. If we knew that Definition 5.1 provides a unique representation, we could deduce
that Algorithm 13 outputs the same as Procedure wNAF from Section 5.3.2. This is true,
although we could not find a proof in literature. For the sake of completeness, we prove
the following theorem via exploiting the uniqueness of MOF representation.
Theorem 6.2 Every non-negative integer d has a representation as wNAF, which is
unique except for the number of leading zeros.
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Proof We show (ignoring leading zeros in the following) that Definition 5.1 leads to a
unique representation of positive integers as follows:
1. We define a conversion MOF −→ wNAF.
2. We define a conversion wNAF −→ MOF.
3. We show that these two conversion are inverse to each other.
Consequently, there is a bijection between wNAF and MOF. As there is also a bijection
between MOF and Binary, this proves the uniqueness of wNAF.
ad (1): MOF −→ wNAF is defined by performing the sliding window method with
width w from the least significant bit (i. e., right-to-left) on MOF as described in Sec-
tion 6.3.1.
ad (2): wNAF −→ MOF scans the bits right-to-left using a window with width w,
until the rightmost window digit d is non-zero. All scanned zeros are taken to the converted
string as usual. If d is non-zero, due to the properties of wNAF the window content is of the
shape 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1
d, d ∈ {±1,±3, . . . ,±2w−1}. To find the correct replacement, we distinguish
two cases:
Case 1 The most significant non-zero bit of the already converted string equals -1:
We build the length-w-MOF corresponding to |d| (padded with leading zeros, if
necessary). In the case of d < 0, we change all signs of this length-w-MOF and take
this string. Otherwise, we force the last bit of the length-w-MOF to be 1 by replacing
its last 2 bits as follows: 11¯ 7→ 01, 01¯ 7→ 1¯1.
Case 2 The most significant non-zero bit of the already converted string equals 1 or no
non-zero bit has been converted at all:
We build the length-w-MOF corresponding to |d| (padded with leading zeros, if
necessary). In the case of d > 0, we take this string. Otherwise, we change all signs
of this length-w-MOF and we force the last bit of this string to be 1¯ by replacing its
last 2 bits as follows: 01 7→ 11¯, 1¯1 7→ 01¯.
This case differentiation ensures that the converted string possesses the MOF properties
(particularly the alternating signs of the non-zero bits).
Example 6.2 In the case of w = 3, we use the following table for the right-to-left con-
version
001 7→
{
001 Case1
011¯ Case2
001¯ 7→
{
01¯1 Case1
001¯ Case2
003 7→
{
11¯1 Case1
101¯ Case2
003¯ 7→
{
1¯01 Case1
1¯11¯ Case2
ad (3): The two conversions are inverse to each other, because if we perform w. l. o. g.
MOF −→ wNAF first and wNAF −→ MOF afterwards, the fragmentations of the strings
are exactly the same and the tables are inverse to each other. uunionsq
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6.3.2 Left-to-Right Case: wMOF
In this section, we introduce our new proposed recoding scheme. The crucial observation
is that as the generation Binary −→ MOF can be performed left-to-right, the combination
of this generation and left-to-right sliding window method leads to a complete signed
left-to-right recoding scheme dual to wNAF.
In order to describe the proposed scheme, we need the conversion table for width w.
The conversions for MOF windows of length l, such that the first and the last bit is non-
zero, are defined in exactly the same way as in the right-to-left case (see the table in
Section 6.3.1 and reflect the assignments). To generate the complete table for width w, we
have to consider all conversions of length l = 2, 3, . . . , w as before. The only difference is
that if l < w holds, the window is filled with closing zeros instead of leading ones.
Example 6.3 (Conversion table for 4MOF) As an example, we construct the con-
version table Table −→4SW for width 4:
1000} 7→1000 1100} 7→0100 11101010
}
7→0030 11011111
}
7→0005 10011011
}
7→0007
1000
} 7→1000 1100} 7→0100 11101010
}
7→0030 11011111
}
7→0005 10011011
}
7→0007
The table is complete due to the properties of MOF. Note that because of the equalities
?11 = ?01, ?11 = ?01 usually two different MOF-strings are converted to the same pattern.
In an analogue way, Table −→wSW is defined for general width w. In this case, the digit set
equals T = {±1,±3, . . . ,±2w−1 − 1}, which is the same as for wNAF. Therefore, the
scheme requires only 2w−2 precomputed elements. Algorithm 14 makes use of this table
to generate wMOF left-to-right.
In order to deepen the duality between wNAF and wMOF, we give a formal definition
of wMOF and prove that it leads to a unique representation of non-negative integers.
Definition 6.2 A sequence of signed digits is called wMOF iff the following three prop-
erties hold:
1. The most significant non-zero bit is positive.
2. All but the least significant non-zero digit x are adjoint by w-1 zeros as follows:
• in case of 2k−1 < |x| < 2k for an integer 2 ≤ k ≤ w − 1 the pattern equals
0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
x 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−k−1
,
• in case of |x| = 1 either the pattern equals x 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1
and the next lower non-zero
digit has opposite sign from x or the pattern equals 0x 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−2
and the next lower
non-zero digit has the same sign as x.
If x is the least significant non-zero digit, it is possible that the number of right-hand
adjacent zeros is smaller than stated above. In addition it is not possible that the last
non-zero digit is a 1 following any non-zero digit.
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3. Each non-zero digit is odd and less than 2w−1 in absolute value.
This definition is directly related to the generation of wMOF. Note that the exceptional
case corresponding to the least significant bit takes in account that the last window may
be shorter than w.
Algorithm 14: Left-to-Right Generation from Binary to wMOF
Input: a width w, a non-zero n-bit binary string d = dn−1|dn−2| . . . |d1|d0
Output: wMOF representation δw = (δw[n], δw[n− 1], . . . , δw[1], δw[0]) of d, where
δw[i] ∈ {0,±1,±3, . . . ,±2w−1 − 1}
d−1 ← 0; dn ← 0; i← n;1
while i ≥ w − 1 do2
if di = di−1 then3
δw[i]← 0; i← i− 14
else5
/*The MOF window begins with a non-zero digit lefthand */
(δw[i], δw[i− 1], . . . , δw[i− w + 1])←6
Table −→wSW (di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , di−w − di−w+1);
i← i− w7
if i ≥ 0 then8
(δw[i], δw[i− 1] . . . , δw[0])← Table −→i+1SW (di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , d0 − d1,−d0)9
return (δw[n], δw[n− 1], . . . , δw[1], δw[0])10
Regarding the uniqueness and the non-zero density of wMOF, we have the following two
theorems:
Theorem 6.3 Every non-negative integer d has a representation as wMOF, which is
unique except for the number of leading zeros.
Proof We proceed as follows:
1. We define a conversion MOF −→ wMOF.
2. We define a conversion wMOF −→ MOF.
3. We show that these two conversion are inverse to each other.
Consequently, there is a bijection between wMOF and MOF. As there is also a bijection
between MOF and Binary, this proves the uniqueness of wMOF. This proof is similar to
the preceding one (MOF ↔ wNAF).
ad (1): MOF −→ wMOF is defined by performing the sliding window method with
width w from the most significant bit (i. e., left-to-right) on MOF.
ad (2): wMOF −→ MOF scans the bits right-to-left using a window with width w,
until the window content equals one of the patterns described in Definition 6.2, property
2. All scanned zeros are taken to the converted string as usual. The replacements are
performed as in the proof of Theorem 6.2 with the following exceptions: If the window
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content equals 1 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1
and case 1 applies, then we adopt the content as it stands. But if
case 2 applies, it follows from Definition 6.2, property 2, that the left-hand neighbor of the
window must be a zero. In this case, we shift the window one step leftwards and replace
01 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−2
by 11 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−2
. The dual case (1 instead of 1) is treated in the analogue way.
As before the case differentiation ensures the MOF properties.
ad (3): We can argue exactly in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 6.2. uunionsq
In Schmidt-Samoa et al. [OSSST04a] it is proved that the asymptotic non-zero density
of wMOF is exactly the same as for wNAF:
Theorem 6.4 The wMOF scheme applied to a scalar d requires 2w−2 precomputed ele-
ments and achieves a representation with a non-zero density of 1w+1 when the bit length
of d tends to infinity.
We finish this section with a detailed example of the conversion from unsigned binary to
MOF and the effects of several sliding window methods.
Example 6.4 (MOF, wMOF and wNAF)
Bin: 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
MOF: 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
2MOF: 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
3MOF: 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1
4MOF: 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 0 1
NAF: 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
3NAF: 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 1
4NAF: 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 7
6.3.3 Comparison with Previous Methods
In this section, we clarify the difference to previous schemes for generating signed digit
representations.
In 1992, Koyama and Tsuruoka developed a new recoding technique to convert a
binary string to a signed binary string [KT92]. Following this step, a left-to-right sliding
window method is applied. The new signed binary representation has the benefit that it
reduces the asymptotic non-zero density, but it requires the sub-optimal digit set T =
{±1,±3, . . . ,±(2w − 3)}. If the sliding window method is directly applied to NAF, due to
the NAF property fewer possible window contents have to be taken into account, resulting
in a smaller digit set T . An easy calculation shows that the largest odd NAF consisting of
at most w digits equals 13(2
w+1−1) for odd w (cf. 1010 . . . 01) and 13(2w+1+1)−2 for even w
(cf. 1010 . . . 1001). For this reason, De Win et al. prefer the latter method for elliptic curve
scalar multiplication [WMPW98] (see Section 5.3.1). Although there are slightly more
point operations needed to evaluate the scalar multiplication if the scalar is represented as
wNAF compared to the [WMPW98] representation, the required precomputation is less
in the wNAF case because of the smaller digit set. Indeed, Blake et al. proved that wNAF
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is asymptotically better than sliding window on NAF schemes if w > 3 [BSS99]. In the
context of memory constraint devices, a small digit set T is even more valuable, because
fewer precomputed elements have to be stored. But as none of the preceding methods is a
left-to-right scheme, each one requires additional memory O(n) to store the recoded string
before starting the left-to-right evaluation of the scalar product. Note that in the context
of sliding window on signed binary schemes like [KT92,WMPW98] the sliding window
conversion may be performed left-to-right, but to obtain the signed binary representation
we have to proceed right-to-left in either case.
In contrast, wMOF turns out as a complete left-to-right scheme. Consequently, there
is no additional memory required for performing the scalar multiplication. Moreover, due
to the properties of MOF, the digit set of wMOF is the same as for wNAF and therefore
minimal.
Next, we compare the characterizing properties for the proposed schemes and some
previous ones. In the second column, the value #T /2 equals the number of elements
that have to be precomputed and stored. In the last column, we describe the amount of
memory (in bits) that is required additionally to this storage, e. g., to construct the signed
representation or to store the converted string in right-to-left schemes. As usual, n equals
the bit-length of the scalar, and SW is an abbreviation for sliding window.
Scheme #T /2 1/N.-z. Density Additional Memory
wNAF [Sol00,BSS99,MOC97] 2w−2 w + 1 O(n)
[KT92] 2w−1 − 1 w + 32 O(n)
NAF+SW as [WMPW98] 13 (2
w + (−1)w+1) w + 43 − (−1)
w
3·2w−2 O(n)
wMOF, Sec. 6.3.2 2w−2 w + 1 O(w)
Table 6.1: Comparison of Memory Requirement and Non-zero Density
6.4 Applications to Elliptic Curve Cryptography
In this section, we show how MOF representation can be exploited to develop memory
saving algorithms for elliptic curve scalar multiplication, which is the most important
operation in elliptic curve cryptography.
6.4.1 Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication
Let K = IFp be a finite field, where p > 3 is a prime. Let E be an elliptic curve over K.
The elliptic curve E has an Abelian group structure with identity element O called the
point of infinity. The elliptic curve additions P1+P2 and 2P are denoted by ECADD and
ECDBL, respectively, where P1, P2, P ∈ E. ECADD and ECDBL are constructed with the
arithmetic of the base field K. There are several coordinate systems that provide efficient
algorithms for computing ECADD and ECDBL [CMO98], but in each coordinate system,
the inversion of a point can be computed immediately. For example, in affine coordinates a
point P is represented as P = (x, y), x, y ∈ IFp, and −P is then obtained as −P = (x,−y).
In Section 5.1, we have observed that scalar multiplication can be performed left-to-
right and right-to-left, respectively. Though in general both methods provide the same
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efficiency, the left-to-right method is preferable due to the following reasons:
1. The left-to-right binary method can be adjusted for general T -representations of d
like wNAF or wMOF in a more efficient way than the right-to-left method. Although
there is a right-to-left analogue of Algorithm 7, this variant is less flexible as the
“precomputation” depends on both the point and the scalar [Knu81,Yao76].
2. The ECADD step in the left-to-right method (cf. line 6 in Algorithm 7) has the fixed
input tP, t ∈ T . Therefore it is possible to speed up these steps if tP is expressed
in affine coordinates for each t ∈ T , since some operations are negligible in this
case. The approach of using different coordinate systems for different operations
is known as mixed coordinates method, and the improvement for a 160-bit scalar
multiplication is about 15% with NAF over right-to-left scheme in the Jacobian
coordinates [CMO98].
6.4.2 Explicit Implementation
Algorithm 15 puts the ideas of Section 6.3.2 into practice. It is notable that in contrast
to previous solutions reviewed in Section 5.3 the recoding and evaluation phase can be
merged.
6.5 Conclusion
It was an unsolved problem to generate a signed representation left-to-right for a general
digit set T . In this chapter, we presented a solution of this problem. The proposed scheme
inherits the outstanding properties of wNAF, namely the set of pre-computed elements
and the non-zero density are same as those of wNAF. In order to achieve a left-to-right
scalar recoding, we defined a new canonical representation of signed binary strings, called
the mutually opposite form (MOF). An n-bit integer can be uniquely represented by
(n+1)-bit MOF, and this representation can be constructed efficiently left-to-right. Then
the proposed recoding is obtained by applying the width w (left-to-right) sliding window
conversion to MOF. The proposed scheme is conceptually easy to understand and it is
quite simple to implement. Moreover, if we apply the width w (right-to-left) sliding window
conversion to MOF, we surprisingly obtain the classical wNAF. This is the first carry-free
algorithm for generating wNAF. Therefore the proposed scheme has a lot of advantages
and it promises to be a good alternative to wNAF. We believe that there will be many
new applications of this algorithms for cryptography.
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Algorithm 15: Scalar Multiplication with wMOF
Input: a point P , a width w, a non-zero n-bit binary string d = dn−1|dn−2| . . . |d1|d0
Output: the point dP
Precomputation:
P1 ← P ; P2 ← ECDBL(P1);1
for j from 1 to 2w−2 − 1 do P2j+1 ← ECADD(P2j−1, P2);2
/*(P2j+1 contains (2j + 1)P for each j in {0, . . . , 2w−2 − 1}) */
Recoding and Evaluation:
A← O; i← n;3
d−1 ← 0; dn ← 0;4
while i ≥ 0 do5
if di−1 = di then A← ECDBL(A); i← i− 1;6
/*(the MOF digit is zero) */
else7
s← max(i− w + 1, 0);8
/*s is the index of the last digit of the new window */
Let t be the smallest integer such that t ≥ s and dt−1 6= dt;9
for k from 1 to i− t+ 1 do A← ECDBL(A);10
/*(computation of 2i−t+1A) */
if [di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , dt−1 − dt]2 > 0 then11
A← ECADD(A,P[di−1−di,di−2−di−1,...,dt−1−dt]2);12
if [di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , dt−1 − dt]2 < 0 then13
A← ECADD(A,−P|[di−1−di,di−2−di−1,...,dt−1−dt]2|);14
for k from 1 to t− s do A← ECDBL(A);15
/*(computation of 2t−sA) */
i← s− 1;16
return A17
Chapter 7
Fractional MOF—Elliptic Curve
Scalar Multiplication With
Flexible Memory Consumption
In the preceding chapter, we introduced wMOF, a left-to-right recoding technique perfectly
suited for performing elliptic curve scalar multiplication. Though wMOF turned out to
be advantageous compared to the previous methods sliding window on NAF (NAF+SW)
and wNAF, it nevertheless shares a common drawback with these schemes: Only a small
portion of numbers are possible sizes for the precomputation tables, and the gaps between
consecutive table sizes grow exponentially in the width w. Therefore, in practice it is often
necessary to waste memory, because there is no table fitting exactly the available storage.
Only in the case of wNAF, there exists a variant that allows arbitrary table sizes, the
so-called fractional wNAF (Frac-wNAF).
In this chapter, we propose the fractional wMOF (Frac-wMOF), which is a left-to-
right analogue of Frac-wNAF. We provide a comprehensive proof using Markov theory to
determine the non-zero density of Frac-wMOF. It turns out that Frac-wMOF inherits the
outstanding properties of Frac-wNAF. However, because of its left-to-right nature, Frac-
wMOF is preferable as it reduces the memory consumption of the scalar multiplication.
Finally, we show that the properties of all discussed previous schemes can be achieved
as special instances of the Frac-wMOF method. To demonstrate the practicability of Frac-
wMOF, we develop an on-the-fly algorithm for computing elliptic curve scalar multiplica-
tion with a flexibly chosen amount of memory.
Since it has been recently proved that Frac-wMOF additionally provides minimal Ham-
ming weight among all representations using an appropriate digit set, we conclude that
the Frac-wMOF method is the optimal choice for performing elliptic curve scalar multi-
plication in memory-constraint devices.
7.1 Introduction
In Section 5.3 we reviewed NAF+SW and wNAF, two well-known representations suitable
for performing elliptic curve scalar multiplication of random points. For devices with scarce
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resources, however, these two as well as all further previous techniques turned out to be
sub-optimal due the right-to-left/left-to-right mismatch of recoding and evaluation stage.
To overcome this problem, we introduced wMOF—a left-to-right analogue of wNAF—in
the preceding chapter. But unfortunately, a common drawback of all previous methods
also applies to wMOF, namely the table sizes used to store precomputed elements are not
arbitrary (for example, we have #{|x| : x ∈ T } = 2w−2 for wNAF and wMOF). Hence,
the gaps between w-table and (w + 1)-table grow exponentially fast with w. We achieve
some additional values taking NAF+SW into account, but the actual problem persists.
Consider the case that a certain amount of memory is available to store the precomputed
table, but none of the possible tables fits exactly the obtainable memory. Subject to
these limitations, we have to choose a smaller table and consequently waste memory. This
is painful especially in memory-constraint devices like smart cards, for which wMOF is
designated. To address this problem, Mo¨ller proposed fractional window methods [Mo¨l02],
in particular fractional wNAF (Frac-wNAF) as a variant of wNAF for the signed case.
The Frac-wNAF allows a free choice of the table-size and is as efficient as wNAF.
In this chapter, we introduce the fractional wMOF (Frac-wMOF) method, which is a
left-to-right analogue of Frac-wNAF. The proposed Frac-wMOF is a highly flexible variant
of wMOF as it can be set up with arbitrary table sizes. We will show that the average non-
zero density of Frac-wMOF for a given memory size is exactly equal to that of Frac-wNAF,
thus highlighting the duality of wNAF and wNAF once more.
From this result, we can achieve an efficient left-to-right recoding algorithm with flexi-
ble memory usage. As an application to elliptic curve cryptosystems, we present an on-the-
fly scalar multiplication algorithm based on Frac-wMOF recoding. The proposed scheme
requires virtually no additional working memory1, and thus it is suitable for implementa-
tion on memory-constraint devices.
Finally, based on these results, we are able to give a detailed comparison of NAF+SW,
wNAF, and wMOF with the fractional methods. From the construction of the latter it
is obvious that wNAF and wMOF can be modeled with the fractional methods. But
surprisingly, we point out that the same is true for NAF+SW which is generated in a
completely different manner (see Section 5.3). Namely, we show that the properties of
NAF+SW can be achieved as a special instance of Frac-wMOF. Therefore, we conclude
that the Frac-wMOF is the best window method among these schemes.
Recently, independently from our work, Mo¨ller also analyzed a generalization of his
fractional method to the left-to-right case. He achieved the same representation as Frac-
wMOF and was able to prove that this representation provides minimal Hamming weight
among all signed-digit representations utilizing the digit set {0,±1,±2, . . . ,±m} [Mo¨l04].
This work goes perfectly with our results and confirms our conjecture that Frac-wMOF
is the best universally applicable method for performing base-2 elliptic curve scalar mul-
tiplication in limited-constrained devices.
7.1.1 Elementary Markov Theory
In this section, we review the most basic facts about Markov theory. For a comprehensive
treatment, see [Ha¨g02]. Markov theory is often used to analyze random processes over
finite state spaces with the property that the probability of the current state depends only
1In case of Frac-wNAF, the entire recoded scalar has to be buffered in working memory.
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on the preceding one, but not on the earlier stages. Such a process X0, X1, . . . is called a
homogenous Markov chain, if Pr(Xn+1|Xn) is the same for all n. Homogeneous Markov
chains can be represented by a transition matrix that contains the conditional probabilities
of a stage given the preceding stage. Namely, if S = {s1, . . . , sk} is the state space, then
the entries of the transition matrix P are given as Pi,j = Pr(Xn+1 = sj |Xn = si). A
crucial property of homogenous Markov chains is that given the initial distribution, i. e.,
µ(0) := (Pr(X0 = s0),Pr(X0 = s1), . . . ,Pr(X0 = sk)), the distribution at an arbitrary time
n can be computed as µ(n) = (Pr(Xn = s0),Pr(Xn = s1), . . . ,Pr(Xn = sk)) = µ(0)Pn.
A natural question now concerns the asymptotic behavior of the Markov chain, i. e.,
the behavior of the sequence (µ(n))n∈N when n tends to infinity. To answer this question,
we first consider two properties of Markov chains. The first one is irreducibility : Roughly
speaking, a Markov chain is called irreducible, if each state si can be reached from each
state sj , that is ∃n ∈ N : Pr(Xn = si|X0 = sj) > 0. The second property is aperiodicity :
A Markov chain is called aperiodic, if for all states si the greatest common divisor of the
set of times the chain can return to si when starting from si equals one, that is gcd({n ≥
1 | Pr(Xn = si|X0 = si)}) = 1. It is possible that from a certain point on, the distribution
of the Markov chain will stay invariant for all time, that is ∃k∀i ≥ k : µ(i) = µ(k). In this
case, the distribution µ(k) is called a stationary distribution2, and we have µ(k)P = µ(k)
(µ(k) is an eigenvector of P ).
The main theorem of elementary Markov theory now states there exists a unique
stationary distribution pi for each irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain, and under an
appropriate metric the sequence µ(n) tends to pi with n → ∞. Therefore we can analyze
the asymptotic behavior of irreducible and aperiodic Markov chains simply by determining
the eigenvector of its transition matrix.
7.2 Fractional Window Methods
The window methods described in the preceding section use precomputed tables whose
sizes are not arbitrary, as shown in Fig. 7.1.
In particular, the gaps between two consecutive table sizes grow exponentially fast. This
is a problem, especially in limited performance devices, such as smart cards: For these
devices, we want to use all the available memory, in order to obtain a better trade-off
between memory and speed. The fractional window methods fulfill this purpose.
7.2.1 Fractional wNAF
The fractional wNAF (Frac-wNAF) [Mo¨l02] is a generalization of the wNAF method
which permits the use of precomputed tables of any sizes. We denote with q the number
of elements of the intended precomputed table. There is a unique w0 such that 2w0−2 ≤
q < 2w0−1 (w0 = blog2(q)c+ 2). If we were using the standard wNAF algorithm, then the
window size could be at most w0, and the precomputed table would contain 2w0−2 elements.
We now call r the size of the memory space which would be wasted (r = q−2w0−2) and we
introduce the notation w1 for w1 = r/2w0−2. Note that 0 ≤ r < 2w0−2 and that 0 ≤ w1 < 1.
The elements in the precomputed table are {1P, 3P, 5P, . . . , (2q−1)P} = {1P, 3P, 5P, . . . ,
2Note that this does not mean ∀i ≥ k : Xi = Xk.
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Figure 7.1: Concrete table sizes and corresponding non-zero densities
(2w0−1−1)P, (2w0−1+1)P, . . . , (2w0−1+w12w0−1−1)P}. The precomputed table hence has
q = (1+w1)2w0−2 elements. These parameters define Frac-wNAF with width w = w0+w1.
The generation of Frac-wNAF of width w = w0+w1 in Procedure Frac-wNAF from [Mo¨l02]
derives directly from the (w0+1)NAF generation (see the Procedure given in Section 5.3),
in which we replace the non precomputed elements by their w0NAF analogue (lines 5 and 6
of Procedure Frac-wNAF).
Procedure Frac-wNAF(d,w)
Input: a fractional width w = w0 + w1 where w0 = bwc and w1 = r/2w0−2 for an r
between 0 and 2w0−2 − 1, a non-zero n-bit binary string
d = dn−1|dn−2| . . . |d1|d0
Output: the Frac-wNAF representation (νw[n], νw[n− 1], . . . , νw[0]) of d, where
νw[i] ∈ {0,±1,±3, . . . ,±2q−1 − 1}, q = (1 + w1)2w0−2
i← 0;1
while d > 0 do2
if d is odd then3
νw0+1[i]← d mods 2w0+1;4
if |νw0+1[i]| > ((1 + w1)2w0−1 − 1) then νw[i]← d mods 2w0 ;5
else νw[i]← νw0+1[i];6
d← d− νw[i];7
else νw[i]← 0;8
d← d/2; i← i+ 1;9
return (νw[n], νw[n− 1], . . . , νw[0])10
We obtain an algorithm for scalar multiplication with Frac-wNAF by replacing the re-
coding stage of Algorithm 11 with the above Frac-wNAF generation. In addition, the
precomputation phase has to be adjusted as follows: instead of j = 0, . . . , 2w−2 − 1 the
loop passes through j = 0, . . . , 2w0−2(1 + w1) − 1 (such that the largest table entry is
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(2j + 1)P = (2w0−2 + w12w0−2 − 1)P ).
In [Mo¨l02], Mo¨ller states that the asymptotic non-zero density of Frac-wNAF with a
valid fractional window size w equals 1/(w+1). This claim has been proved rigorously by
Schmidt-Samoa et al. [SSST06].
7.2.2 Fractional wMOF
In this section, we apply the highly flexible fractional window method to MOF.
As the precomputation is the same for wNAF and wMOF (see Section 6.3), we can
argue in a similar way as in the preceding section. In particular, let r be the number of
points that should be precomputed in addition to the table corresponding to width w0
(0 ≤ r < 2w0−2). Then we define the fractional width as w = w0+w1, where w1 = r/2w0−2.
To evaluate the scalar multiplication, we proceed like (w0 + 1)MOF if possible, and like
w0MOF, else. Algorithm 17 illustrates this concept.
In the first phase, the table entries are precomputed. There is memory available for 2w0−2+
r points, therefore we precompute P1, P3, . . . , P2w0−1−1 (2w0−2 points) and
P2w0−1+1, P2w0−1+3 . . . , P2w0−1+2r−1 (r points). With w1 = r/2w0−2 we obtain the bound
for the loop variable j.
The second phase merges recoding and evaluation. Note that the ith MOF-digit µi of d is
computed as di−1− di and that the MOF representation is one bit longer than the binary
representation. The assignments in line 4 are necessary to compute the MOF-digits µ0
and µn, respectively. The evaluation is performed from left-to-right, i. e., from the most
significant bit. Whenever di−1 = di holds, the MOF digit µi is zero and only an ECDBL
is computed (line 6). Otherwise, a window of length w0 + 1 is processed. In line 8, the
index s of the rightmost window digit is assigned. As we do not use the full precomputed
table for width w0 + 1, it may happen that the window content corresponds to a point
that is not available. First we note that this is only possible if ds−1 6= ds, i. e., µs 6= 0
holds: Let µs = 0 and let t > s be minimal with respect to dt−1 6= dt, i. e., µt 6= 0. Then
the appropriate precomputed point corresponding to the actual window is computed as
|[µi, µi−1, . . . , µt]2| ≤ [1, 0, . . . , 0, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
w0
]2 = 2w0−1 − 1 following the MOF-property. Thus, the
precomputed table is always sufficient. In case of ds−1 6= ds, the precomputed table is too
small if and only if |[µi, µi−1, . . . , µs]2| ≥ 2w0−1(1 + w1) holds. Consequently, the window
has to be reduced in this case (line 10). In line 11, the index t of the window’s rightmost
non-zero MOF digit is assigned. The remaining part of the algorithm does not differ from
the usual scalar multiplication with (w0 + 1)MOF resp. w0MOF (see Algorithm 15).
To finish this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1 Let w be a valid fractional window size, i. e., w = w0+w1 where w0 = bwc
and w1 = r/2w0−2 for an r between 0 and 2w0−2−1. The fractional wMOF scheme applied
to a scalar d requires (1 + w1)2w0−2 precomputed elements and achieves a representation
with a non-zero density of 1w0+w1+1 =
1
w+1 when the bit length of d tends to infinity.
Proof From the considerations above, it is obvious that the number of precomputed
points equals (1 + w1)2w0−2.
We model the recoding process of Frac-wMOF as a Markov process that on input of an
infinitely long sequence of uniformly and independently distributed bits d0, d1, . . . outputs
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Algorithm 17: Scalar Multiplication with Frac-wMOF
Input: a point P , a fractional width w = w0 + w1, where w0 = bwc and
w1 = r/2w0−2 for an r between 0 and 2w0−2 − 1, a non-zero n-bit binary
string d = dn−1|dn−2| . . . |d1|d0,
Output: the point dP
Precomputation:
P1 ← P ; P2 ← ECDBL(P1);1
for j from 1 to 2w0−2(1 + w1)− 1 do P2j+1 ← ECADD(P2j−1, P2);2
/*(P2j+1 contains (2j + 1)P for each j in {0, . . . , 2w0−2(1 + w1)− 1}) */
Recoding and Evaluation:
A← O; i← n;3
d−1 ← 0; dn ← 0;4
while i ≥ 0 do5
if di−1 = di then A← ECDBL(A); i← i− 1;6
/*(the MOF digit is zero) */
else7
s← max(i− w0, 0);8
/*s is the index of the last digit of the new window */
if ds−1 6= ds and |[di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , ds−1 − ds]2| ≥ 2w0−1(1 + w1)9
then
/*the window has to be reduced */
s = s+ 1;10
Let t be the smallest integer such that t ≥ s and dt−1 6= dt;11
for k from 1 to i− t+ 1 do A← ECDBL(A);12
/*(computation of 2i−t+1A) */
if [di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , dt−1 − dt]2 > 0 then13
A← ECADD(A,P[di−1−di,di−2−di−1,...,dt−1−dt]2);14
if [di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , dt−1 − dt]2 < 0 then15
A← ECADD(A,−P|[di−1−di,di−2−di−1,...,dt−1−dt]2|);16
for k from 1 to t− s do A← ECDBL(A);17
/*(computation of 2t−sA) */
i← s− 1;18
return A19
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a series of blocks of the following shapes: a single zero bit, a block of w0 + 1 bits, or a
block of w0 bits. Let the current bit be di and let s be defined like in Algorithm 17, i. e.,
if di 6= di−1 then s = i−w0 is the index of the rightmost digit in the current window. We
distinguish three states:
• State b1:
The output is a single zero bit. This is the case iff di−1 = di holds.
• State b2:
The output equals 0i−t+1 ? 0t−i+w0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w0+1
, where ? is a non-zero digit and t ≥ s is minimal
with respect to dt−1 6= dt. We define the following property:
ds−1 = ds or |[di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , ds−1 − ds]2| ≤ 2w0−1(1 + w1)− 1 (7.1)
Then state b2 occurs iff di−1 6= di holds and property (7.1) is fulfilled.
• State b3:
The output equals 0i−t+1 ? 0t−i+w0−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
w0
, where ? is a non-zero digit and t ≥ s + 1 is
minimal with respect to dt−1 6= dt (t is defined for the reduced window). State b3
occurs iff di−1 6= di holds and property (7.1) is not fulfilled.
We determine the conditional probabilities Pr (Xn+1 = bi|Xn = bj). First, we consider the
case Xn+1 = b1 for the different Xn:
• If the current state is Xn = b1:
That means di−1 = di and the next input bit is di−1. Hence,
Pr (Xn+1 = b1|Xn = b1) = Pr (di−2 = di−1|di−1 = di)
= Pr (di−2 = di−1) =
1
2
. (7.2)
• If the current state is Xn = b2:
That means di−1 6= di, property (7.1) is fulfilled, and the next input bit is di−w0−1 =
ds−1. Obviously, the logical value of ds−2 = ds−1 is independent from di−1 6= di and
from property (7.1). Hence,
Pr (Xn+1 = b1|Xn = b2) = Pr (ds−2 = ds−1) = 12 . (7.3)
• If the current state is Xn = b3:
That means di−1 6= di, property (7.1) is not fulfilled, and the next input bit is
di−w0 = ds. As property (7.1) is not fulfilled we must have ds−1 6= ds. Hence,
Pr (Xn+1 = b1|Xn = b3) = Pr (ds−1 = ds|ds−1 6= ds) = 0. (7.4)
Next, we determine the remaining probabilities Pr (Xn+1 = b2|Xn) and Pr (Xn+1 = b3|Xn).
If the new state is not b1, then w0 + 2 input bits are processed and the first two of these
differ. Therefore there are 2w0+1 possibilities for these input bits. It is a consequence of the
MOF properties that for each positive odd integer 1 ≤ x ≤ 2w0 − 1 there are exactly four
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choices of di 6= di−1, di−2, . . . , ds, ds−1 ∈ {0, 1} such that |[di−1−di, di−2−di−1, . . . , dt−1−
dt]2| = x holds, where t ≥ s is minimal with respect to dt−1 6= dt (e. g., for x = 3 the four
choices are 0110, 1001, 0101 and 1010 leading to the MOF sequences 101, 101, 111 and 111).
Hence, there are 2w0−1 possibilities for the expression |[di−1−di, di−2−di−1, . . . , dt−1−dt]2|,
each of which occurs with the same probability. Consequently, we conclude that if the next
state is not b1, then we have Xn+1 = b2 in
2w0−2(1+w1)
2w0−1 =
1+w1
2 of the cases (namely if
|[di−1 − di, di−2 − di−1, . . . , dt−1 − dt]2| ≤ 2w0−1(1 + w1) − 1 is fulfilled), and we have
Xn+1 = b3 in the remaining cases, that is 1−w12 . Thus, we have proved
Pr (Xn+1 = b2|Xn) = (1− Pr(Xn+1 = b1|Xn))
(
1 + w1
2
)
and (7.5)
Pr (Xn+1 = b3|Xn) = (1− Pr(Xn+1 = b1|Xn))
(
1− w1
2
)
(7.6)
From (7.2), (7.3), (7.5), (7.5), and (7.6) we conclude that the random process is a Markov
chain with transition matrix:
b1 b2 b3
b1
1
2
1+w1
4
1−w1
4
b2
1
2
1+w1
4
1−w1
4
b3 0 1+w12
1−w1
2
As w1 < 1 holds, the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, and its stationary
distribution can be easily determined as
pi =
(
pi(b1) =
1 + w1
3 + w1
, pi(b2) =
1 + w1
3 + w1
, pi(b3) =
1− w1
3 + w1
)
.
The non-zero density of this form is hence
pi(b2) + pi(b3)
pi(b1)l(b1) + pi(b2)l(b2) + pi(b3)l(b3)
,
where l(x) stands for the length of the block x. That is: 1w0+w1+1 =
1
w+1 . uunionsq
Note that a similar proof can be constructed to show that the non-zero density of Frac-
wNAF is exactly the same as for Frac-wMOF [SSST06]. Moreover, the three states of the
Markov process are different, but their mutual dependencies are identical. This supports
our claim that wMOF and wNAF are dual to each other.
Remark 7.1 Although Theorem 7.1 as well as Theorem 6.4 is only of asymptotic nature,
experimental results published in Okeya et al. [OSSST04b] indicate that for all values
of cryptographic relevance the provided asymptotic terms reflect the measured real-life
values quite accurate3.
3The data given in [OSSST04b] refers to wMOF, but from the generation of Frac-wMOF it is clear that
the same conclusion can be drawn for the fractional variant.
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7.3 Comparison
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of the comparison of the standard
wMOF methods with its extended fractional version:
Theorem 7.2 The fractional wMOF method coincide with its original versions for integer
widths (i. e., w1 = 0).
Let us now compare the fractional methods with the sliding window method applied to
the NAF of the scalar d (NAF+SW). The following theorem is proved in Schmidt-Samoa
et al. [SSST06]:
Theorem 7.3 Regarding the number of precomputed elements and the non-zero density,
the sliding window method with width v applied to NAF is equivalent to the fractional
wNAF resp. wMOF with width w = v +
(
2v−2+(−1)v+1
3
1
2v−2
)
.
We hence showed that the fractional window schemes are much more flexible than the
other methods (standard wNAF resp. wMOF, NAF+SW), in the sense that they allow
any sizes of precomputed tables. And we proved that they are as efficient as the preceding
methods: in the cases where they use tables of the same sizes as standard wNAF, standard
wMOF, or NAF+SW, they achieve the same non-zero density. This result is illustrated
by Fig. 7.2.
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0  20  40  60  80  100
n
o
n
-z
e
ro
 d
en
sit
y
table size
fractional methods
n
o
n
-z
e
ro
 d
en
sit
y
wNAF or wMOF
n
o
n
-z
e
ro
 d
en
sit
y
NAF+SW
Figure 7.2: Non-zero density and allowed sizes for the precomputed table
Note that in contrast to Fig. 7.1, the gaps between the table sizes are filled now thanks to
the fractional methods.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed the fractional wMOF (Frac-wMOF) method for computing
scalar multiplications in elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC). Frac-wMOF is a left-to-right
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analogue to the fractional wNAF (Frac-wNAF) method. This duality is also highlighted
by the observation that both recoding schemes can be modeled as a Markov chain with
the same transition matrix. Therefore we used Markov theory to analyze the asymptotic
behavior of Frac-wMOF.
We indeed proved that the proposed Frac-wMOF has the same non-zero density as
Frac-wNAF using identical table sizes. In addition, our analysis enabled the comparison
of the fractional schemes with previously known efficient window methods for EC scalar
multiplication. We were able to prove that the main properties of all these methods can
be achieved as a special instances of fractional wMOF resp. wNAF.
With Frac-wMOF recoding, the whole scalar multiplication can be processed left-to-
right, hence requiring less working memory than the Frac-wNAF approach. As a demon-
stration, we constructed an on-the-fly algorithm for EC scalar multiplication. Since recent
results additionally show that Frac-wMOF recoding provides the minimal Hamming weight
among all schemes using the same table4, we believe that Frac-wMOF is indeed the opti-
mal universally applicable base 2-representation for performing EC scalar multiplications
in limited constraint devices.
4Actually, this result is proved for an even larger table including the even elements, too.
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